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FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER UNION CONSTITUTIONS
AFTER WOODDELL
JAMES

I.

E. PFANDER*

INTRODUCTION

For the first half of this century, the task of policing the internal affairs of labor organizations fell, essentially by default, to
state court judges.' State courts based their authority to inter* Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law; B.A.
1978, University of Missouri; J.D. 1982, University of Virginia. I wish both to
thank and to absolve Don Dripps, Kit Kinports, Martin H. Malin, Thomas M.
Mengler, Laurie Mikva and Clyde W. Summers (for comments on earlier drafts),
Jim Piper, Lee Reichert and Tony Rodriguez (for research assistance) and the
University of Illinois (for research support).
1. The state courts' initial reluctance to hear disputes arising from the internal workings of labor unions stemmed from the fact that unions were typically
organized as voluntary associations. At common law, such associations were
said to lack any legal personality apart from their members, and thus lacked the
capacity to sue and to enter into contracts. See FREDERICK H. BACON, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF BENEFIT SOCIETIES AND INCIDENTALLY OF LIFE INSURANCE § 27
(1888); EDWARD M. DANGEL & IRENE SHRIBER, THE LAW OF LABOR UNIONS § 286
(1941); EDWIN STACEY OAKES, THE LAW OF ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL
CONFLICTS § 108 (1927). As a consequence, voluntary associations were often
frustrated in their attempts to obtain judicial recognition of their internal proceedings. In refusing to order a local body to forfeit its property to the parent in
keeping with the parent constitution, for example, the New York Court of Appeals explained that the "courts ofjustice cannot be called upon to aid in enforcing the decrees of these self-created judicatories." Austin v. Searing, 16 N.Y.
112, 125 (1857); see also Bauer v. Sampson Lodge, No. 32, Knights of Pythias, 1
N.E. 571 (Ind. 1885) (mutual benefit society could establish internal regulations
but could not deprive members of existing rights); Goodman v. Jedidjah Lodge,
9 A. 13 (Md. 1887) (district grand lodge and minority members could not force
forfeiture of local lodge funds).
Similarly, common law courts expressed reluctance to review the merits of
decisions to expel a member. See, e.g., Black & White-Smiths' Soc'y v. Vandyke,
2 Whart. 309 (Pa. 1837). The rhetoric of nonintervention was suspended, however, in cases where a member's property rights were at stake. In such cases, the
court was to "look so far into the case as to satisfy itself that there was not a
capricious or arbitrary exercise of the power." BACON, supra, § 107. Eventually
state courts worked out property and contract theories that enabled them to
intervene more frankly in union affairs. For a discussion of these theories, see
infra notes 3-6.

(443)
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vene upon the unions' written constitutions, 2 which were said to
establish contractual relationships among the unions' constituents.3 Relying on contract theory and the law's traditional reluctance to countenance a forfeiture of property, 4 state courts
2. On the origins and evolution of union self-government, I have found
Theodore Glocker's work quite helpful, both for its discussion of the factors that
led to greater centralization within early national unions and for its description
of how unions borrowed from a host of sources, including fraternal orders and
British trade unions, in structuring early constitutions. See Theodore W.
Glocker, The Government of American Trade Unions, in JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (Series XXXI No. 2, 1913).
Lloyd Ulman's classic work extends Glocker's analysis by considering more explicitly the factors that contributed to national union domination and by testing
the hypothesis that the locus of product market competition played a decisive
role in the tendency towards centralization. See LLOYD ULMAN, THE RISE OF THE
NATIONAL TRADE UNION:
TURE,

THE DEVELOPMENT AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ITS STRUC-

GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC POLICIES (1955) [hereinafter

ULMAN, NATIONAL UNION]. For more general treatments of union structure and
government, see HARRY A. MILLIS & ROYAL E. MONTGOMERY, ORGANIZED LABOR
(1945);JAMES WALLIHAN, UNION GOVERNMENT AND ORGANIZATION IN THE UNITED

STATES (1985). In addition to these works, the Twentieth Century Fund series
on union structure and government teaches the important lesson that, although

union constitutions have much in common, they are less the instruments of parental control than the sum of the history, traditions and economic imperatives
that shaped each union's growth and development. See MORRIS A. HOROWITZ,
THE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE CARPENTERS' UNION (1962); MELVIN
ROTHBAUM, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE OIL, CHEMICAL, AND ATOMIC WORKERS

UNION (1962), LLOYD ULMAN, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STEEL WORKERS' UNION
(1962) [hereinafter ULMAN, STEEL WORKERS].
3. The language of an early Pennsylvania decision illustrates the contractual approach of the courts: "[E]ach member pledges himself to obey these laws
as a condition of his membership, by an express undertaking in signing the constitution and his promise to support the constitution and by-laws as a brotherly
member." St. Mary's Beneficial Soc'y v. Burford's Adm'r, 70 Pa. 321, 324

(1872); see also Polin v. Kaplan, 177 N.E. 833, 834 (N.Y. 1931) (stating that constitution and by-laws of unincorporated association constitute contract that sets
forth privileges and rights of members); BACON, supra note 1, § 91 (articles of
association set forth rights of members in incorporated or unincorporated societies); OAKES, supra note 1, § 9 (stating that "[t]he constitution, rules and by-laws
of an unincorporated union . . . constitute a contract between the members
themselves and between the association and the individual members"). For a
relatively modern restatement of the contract theory, see DANGEL & SHRIBER,

supra note 1, § 138.
4. As the leading British case explained, judicial review of a member's expulsion depended on the court's finding a "right of property vested in the member of the society, and of which he is unjustly deprived by such unlawful
expulsion." Rigby v. Connol, 14 L.R.-Ch. D. 482, 487 (1880). The judicial focus on the existence of property rights enabled the courts to distinguish commercial associations from those where the relationship was purely personal or
fraternal. Thus, treatise writers distinguished a member's wholly personal interest in a neighborhood bridge group, say, from the mixed interests in a beneficial
society, whose members expected both conviviality and life insurance. See BACON, supra note 1, §§ 73, 105; Jerre S. Williams, The Political Liberties of Labor
Union Members, 32 TEX. L. REV. 826, 828-29 (1954).
Recognition of the importance of property interests as a source of judicial
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developed common law rules that protected individual union
members from unfair discipline. 5 The courts also respected
intervention suggests that those who developed structural reforms associated
with the rise of the national labor union in the latter half of the 19th century may
have unconsciously supplied the basis for judicial intervention into the union's
internal affairs. Labor historians credit Adolph Strasser and Samuel Gompers,
early leaders of the Cigar Makers' Union, with having developed the first modern national trade union. See SELIG PERLMAN, A HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM IN
THE UNITED STATES 75, 78-79 (1929). Building on the model of the British trade
union system, the Cigar Makers' 1879 convention approved constitutional
amendments that provided for centralized national control of local unions,
higher dues, and a system of illness and death benefits. See JOSEPH G. RAYBACK,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR 155-56 (1959). Such beneficial provisions encouraged workers to join the union initially, to maintain their membership during lean times and to obey the union's laws for fear of being expelled and losing
benefits. Gompers later claimed that with these beneficial programs, national
unions displayed a "stability and permanency" in the face of industrial crises
that had decimated their predecessors. See MILLIS & MONTGOMERY, supra note 2,
at 55-74. Such beneficial programs also supplied the property interests that led
state courts to adopt a more interventionist posture.
5. The law of internal union affairs owes much to its leading student, Professor Clyde Summers. In a series of important articles that predated the passage of federal legislation, Professor Summers managed both to describe the law
of union discipline and to shape its development with a strong call for union
democracy. See Clyde Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 483 (1950); Clyde Summers, DisciplinaryProceduresof Unions, 4 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 15 (1950) [hereinafter Summers, DisciplinaryProceduresof Unions];
Clyde W. Summers, Union Powers and Workers' Rights, 49 MICH. L. REV. 805
(1951); Clyde W. Summers, The Usefulness of Law in Achieving Union Democracy, 48
AM. EcON. REV. 44 (1958). Following the passage of the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988) [hereinafter
LMRDA], which owed a great deal to his early work, Professor Summers published a series of additional articles that explored the new law and its impact on
existing common law protections. See Clyde W. Summers, The Impact of LandrumGriffin in State Courts, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY THIRTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR (Emanuel Stein, ed., 1960) [hereinafter Summers,
State Courts]; Clyde W. Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in
Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175 (1960); Clyde W. Summers, Pre-Emption and the Labor Reform Act-Dual Rights and Dual Remedies, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 119 (1961) [hereinafter
Summers, Pre-Emption]; Clyde W. Summers,Judicial Regulation of Union Elections,
70 YALE LJ. 1221 (1961); Clyde W. Summers, American Legislationfor Union Democracy, 25 MOD. L. REV. 273 (1962) [hereinafter Summers, American Legislation].
While the conclusions I reach here differ from those of Professor Summers, my
approach has been deeply influenced by his work.
Among his other works, Professor Summers has carefully explained and
thoughtfully criticized the theoretical bases of common law intervention in internal union affairs. See Clyde W. Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64
HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1051-58 (1951) [hereinafter Summers, Legal Limitations]
(describing and evaluating state courts' use of property rights and contract theory in resolving union disciplinary disputes); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Internal
Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993, 999-1010 (1930) (discussing property rights, contract theory and tort theory as frequent bases for
resolution of union member claims); Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of
Actions of PrivateAssociations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 983, 998-1004 (1963) (discussing
historical use of property, contract and fiduciary theories to resolve disputes involving associations). As Professor Summers points out, state courts based their
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union rules that had been framed to protect the union from the
actions of members, officers and various factions that would un6
dermine the organization's effectiveness.
power to intervene either on the claim that members had a property interest in
their union membership that deserved judicial protection, or on the claim that
their relationship with the union established an enforceable contract. For a discussion of these theories, see supra notes 3-4. See generally Summers, Legal Limitations, supra, at 1051-56. For a summary of state legislative developments, see
Benjamin Aaron & Michael I. Komaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs-I,44 ILL. L. REV. 425, 451-62 (1949).
Neither theory has fared well at the hands of the commentators. The property theory runs afoul of the proposition that a member has only the most circumscribed rights in the association's property, such as the right of joint use of
the association's property and the right to share in any surplus in the case of
dissolution. As Summers points out, the member cannot transfer his or her interest in the property and his or her claim to a share of the assets upon dissolution may be overridden by the claim of the parent union. Summers, Legal
Limitations, supra, at 1052. Such speculative property interests provide little substantial basis for judicial intervention. Id.; see also Chafee, supra, at 999-1000.
Moreover, in many cases where severe injury results from expulsion, the member cannot establish the existence of any property interest. Id. at 1000-01 (criticizing Rigby v. Connol, 14 L.R.-Ch. D. 482 (1880), which held that a union
member had no property right in union membership); Developments in the Law,
supra, at 1000-01 (describing inconsistency and inadequacy of use of property
right theory). In any case, courts do not limit relief to the extent of the member's property interest but will order full reinstatement to rights of membership.
Summers, Legal Limitations, supra, at 1053-54 (fashioning broad relief in cases
where little property at stake reveals that courts use property as excuse for intervention to protect membership relationship). For a critique of the courts' use of
contract theory, see infra note 35 and accompanying text.
6. The willingness of common law courts to hold members or factions responsible for violation of the association's rules dates from early in the 19th
century. In Lloyd v. Loaring, 31 Eng. Rep. 1302 (1802), Lord Eldon entertained
an action on behalf of the Free Masons to recover association property. The
court was plainly uncomfortable with agreeing to "sit upon the concerns of an
association, which in law has no existence," but nonetheless felt obliged to grant
relief. Id. at 1305.
In this century, courts have frequently been asked by banks and other stakeholders to resolve the claims of competing factions to the property and assets of
the association. See, e.g., Tile, Marble, Terrazzo Finishers, Int'l Union v. Tile,
Marble, Terrazzo Finishers, Local 32, 896 F.2d 1404, 1416 (3d Cir. 1990) (dispute between trustee of parent union and dissolved local union members over
property right to union dues); General Elec. Co. v. Emspak, 94 F. Supp. 601
(S.D.N.Y. 1950) (employer seeking to determine title to checked off union dues).
Pressure to resolve such disputes pushed courts to recognize and give effect to
union constitutions, which often contained provisions to address the disposition
of assets in the case of schism. See Clyde W. Summers, Union Schism in Perspective:
Flexible Doctrines, Double Standards, and ProjectedAnswers, 45 VA. L. REV. 261, 265-66
nn.21-25 (1959); Donald H. Wollett & Robert J. Lampman, The Law of Union
Factionalism-The Case of the Sailors, 4 STAN. L. REV. 177 (1952). A similar form of
implicit legal recognition was accorded labor unions in decisions that upheld the
conviction of former officers for embezzling association funds. Chief Justice
Taft drew upon such developments in arguing that the law's willingness to protect labor organizations justified holding them liable for claims for damages
under the federal antitrust laws. See United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal
Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922); cf. T. Richard Witmer, Trade Union Liability: The Prob-
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The federal courts began, in the early 1960s, to hear disputes
over the meaning of union constitutions, 7 basing jurisdiction on
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act of 1947 [hereinafter Taft-Hartley Act]. 8 In United Ass 'n ofJourneymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Industry v. Local 334,
United Ass 'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing and Pipe Fitting
Industry [hereinafter Local 334],9 the Supreme Court approved of
the exercise of federal control over the meaning of union constitutions. Borrowing a theory already in use by state courts, the
Court held that actions brought by local unions to enforce national constitutions against parent unions were to be considered
"[s]uits for violation of contracts ... between any such labor organizations" within the meaning of section 301(a).' 0 The Court
also held, in keeping with principles developed in the disposition
of "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization" under section 301, that federal common law
lern of the UnincorporatedCorporation, 51 YALE L.J. 40, 42 n.9 (1941) (noting that
most state courts adhered to rule of associational nonliability in absence of statute). For a discussion of the general tendency of judges to respect balances
struck in institutional documents for want of any current alternative standard,
see Summers, State Courts, supra note 5, at 344-45.
7. For the factors that led the lower courts to assert § 301 jurisdiction over
disputes concerning the meaning of union constitutions, see infra notes 90-119
and accompanying text.
8. Section 301(a) provides as follows:
Suitsfor violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of
the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 301(a), 61 Stat. 156
(1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988)) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
Taft-Hartley Act].
Section 301 (a) has been the focus of much distinguished commentary, most
of it directed at the provision for jurisdiction over contracts between employers
and unions. For a summary of this commentary, see James E. Pfander, Judicial
Purpose and the Scholarly Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 69 WASH. U. L.Q 243, 28284 (1991). The statute's second clause, the italicized reference to contracts "between any such labor organizations," has attracted little attention in recent
years. For early arguments that the statute applied to no-raid agreements between rival unions, see Bernard D. Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State
JurisdictionOver Labor Relations: 11, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 297 (1959); Comment,
Applying the "Contracts Between Labor Organizations" Clause of Taft-Hartley Section 301:
A Plea For Restraint, 69 YALE L.J. 299 (1959). For a more recent attempt to make
sense of the enforcement of union constitutions under § 301 (a), see MARTIN H.
MALIN, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WITHIN THE UNION

4-14 (1988).

9. 452 U.S. 615 (1981).
10. Id. at 627 (emphasis omitted).
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governs suits within the scope of the jurisdictional grant.'"
Although the decision in Local 334 clearly upheld the assertion of federal power over the constitutional "contract" between
parent and local unions, it refrained from defining the scope of
section 30 I's application to other internal union relationships and
thus left in doubt the boundary between state and federal law.
Lower federal courts have struggled to define that boundary, at
least in part because Congress did not draft section 301 for the
purpose of authorizing federal courts to enforce union constitutions.' 2 Rather, Congress added the between-labor-organizations
provision to section 301 in order to permit federal courts to police a special group of agreements between rival national unions
over such matters as representational and jurisdictional
disputes. 3
While the absence of historical support for the result in Local
334 may explain the confusion, it did not relieve federal courts
from the task of defining the breadth of federal power.' 4 Unfor11. Id. (citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456
(1957)). This body of federal common law under § 301 operates to the exclusion of state law. While state courts retain concurrent jurisdiction over disputes
arising under § 301, they must apply federal law. See Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) (noting that state courts must
apply federal law to cases arising under § 301); Charles Dowd Box Co. v.
Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962) (affirming state court jurisdiction over § 301
cases). The displacement of state law extends beyond the power to develop contract rules; recent decisions of the Supreme Court establish that the uniquely
potent preemptive force of § 301 also displaces state tort claims that shape or
redefine the rights and obligations of contracting parties. See, e.g., Allis-Chambers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (displacing state law tort claim for bad
faith breach of collective agreement). In addition, state courts lose their power
to pass on the preemption question in the first instance. Rather than asserting a
preemption defense in state court, § 301 defendants may remove actions to federal court and present preemption defenses to federal judges. See Avco Corp. v.
Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968); 13B
CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3581 (1984).
12. For a summary of lower court disagreements, see infra notes 116-19,
143-46 and accompanying text. For the history of § 301, see infra notes 57-78
and accompanying text.
13. A review of the historical record reveals that the Taft-Hartley Congress
enacted the § 301(a) between-labor-organizations clause to authorize enforcement of such inter-union agreements as those Professor John Dunlop described
in his classic article on union structure. See John T. Dunlop, Structural Changes in
the American Labor Movement and Industrial Relations System, in LABOR AND TRADE
UNIONISM: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER (Walter Galenson & Seymour M. Lip-

set eds., 1960). The article, however, focuses solely on the statute's proper application to union constitutions. The article thus discusses inter-union contracts
only insofar as they inform the application of the statute to internal union disputes and does not attempt to develop an exhaustive list of the kinds of agreements between unions that might satisfy § 301(a). Id.
14. The federal courts have generally extended the rules of § 301 preemp-
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tunately, the ambiguity of section 301's open-ended reference to
contracts between labor unions complicated the definitional task.
Under the contract theory relied upon by the Court in Local 334,
union constitutions establish contractual relationships between
parent and local, between union and member, between union and
officer and among the members themselves.1 5 Lower courts
could choose either to evaluate each such contract on its own
terms (and thus limit federal power to suits arising from the parent-local contract) or to treat all of the contracts as byproducts of
the jurisdictionally sufficient contract between the parent and locals (and thus extend federal control over all aspects of internal
union affairs).
After the lower courts struggled with these questions for ten
years,' 6 the Supreme Court resolved a split in the circuits on the
scope of section 301 in a decision that some observers may read
as finally displacing all remaining vestiges of state control with
uniform federal law. In Wooddell v. InternationalBrotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 71,17 the Court squarely held that the federal
courts may exercise section 301 jurisdiction over an individual
member's claim that his local union violated obligations it had
assumed under the national union constitution.' 8 The Court took
pains to base its assertion of jurisdiction on the fact that Wooddell's claim implicated not only a union constitution, but also a
provision in the constitution that specifically regulated the parent-local relationship. Lower courts may overlook the implications of Wooddell's carefully circumscribed opinion, however, and
cite it in support of a much broader assertion of federal power.
Indeed, the recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Shea v. McCarthy 19 relied on Wooddell in asserting
tion and removal to disputes over the union constitution under the statute's second clause. See, e.g., DeSantiago v. Laborers Int'l Union, Local No. 1140, 914
F.2d 125, 128-29 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that alleged violations of fair treatment and representation guarantees under union constitution was properly a
federal question); Pruitt v. Carpenters' Local Union No. 225, 893 F.2d 1216,
1219 (11 th Cir. 1990) (finding that suits for contract violation, including union
constitution violation, are preempted by federal law). Disagreement over the
scope of § 301(a) thus entails disagreement about the application of state or
federal law to a particular internal union dispute.
15. For a discussion of the use of contract theory in disputes regarding
union constitutions, see infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the division of lower federal court authority, see
infra notes 116-19, 143-46 and accompanying text.
17. 112 S. Ct. 494, 498 (1991).
18. Id. at 498-501.
19. 953 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992).
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section 301 jurisdiction over an individual member's action that
charged national officers of the Teamsters union with a breach of
their duty to the union.
This Article argues that such an expansive view of section
301 makes no historical, doctrinal or practical sense. It suggests
instead that section 301 should be read to confer jurisdiction on
the federal courts to hear only those claims that implicate the parent-local relationship, a limited view of federal power which certainly remains viable after Wooddell. Equally important, the more
limited view of section 301 proposed here will enable the federal
courts to ensure the vindication of federal interests without requiring federal resolution of internal union disputes that lie
within the traditional competence of state courts.
Part II of the Article reviews the history of section 301's between-labor-organizations clause, a history that reveals two salient facts. First, this clause was added to section 301 to authorize
federal courts to enforce types of labor contracts that are quite
different from union constitutions. Second, the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 [hereinafter
LMRDA] 20 played a central role in the federal courts' essentially
opportunistic decision to interpret section 301(a) as applying to
union constitutions. Before 1959, federal judges largely refused
the invitation to treat the union constitution as a contract between
labor organizations within section 301(a). After the LMRDA
transferred litigation over internal union affairs into their bailiwick, federal courts found it convenient to use the earlier statute
as a way to hear related claims for breach of the union constitution-claims that federal courts would hear today by invoking
2
their supplemental jurisdiction over pendent claims. '
Despite the influence of the subsequently enacted statute, the
Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to acknowledge or assess
the legitimacy of the LMRDA's role in the evolving interpretation
of section 301(a). As Part III of the Article shows, the Court
based its decisions in both Local 334 and Wooddell on the historically dubious claim that section 301's second clause unambiguously applies to the union constitution. In both cases, the Court
dismissed the LMRDA as irrelevant to its interpretive task, 2 2 no
20. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-

531 (1988)).

21. For a discussion of the judicial use of the LMRDA in the interpretation
of § 301(a), see infra notes 90-119 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the Court's treatment of the LMRDA in Local 334
and Wooddell, see infra notes 126 and 162, respectively, and accompanying text.
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doubt because the statute expressly preserves the state courts'
23
traditional control of actions to enforce union constitutions.
Unfortunately, the Court's dismissal of the LMRDA deprives the
federal courts of an important source of guidance as they attempt
to work out the body of federal common law that section 301
obliges them to fashion.
Part IV of the Article seeks to develop a theory of federal
power that explicitly acknowledges the LMRDA's influence in section 301(a)'s evolving interpretation. Part IV suggests that the
LMRDA's regulatory approach to the relationship between the
parent union and its subordinate bodies differs in important respects from the statute's approach to other relationships in the
union constitution. Part IV builds on this demonstration by suggesting that the federal courts should interpret section 3 01(a) to
embrace only the constitutional relationship between parent and
local. 24 Such an approach would leave to state courts the primary
responsibility for the constitutional relationship between the
union as an entity and its individual officers and members, in
keeping with the evident meaning of the non-preemption provisions in the LMRDA.
Part IV of the Article next considers the practical implications of limiting federal power to the parent-local relationship in
the wake of Wooddell. It begins by showing that Wooddell contains
nothing inconsistent with, and much that supports, the limitation
on federal power proposed herein. Properly understood, indeed,
Wooddell stands for the entirely uncontroversial proposition that
section 301 jurisdiction depends not on the identity of the claimant but on the nature of the contract at issue in the dispute.2 5 It is
thus perfectly compatible with an interpretation of section 301
that leaves actions to enforce constitutional relationships other
than those between parent and local unions in the hands of state
judges.
Finally, Part IV shows that practical considerations argue in
favor of the retention of state court authority over such actions as
those brought by unions to collect fines and assessments from delinquent members and those that involve the employment relations between unions and officers. Such claims represent a
23. For a discussion of the LMRDA arid union constitutions, see infra notes
175-204 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of this suggested course of action see infra notes 205-

19 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of the limited nature of the Wooddell Court's holding,
see infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
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serious threat to the federal docket and lie well beyond any federal interest defined by the LMRDA. 2 6 They also make up the
class of claims that many federal courts have attempted to avoid
hearing, on one ground or another. 27 The approach proposed in
this Article would enable the federal courts to avoid such marginal claims without requiring them to adopt doctrinally suspect
avoidance techniques that cloud jurisdictional lines.
Apart from its practical merits, the proposed approach limits
the federal role in the enforcement of the union constitution
within the bounds of legitimacy supplied by the LMRDA. 2 8 To be
26. In his year-end report on the federal judiciary, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist sounded familiar themes in expressing concern about federal judicial
resources. See The Chief on the Judiciary:Less is More, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 6, 1992, at
6, 6-7. Opposed to the addition of more judges, the Chief Justice called for
some curtailment of federal jurisdiction and for "self-restraint in adding new
causes of action." Id. New additions to the federal docket, he argued, should
not be made unless they apply to disputes that implicate some important national interest that cannot otherwise be addressed by non-judicial solutions or
by the state courts. Id.
In deciding whether to assert § 301 jurisdiction over internal union disputes, federal courts face a question about the addition of claims to the federal
docket to which the ChiefJustice's criteria sensibly apply. This Article suggests
that the federal interest in the enforcement of union constitutions extends only
to those disputes concerning provisions in a national union constitution that
regulate the parent-local relationship. Other disputes not only fail to implicate
any federal interest, they also fall within the traditional competence of state
courts.
27. The history of federal jurisdiction over union constitutions has been
punctuated by a series of tactics adopted by courts to avoid hearing disputes
regarded as insignificant. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, federal courts took
the position that they had no obligation to hear a constitutional claim unless it
arose from an internal dispute that threatened a "significant impact" on industrial relations. For a discussion of the use of the "significant impact" test, see
infra notes 110-19 and accompanying text. Although the Supreme Court's rejected that limitation in its first decision in this area, the "significant impact" test
reappeared in recent decisions of the lower federal courts. For a discussion of
the Supreme Court's rejection of the "significant impact" test, see infra notes
120-42 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the continued use of the
"significant impact" test, see infra notes 274-77 and accompanying text. Other
recent decisions adopt equally dubious tactics to refrain from hearing constitutional claims. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's struggle to avoid "internal
squabbles," see infra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
28. Judge Posner recently issued a frank call for the consideration of matters pragmatic or consequentialist in the interpretation of statutes. See RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 269-309 (1990). Along the way,
he expresses disagreement with virtually every other approach, from the reliance
on originalism ofJustice Scalia and Judge Robert Bork, to the deep textual skepticism of the deconstructionists. Id. at 287-99, 305-07; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990) (criticizing Justice
Scalia and Judge Easterbrook for excessive reliance on statutory texts); Owen M.
Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER 229 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988) (criticizing textual indeterminists).
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sure, Congress cannot be said to have approved the judicial role
through its passage of section 301(a). But Congress certainly
took the relationships between the parent and local bodies closely
in hand during its consideration of the LMRDA by establishing
general statutory guidelines and authorizing courts to develop a
body of federal common law to govern the relationship. It does
not require too dynamic a feat of statutory interpretation 29 to
conclude, as this Article does, that the LMRDA supplies sufficient
federal content to justify a properly limited federal role in the enforcement of union constitutions under section 301(a)'s second
clause.
II.

THE JUDICIAL TRANSFORMATION OF SECTION

301(a)

During the 1950s, the federal courts reached a broad consensus that section 301 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act left the state courts
in control of actions to enforce union constitutions. 30 The con29. Professor Eskridge expressly argued for the application of a dynamic
theory of statutory interpretation that takes into account more than merely the
original understanding of the statute as it emerges from a review of text and
history. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1479 (1987). His understanding of the dynamic interpretive process somewhat resembles Posner's pragmatism in that he takes account of the current legal
landscape in deciding what meaning to ascribe to a text that may have been
enacted in response to the concerns of a different time. Id. at 1554-55. Eskridge's approach also owes something to the purposive interpretive model of
the legal process school. Id. at 1544-49; see HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION
OF LAW 1201 (tent. ed. 1958).

Although Eskridge does not treat a case similar to that at issue in this Article, his dynamic approach offers support for my conclusion that federal courts
simply cannot make sense of the application of § 301(a)'s second clause to union
constitutions without taking account of the LMRDA. My approach should present fewer countermajoritarian concerns than a more vigorously dynamic approach because it argues for an updated version of § 301 (a) that ultimately rests
on legislative choices embedded in the LMRDA.
30. See, e.g., Adams v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 262 F.2d 835,
838 (10th Cir. 1958) (stating that § 301 limited to suits between employer and
labor union or suits between labor unions-not suits between labor unions and
members); Murphy v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union, 102 F. Supp.
488, 490-92 (E.D. Mich. 1951) (finding effect of § 301 was not to vest general
jurisdiction in federal courts for suits by or against labor unions); Sun Shipbuilding & Dry-Dock Co. v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 95 F.
Supp. 50, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (same); Snoots v. Vejlupek, 87 F. Supp. 503, 504
(N.D. Ohio 1949) (same); Kriss v. White, 87 F. Supp. 734, 735 (N.D.N.Y. 1949)
(same); cf. Burlesque Artists Ass'n v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 187 F.
Supp. 393, 394-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (upholding § 301 jurisdiction over claim for
violation of union constitution on suit between labor unions); Local 2608, Lumber and Sawmill Workers, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Millmen's Local 1495,
United Bhd. of Carpenters, 169 F. Supp. 765, 767-68 (N.D. Cal. 1958) (same;
analogizing dispute between constituent locals of the Carpenters' Union to one
between national unions); Local 1104, United Elec. Workers v. Wagner Elec.
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sensus began to unravel in 1959, following the passage of the
LMRDA, as the lower federal courts increasingly held that the
Taft-Hartley Act authorized them to hear disputes over the meaning of union constitutions. By the time the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Local 334, a decisive majority of federal appellate courts had held that the between-labor-organizations
clause-the second clause of section 301 (a)-embraced actions to
3
enforce the union constitution, at least in some circumstances. '
In tracing the judicial transformation of section 301(a)'s second clause, this part of the Article begins by showing that the
early consensus was well grounded in the language, structure and
history of the Taft-Hartley Act. This part next demonstrates that
courts in the 1960s abandoned this understanding of section
301 (a), not because they uncovered historical support for a different reading of the Taft-Hartley Act, but because the passage of
the LMRDA in 1959 obliged them, for the first time, to resolve
Corp., 109 F. Supp. 675, 683-85 (E.D. Mo. 1951) (asserting § 301 jurisdiction
over action to enforce collective bargaining agreement and dispute over union
constitution).
31. At the time of the Court's decision to hear the Local 334 case, the
United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits had held that § 301(a)'s second clause embraced suits
to enforce union constitutions, at least where the dispute had a significant impact on industrial relations. See Local 334, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Indus. v. United Ass'n of Journeymen &
Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Indus., 628 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1980),
rev'd, 452 U.S. 615 (1981) [hereinafter Local 334]; Alexander v. International
Union of Operating Eng'rs, 624 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980); Studio Elec. Technicians Local 728 v. International Photographers of Motion Picture Indus., Local
659, 598 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1979); Stelling v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union No. 1547, 587 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
944 (1979); Local Union No. 657 of United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Sidell, 552
F.2d 1250 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 862 (1977); Local Union 1219, United
Bhd. of Carpenters v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 493 F.2d 93 (1st Cir. 1974);
Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234 (2d Cir. 1970); Parks v. International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963).
In its only opportunity to explore the question, the District of Columbia Circuit
appeared to accept the possibility that disputes over the union constitution
could satisfy the jurisdictional test of § 301, but refrained from answering the
question directly by concluding that the case before it failed to present any such
impact. See 1199 DC, Nat'l Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees v. National Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees, 533 F.2d 1205, 1208 & n.l
(D.C. Cir. 1976). Only the Sixth and Tenth Circuits refused to assert jurisdiction over the union constitution. See Trail v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
542 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1976) (refusing to assert jurisdiction over individual
union member's action to enforce the union constitution); Smith v. United Mine
Workers, 493 F.2d 1241 (10th Cir. 1974) (refusing to assert jurisdiction over
challenge to order of parent union directing merger of subordinate bodies); Adams v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 262 F.2d 835, 838 (10th Cir. 1958)
(no jurisdiction over action brought by individuals to enforce union
constitution).
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disputes over internal union affairs that had been previously litigated in state court.
A.

The Language of Section 301(a) and the Structure of Labor Unions

Although section 301(a)'s reference to "contracts . . . between any ...labor organizations " 32 may appear literally to apply
to the union constitution,3 3 a brief review of the structure and
government of the modern American trade union weakens such
32. Taft-Hartley Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988).
33. After all, the union constitution has been regarded as a contractually
binding instrument for much of this century. For a discussion of this contract
theory, see supra note 3. Moreover, at least certain provisions of the union constitution regulate the relationships between the parent union and its affiliated
locals. If the parent and the local both satisfy the definition of "labor organization" in the statute, their constitutional relationship would appear to establish
quite literally a contract "between labor organizations." The statute defines "labor organization" quite broadly to include any committee or group that exists,
even in part, for the purpose of dealing with employers on industrial concerns.
See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5). Parent and local unions plainly fit that definition. They
also appear to satisfy the requirement, imposed by § 301(a)'s use of the term
"such labor organizations," that they "represent[]" employees in an industry affecting commerce. Id. § 185(a). For the text of § 301(a), see supra note 8.
One might propose to define this "representation" requirement by reference to provisions that specify that the labor organization selected by the employees shall be their exclusive representative for purposes of collective
bargaining. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). Such a reading might suggest that, before
asserting § 301 jurisdiction, the court should determine whether the parent and
the local both formally serve as the designated representative of employees.
Such a preliminary inquiry might preclude the assertion ofjurisdiction over constitutions in unions where the parent or the local (but not both) acts as the designated representative of employees.
The argument for a threshold inquiry into the union's status as a "representative" of employees runs headlong into Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local Unions
Nos. 128 & 633 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962). In Retail Clerks, an
action to enforce a strike settlement agreement between an employer and a
union, the Supreme Court rejected a similar argument that would have allowed
the employer to challenge the scope of § 301 jurisdiction by denying that the
union in the particular case had retained its representation status. Id. at 28-29.
The Retail Clerks result sensibly avoids complicating the jurisdictional inquiry
and enjoys the support of a legislative record that reflects a desire for a broad,
rather than restrictive, reading of the statute's commerce test for representation.
See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1947), reprinted in 1
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947,
at 505, 570 (1948) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
Despite the holding in Retail Clerks, it remains somewhat incongruous to
view a parent and local body as separate labor organizations. Irrespective of
whether the parent or local formally serves as "representative," both bodies play
an important role in the provision of services to any particular bargaining unit of
employees. The unity of interest in discharging the representational function
was reflected in the Supreme Court's recent decision that an independent
union's decision to affiliate with an international did not raise serious doubts
concerning the independent's continuing status as the employees' statutory representative. See NLRB v. Financial Inst. Employees, Local 482, 475 U.S. 192

(1986).
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an interpretation. State courts have often used contract theory to
enforce the provisions of the union constitutions that govern the
internal relations of national and international labor unions, 3 4 but
the "contract" nonetheless lacks the elements of a bargained-for
exchange ordinarily associated with the term. 3 5 In most national
unions, the parent body exercises wide-ranging authority over the
affairs of the organization and often dictates the terms of the
union constitution that govern internal relationships. 3 6 This pa34. For a discussion of the use of contract theory, see supra note 3. The
term "international" describes labor unions with affiliated locals in both the
United States and Canada. See WALLIHAN, supra note 2, at 147-49. This Article
will use the terms national and international interchangeably.
35. The shortcomings of the contract theory have been explored at some
length by other writers. See Chafee, supra note 5, at 1001-07; Summers, Legal
Limitations, supra note 5, at 1054-56; Developments in the Law, supra note 5, at
100 1-02. The standard critique of using contract theory focuses on the absence
of any real bargaining between members and the union at the time the member
"accepts" the offer of membership. Summers, Legal Limitations, supra note 5, at
1055, 1055 n.30; Developments in the Law, supra note 5, at 1001. Moreover, it may
be difficult to identify the parties with whom the member has contracted. As
Chafee and Summers point out, the association itself may lack capacity to contract-a fact that forces the contractual court to find that the member entered
into an absurd number of contracts with the other individual members. Chafee,
supra note 5, at 1003; Summers, Legal Limitations, supra note 5 at 1055. Compare
OAKES, supra note 1, § 9, at 23 (stating that "[t]he constitution, rules, and bylaws of an unincorporated union, so far as they purport to give rights of a civil
nature, constitute a contract between the members themselves and between the
association and the individual members") with Chafee, supra note 5, at 1002-03
(finding that constitution of club with six hundred members would embody
179,700 separate contracts).
Even granting the existence of a contract, it may be difficult to identify its
terms. The international union retains the power to enact new by-laws and
amend constitutional provisions at its conventions. Courts have treated such
alterations of the "contract" as consistent with the member's agreement in advance to the adoption of reasonable by-laws. See, e.g., St. Mary's Beneficial Soc'y
v. Burford's Adm'r, 70 Pa. 321 (1872). This fictional advance-consent argument, however, "emphasizes the anomalous nature of the relationship." Summers, Legal Limitations, supra note 5, at 1055 n.31. Moreover, courts often hold
that provisions for member discipline cannot violate "natural justice," and
therefore hold that unions must provide the rudiments of due process, even
where no procedural protections appear in the constitution. Id. at 1058; Chafee,
supra note 5, at 1004.
Fictions in the hands of inexperienced jurists can produce awkward results.
See McClees v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 18 N.E.2d 812 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1938) (member's action against his union barred; law does not permit suit
against oneself); Harold J. Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARV. L. REV.
404, 420 (1916) (citing English decision in which member who consumed alcoholic beverage at private club was said not to have purchased beverage on theory that one cannot purchase item from oneself).
36. Commentators agree that the parent body exercises substantial control
over the affairs of the modern national labor union. See MILLIS & MONTGOMERY,
supra note 2, at 257; ULMAN, NATIONAL UNION, supra note 2, at 3-7; WALLIHAN,
supra note 2, at 139-40; Jack Barbash, Power and the Pattern of Union Government, 9
LAB. L.J. 628 (1958); George E. Barnett, The Dominance of the National Union in
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rental authority extends both to the terms that govern existing
constitutional relationships3 7 and to those that govern new local
union affiliates and their members.38 Thus, although union conAmerican Labor Organizations,27 O)J. ECON. 455 (1913); Sidney E. Cohn, The International and the Local Union, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY ELEVENTH
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 7, 7-14 (Emanuel Stein ed., 1958); Patricia
Eames, The Relationship Between Internationaland Local Unions, in PROCEEDINGS OF
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY FIFTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 23, 29 (Emanuel Stein ed., 1962); Glocker, supra note 2, at 96; William J. Isaacson, The Local
Union and the International,in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 493, 501-02 (Emanuel Stein ed., 1950); George
Rose, Relationship of the Local Union to the InternationalOrganization, 38 VA. L. REV.
843, 863-67 (1952). Such parental power frequently includes control over the
admission of new members, the use of the strike weapon, the disbursement of
strike benefits, the organizing and chartering of new local unions, and the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement.
Of course, one still observes differences in the degree of local union autonomy from union to union. Compare ROTHBAUM, supra note 2, at 13 (describing
reform movement that established rank and file oversight committee to monitor
administration of union) with ULMAN, STEEL WORKERS, supra note 2, at 14-19, 51
(describing extensive centralization of control in parent body over matters such
as strikes, finances and collective bargaining). See generally JACK BARBASH, LABOR
UNIONS IN ACTION: A STUDY OF THE MAINSPRINGS OF UNIONISM 53-54 (1948)
[hereinafter BARBASH, LABOR UNIONS IN ACTION] (explaining variation in degree
of centralized control by reference to such factors as locus of product market
competition, history of local union control and factionalism). For a careful consideration of the product market thesis, see ULMAN, NATIONAL UNION, supra note
2, at 156-200 (concluding that pattern of parental authority in national market
unions was similar to that in local market unions).
37. Parental control over the terms of existing relationships begins with the
wide array of explicit constitutional provisions that authorize the parent, acting
through national officials, to take a wide variety of actions that determine the
organization's destiny. For a discussion of the nature and scope of parental
union control, see infra notes 38, 41-44. Most observers agree that these explicit
sources actually understate the scope of parental authority. See MILLIS & MONTGOMERY, supra note 2, at 246, 256; Isaacson, supra note 36, at 499. National
officers typically preside over the convention-the body of delegates that many
unions vest with the power to elect officers and amend the union constitution,
see MILLIS & MONTGOMERY, supra note 2, at 254-and often exercise a good deal
of control over the appointment of members to the convention's committee on
constitutional amendments. See BARBASH, LABOR UNIONS IN ACTION, supra note
36, at 49-50; MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE RETAIL CLERKS 32-37 (1962); WALLIHAN, supra note 2, at 112-13. Most union constitutions further expand the extent of parental control by giving national officers or executive boards the power
to construe and interpret the union constitution. See Cohn, supra note 36, at 14.
38. In most unions, the parent (perhaps with the assistance of the AFLCIO) finances and controls most organizing activity. See, e.g., DEREK C. BOK &
JOHN T. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 140-50 (1970) (describing well-planned organizing campaign conducted by parent of Laborers' International Union to increase membership in local unions). Perhaps as a
consequence, the parent union often dictates the terms upon which the new local will join the parent, see WALLIHAN, supra note 2, at 26, and the rules that will
govern the local's internal affairs, see MALIN, supra note 8, at 12; Rose, supra note
36, at 868 & n.97. New members agree to accept the rights and obligations set
forth in the union constitution. In neither case do the parties actually bargain
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stitutions have been considered "contracts" for some purposes,
they actually bear little resemblance to the negotiated agreements
between parties of relatively equal bargaining strength to which
the reference to contracts in section 301(a) otherwise applies. 39
Even if they were properly described as contracts, albeit contracts of adhesion, 40 union constitutions do not govern the relationships "between labor organizations" as required by section
301 (a). The typical constitution governs relationships within, not
between, national labor organizations. 4' One might consider the
parent and subordinate units of a national union as separate labor
over the terms of their obligations. See Summers, Legal Limitations, supra note 5,
at 1055, 1055 n.30; Developments in the Law, supra note 5, at 1001.
39. Aside from union constitutions, the Supreme Court has applied § 301
to two kinds of labor contracts. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957) (collective bargaining agreements); Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local Unions Nos. 128 & 633 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962) (strike
settlement agreements). Both forms of agreement typically emerge from a period of negotiation and bear the signatures of the parties.
40. A vast literature explores what impact the absence of any real bargaining should have on the judicial attitude towards the enforcement of contracts of
adhesion. For a summary, see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 364-440 (4th ed. 1988). The evolution of
the state court protections for local unions and members in their enforcement of
union constitutions resembles in some respects the protections courts also developed for the consumers of contracts of adhesion such as policies of insurance.
Compare Summers, Legal Limitations, supra note 5, at 1058-84 (criticizing state
courts' use of covert tools of construction to protect dissident members from
anti-democratic union discipline) with Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV.
L. REV. 700, 702-03 (1939) (reviewing 0. PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW

(1937); noting that

in process of construing contracts, covert tools are never reliable tools).
41. The dominance of the national labor union in the structure of organized labor is widely recognized in the literature. See MILLIS & MONTGOMERY,
supra note 2, at 257-59; ALBERT REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 25
(1962); WALLIHAN, supra note 2, at 110-11, 152-56. It dates from the period of
the American Federation of Labor's (AFL) challenge to the Knights of Labor
during the 1880s-a challenge that succeeded in part because the AFL promised
to respect the autonomy and trade jurisdiction of national trade unions. For the
early history of the AFL, see MILLIS & MONTGOMERY, supra note 2, at 72-75;
PERLMAN, supra note 4, 112-29; RAYBACK, supra note 4, at 197-226. For the different tradition of international union autonomy in the Congress of Industrial

Organizations (CIO), see

BARBASH, LABOR UNIONS IN ACTION,

supra note 36, at

47-49. For a discussion of how the historical guarantee of autonomy continues
to influence the current relations between the AFL-CIO and its affiliates, see
Dunlop, supra note 13, at 102. For a more recent assessment, see BOK &
DUNLOP, supra note 38, at 189-206; WALLIHAN, supra note 2, at 152-56. Useful
explanations of the economic and other factors that contributed to the emergence of national labor unions in the latter half of the 19th century appear in the
works of Ulman and Glocker. See ULMAN, NATIONAL UNION, supra note 2; ULMAN,
STEEL WORKERS supra note 2; Glocker, supra note 2; see also Philip Taft, Collective
Bargaining Before the New Deal, in How COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WORKS 873-901
(1942).
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organizations for other purposes, but it would nevertheless be
difficult to describe the union constitution as a contract between
such organizations. 42 The union constitution allocates power between the parent union and the locals, 4 3 defines the powers of the
officers of both the parent and the locals, 44 provides for the day42. One might argue that the parent and local labor organizations must be
viewed as separate to protect the parent's treasury from liability resulting from
the acts of irresponsible locals. Certainly such an assumption of separateness
has informed such decisions as those that refuse to hold the parent vicariously
responsible for its locals' wildcat strikes and secondary boycotts. See, e.g., Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212 (1979) (absolving parent of
liability for local's breach of the no-strike clause; rejecting claim that parent
owed duty to take reasonable efforts to end strike). The rejection of vicarious
liability in such cases, however, was based on common law principles of agency
that the Taft-Hartley Act wrote into federal law in 1947. See id. at 216-17 (citing
rules of agency in § 301(b)). Parent unions need not define their locals as separate bodies for all internal purposes, in short, to escape wildcat liability for the
unauthorized activity of their members.
43. Most international union constitutions authorize the parent union, after
notice and some kind of a hearing, to suspend the charter of, or expel, local
unions that engage in specified forms of misconduct. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1263, UNION CONSTITUTION PROVISIONS: TRUSTEESHIPS (1959) [hereinafter BLS 1263] (stating that all 114 union
constitutions surveyed included provisions for suspension and revocation of local charters). For a collection of state court decisions involving such parental
discipline of locals, see DANGEL & SHRIBER, supra note 1, §§ 266-70, at 289-95.
In addition to these sources of control, most union constitutions authorize
the parent to place the local union into trusteeship. See BLS 1263, supra, at 2
(stating that some 60% of constitutions explicitly provided for trusteeships).
For the origins of union trusteeship provisions, their treatment at the hands of
state court judges and their eventual regulation by Congress in the LMRDA, see
James R. Beaird, Union Trusteeship Provisions of the Labor-ManagementReporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959, 2 GA. L. REV. 469 (1968); see also DORIS B. McLAUGHLIN &
ANITA L. W. SCHOOMAKER, THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT AND UNION DEMOCRACY

127-43 (1979). As a disciplinary tool, unions often prefer the trusteeship, perhaps because, unlike charter suspension, it gives the parent direct control and,
unlike charter revocation, it preserves the structural tie between parent and local. See Eames, supra note. 36, at 30-32.
Other provisions that tend to ensure parental domination of local unions
include those that oblige the local union to obtain parental approval of the collective bargaining agreement and the use of economic force, that place the parent union in control of strike funds, and that establish beneficial programs the
value of which the local may forfeit if it leaves the organization. See ULMAN,
NATIONAL UNION, supra note 2, at 155-90 (tracing extent of parent control over
strikes, strike funds and mutual benefit programs among early national unions).
In addition, many constitutions provide for forfeiture of local union property to
the parent upon the local's disaffiliation. See Isaacson, supra note 36, at 503-10;
Summers, supra note 6, at 262-69; Note, Disposition of Union Assets on Disaffiliation,
45 VA. L. REV. 244 (1959); see also International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Local
Lodge D354, 897 F.2d 1400, 1418 (7th Cir. 1990) (enforcing forfeiture clause).
44. Generally speaking, presidents of international unions enjoy a good
deal of control over the affairs of the association. Sometimes, presidential authority simply reflects the charisma and leadership skills of those who hold the
office. See MILLIS & MONTGOMERY, supra note 2, at 256-57; PHILIP TAFT, THE
STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF LABOR UNIONS

36-37 (1954).

More typically,
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to-day administration of the institution, 4 5 allocates jurisdiction
among competing locals 4 6 and prescribes duties of institutional
loyalty for members 4 7 and officers. 4 8 If the union constitution
presidential authority has a basis in constitutional documents. See WALLIHAN,
supra note 2, at 114. While local union officials may also exercise a good deal of
control over local affairs, they face stronger electoral competition than their national counterparts. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do
UNIONS Do? 211 (1984).

45. The ultimate power in the union theoretically lies with the members,
acting through the delegates they elect to represent them at the union convention. Such conventions, however, often take place at irregular intervals. See, e.g.,
HARRINGTON, supra note 37, at 35. As a result, union constitutions provide for
the administration of the union in the interim by dividing authority between the
national president and some form of national executive council or board. See
WALLIHAN, supra note 2, at 112-15. For a critique of the effectiveness of such
boards at checking the power of the president, see LEO BROMWICH, UNION CONSTITUTIONS (1959).

46. Most local union charters describe in some detail the scope of the local's trade and territorial jurisdiction. In such unions, the parent ordinarily
takes care to prevent overlapping local jurisdiction. When such overlap occurs,
the constitution often establishes an explicit means for the parent to resolve jurisdictional conflict. Some constitutions give the parent plenary authority to alter local jurisdiction; others provide the parent with the power to merge or
consolidate overlapping locals. For examples of litigation over such provisions,
see Local 334, 628 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 615 (1981); Local
Union No. 657 of United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Sidell, 552 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir.
1977). For an example of the experience of parent unions with such merger
campaigns, see BOK & DUNLOP, supra note 38, at 145-46.
47. The union constitution typically obliges members to pay dues and to
obey union rules, such as that compelling members to honor union-sanctioned
picket lines. Members who fail to comply with such obligations may be subject
to discipline ranging from fines to expulsion. In addition to these obligations,
constitutions frequently identify a variety of member rights such as the right to
attend meetings, to inspect the books and to run for union office. For a survey
of the rules governing member discipline, see U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1350, DISCIPLINARY POWERS AND PROCEDURES IN UNION CONSTITUTIONS [hereinafter BLS 1350].
Scholars once
disagreed about the extent to which unions administered their disciplinary rules
to quell political dissent. Compare Summers, DisciplinaryProcedures of Unions, supra
note 5, at 29-31 (arguing that discipline before union tribunals constitutes ongoing threat to union democracy) and Summers, Legal Limitations, supra note 5, at
1049-50 with TAFT, supra note 44, at 243-44 (arguing that union discipline often
administered fairly). The disclosures of the McClellan Committee, which led
Congress to enact the LMRDA, did much to resolve the debate. See PHILIP TAFT,
RIGHTS OF UNION MEMBERS AND THE GOVERNMENT 3-9, 239-41 (1975) (McClel-

lan committee report added greatly to knowledge of financial corruption and
political intolerance within unions).
48. Though less well known, the union constitution also contains provisions that govern the relationship between the officers and the organization.
The constitution typically obliges the officers to comply with the laws of the organization and to hold union funds in trust for the benefit of the members as a
whole. Officers who violate these rules are subject to discipline or removal from
office, although the same reality that makes top-down discipline of members a
threat to rank and file dissidents also reduces the likelihood of effective bottomup discipline of officers. See BLS 1350, supra note 47, at 65-85, 128-54 (describ-
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creates any contract at all, it creates contracts that govern at least
three different relationships: that between the parent and the local; that between the union as an institution and its individual of49
ficers and members; and that among the members themselves.
While the reference in section 301(a) to contracts between
labor organizations does not capture the multiplicity of relationships in union constitutions, it accurately describes a wide range
ing rules that govern discipline of local union officers at national level and national officers at convention level). In addition, officers who pilfer or misapply
union funds may be subject to criminal sanctions for embezzlement as well as
civil actions for breach of fiduciary duty under Title V of the LMRDA. For a
discussion of the scope of union officers' fiduciary duties and penalties for
breach, see infra notes 178-80.
49. Common law courts and treatise writers agree that union constitutions
establish at least two different categories of contractual relationships. In addition to contracts between the members themselves, union constitutions were
viewed as setting the terms of parent-local contracts and union-member contracts. For a discussion of problems inherent in the use of contract theory to
resolve disputes concerning union constitutions, see supra note 35. A 1941 treatise on labor unions describes the contractual relations created by the union's
governing documents in the following terms:
[W]here a local union is affiliated with a superior body, the constitution
and laws of the superior body, and the charter it issues pursuant
thereto to the local union, and the constitution and laws of the local
union, constitute the contract between the members of the union and the local
union as well as between the local union and the superior body.
DANGEL & SHRIBER, supra note 1, § 99, at 134-35 (emphasis added); accord Isaacson, supra note 36, at 504 (stating that in resolving conflicting property claims,
courts regard international and local constitutions and charter "as a two-fold
contract which binds the parent international and the local as well as the local
and its individual members"); see also Alexion v. Hollingsworth, 43 N.E.2d 825,
828 (N.Y. 1942) (finding that voluntary association that accepted local union
charter was bound to agreement); Harris v. Backman, 86 P.2d 456, 459 (Or.
1939) (holding that union charter binds members who forfeit right to union
property and funds upon withdrawal); Polin v. Kaplan, 177 N.E. 833, 834 (N.Y.
1931) (stating that constitution and by-laws of union may define conditions for
admission to and expulsion from membership); cf. W. A. MARTIN, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF LABOR UNIONS § 306, at 380 (1910) (stating that "[t]he power of a
union to fine, suspend or expel a member rests not in the general law, but in the
agreement of the members expressed in its constitution, rules and by-laws");
OAKES, supra note 1, § 9, at 23 ("The constitution, rules, and by-laws of an unincorporated union, so far as they purport to give rights of a civil nature, constitute a contract between the members themselves and between the association
and the individual members, which define their rights and obligations.").
Although the common law courts frequently agree to police the union-officer relationship, they do not speak expressly of a contract between the union
and its officers. See Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 231 P.2d 6 (Cal. 1951)
(action by officer for damages for wrongful expulsion from union membership
and union office); State ex rel. Dame v. Le Fevre, 28 N.W.2d 349 (Wis. 1947)
(same). Instead, common law courts base their remedial authority on the contract between the union and the members, an approach that reflects the fact that
most unions draw their officers from the ranks of the membership and that many
unions who wish to discipline their officers do so by withdrawing their rights as
members. See, e.g., Cason, 231 P.2d at 10-13.
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of bilateral agreements between national labor unions. 50 Such
agreements frequently seek to suppress inter-union "jurisdictional" 5 ' competition for the rights to represent bargaining unit
50. In a classic article on union structure, Professor Dunlop identified the
six common forms of agreement between competing national unions:
(a) Agreements to negotiate jointly with employers or to coordinate
strike action where both unions are significantly represented in plants
of a company or association.
(b) No-raiding agreements to restrict competition for workers already
certified or covered by agreements or to restrict competition for runaway plants.
(c) Agreements for joint organizing campaigns with an interim or permanent division of new members or a specific division of plants and
agreements to regulate the conduct of competitive organizing campaigns or to establish Marquis of Queensbury rules.
(d) Agreements defining jurisdiction between the organizations and
settling disputes over exclusive jurisdiction ....
(e) Agreements merging national unions ....
(f) Agreements creating machinery providing for final and binding decisions by arbitrators in disputes over . . .raiding of workers already
organized by parties to the agreement, the organization of workers unorganized or organized by unions not parties to the agreement, or work
jurisdiction disputes.
Dunlop, supra note 13, at 104-05 (footnote omitted). Dunlop noted that competing national unions entered into at least 50 such agreements between 1948
and 1955. Id. at 105-106.
51. A union's trade or working jurisdiction consists of the work it claims on
behalf of its members-a claim that often has both a technical (trade) and a geographical (territorial) dimension. The union's jurisdictional claim appears both
in its constitution and in the charter it receives from the federation. Parent unions often issue charters to their locals that further refine the scope of the local's
trade and territorial jurisdiction. For useful introductions to union jurisdiction,
see BOK & DUNLOP, supra note 38, at 209-10; MILLIS & MONTGOMERY, supra note
2, at 274-78; WALLIHAN, supra note 2, at 63-72.
Although organized labor has long attempted to suppress rival union competition by clarifying jurisdictional lines between unions, it has not achieved notable success. The AFL's early promise of exclusive jurisdiction to its affiliates
was undermined by a host of factors, including the tendency of some AFL affiliates to organize along industrial lines, the willingness of some craft unions to
take in industrial units, and the inability of the AFL to mediate jurisdictional
conflicts between craft unions. See MILLIS & MONTGOMERY, supra note 2, at 27278.
The passage of the Wagner Act of 1935 and the creation of the CIO exacerbated the confusion over jurisdictional boundaries. The Wagner Act made the
vote of interested employees within a governmentally defined bargaining unit,
rather than the jurisdictional claim of interested unions, the decisive factor in
determining the employees' bargaining representative; labor's definition of
union jurisdiction, though occasionally a factor in Labor Board unit determinations, was not dispositive. See CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE
UNIONS:

LABOR

RELATIONS,

LAW,

AND THE

ORGANIZED

LABOR MOVEMENT

IN

1880-1960 (Louis Galambos & Robert Gallman eds., 1985). The CIO
exploited the Wagner Act model quite effectively, organizing on an industrial
basis and competing successfully with many AFL affiliates for new members. See
AMERICA,

WALTER GALENSON, THE CIO CHALLENGE TO THE
ICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 1935-1941 (1960). The

AFL: A

HISTORY OF THE AMER-

merger of the AFL and CIO in
the 1950s left these overlapping jurisdictional claims in place. SeeJack Barbash,
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employees and to perform specific work. 52 Common examples of
inter-union agreements include no-raid agreements, such as
those that many unions signed in anticipation of the merger of
the AFL and CIO; 53 agreements that seek to adjust disputes over
the assignment of work; 54 and agreements to merge or consoliRelationship Between the Federation and the Internationals, in UNIONS, MANAGEMENT
AND THE PUBLIC 145 (E. Wight Bakke et al. eds., 3d ed. 1967); Dunlop, supra note
13, at 102.
52. Disputes between competing unions, which arise from the inability of
organized labor to draw precise and enduring jurisdictional lines between national unions, can be divided into two general categories. Representational disputes typically involve disagreements over which of two unions should
represent, or bargain on behalf of, a particular group of employees. Work assignment disputes, by contrast, arise in cases where two or more unions represent the employees of a particular firm but disagree as to which union's
members should perform a specific task. See generally BARBASH, LABOR UNIONS IN
ACTION, supra note 36, at 34-39; WALTER GALENSON, RIVAL UNIONISM IN THE
UNITED STATES 1-3, 30-52 (1940).
Historically, representational disputes tended to divide organized labor
along ideological lines. Thus, the craft-oriented AFL engaged in representational disputes with such industrial rivals as the Knights of Labor, the Wobblies
and the CIO. See GALENSON, supra, at 4-29; MILLIS & MONTGOMERY, supra note 2,
at 72-78, 102-23, 201-22. Work assignment disputes, by contrast, often developed between craft unions in the same federation. The AFL's building and construction trades department, for example, struggled for much of its history to
resolve such disputes between the craft-conscious building trades unions. For
an additional discussion of work assignment disputes, see infra note 54.
53. In a typical no-raid agreement, national unions agree to respect existing
bargaining relationships and to refrain from competing for the right to represent workers that have already been organized by other signatory parties. See,
e.g., United Textile Workers v. Textile Workers Union, 258 F.2d 743 (7th Cir.
1958) (setting forth terms of agreement). Such agreements became increasingly
common in the 1950s, as the leaders of the AFL and CIO began to push for an
end to wasteful raids and for the eventual unification of the two federations. See
BOK & DUNLOP, supra note 38, at 167 n.8. By 1954, some 65 AFL and 29 CIO
unions had signed the no-raid pact proposed by the federations' committee on
unity. See Document, AFL-CIO No Raiding Agreement, 8 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
102-08 (1954) (setting forth terms of, and signatories to, AFL-CIO no-raid
agreement). These agreements, which later provided the jurisdictional basis for
the AFL-CIO merger, called for the arbitration of disputes over allegations of
raiding. For an analysis of the no-raid provisions by the impartial arbitrator who
was appointed to administer their terms, see David L. Cole, JurisdictionalIssues
and the Promise of Merger, 9 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 391, 401-05 (1956). See also I
AFL-CIO, DECISIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AFL-CIO IMPARTIAL UMPIRE: 1954-1958 (1958). On the incorporation of these provisions into the constitution of the merged federation, see Dunlop, supra note 13, at 105-10. For a
discussion of the AFL-CIO's current practice in the no-raid arena, see WALLIHAN, supra note 2, at 167-68; Joseph Krislov & John Mead, Arbitrating Union
Conflicts: An Analysis of the AFL-CIO Internal Disputes Plan, 36 ARB. J. 21 (1981); Lea
B. Vaughn, Article XX of the AFL-CIO Constitution: Managing and Resolving InterUnion Disputes, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1990).
54. Bilateral work-assignment or jurisdictional agreements, which typically
seek to resolve a particular dispute between craft unions over the performance
of specific work and to create machinery for the resolution of future disputes,
have become increasingly common. Professor Dunlop noted that 25 such agree-
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date national unions.5 5 Such agreements represent bargained-for
ments were signed between 1948 and 1955. See Dunlop, supra note 13, at 106. A
recent compilation suggests that construction unions have entered into some 56
such agreements since 1957. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSTRUCTION
CRAFTrJURISDICTION AGREEMENTS (1984). The 1941 agreement between the Laborers and the Plumbers offers a good illustration of the form such agreements
may take. After resolving a dispute over work on sewers and water mains by
allocating the work ofjoining pipes to the Plumbers and the work of digging and
backfilling to the Laborers, it provides for reference of future disputes, not covered by the agreement, to the presidents of the two unions. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSTRUCTION CRAFT JURISDICTION AGREEMENTS 6 (1963)
(setting forth verbatim copy of agreement). For a discussion of such agreements
in the Carpenters' Union, emphasizing the fact that they bind local unions, see
HOROWITZ, supra note 2, at 51-52.
In addition to bilateral agreements between specific crafts, unions in the
building and construction trades department of the AFL (and later, the AFLCIO) have attempted to work out departmental machinery for the resolution of
jurisdictional disputes. For largely negative reviews of the early efforts, see MILLIS & MONTGOMERY, supra note 2, at 286-300; William Haber, Building Construction, in How COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WORKS 183, 200-03 (1942); Louis L.Jaffe,
Inter-Union Disputes in Search of a Forum, 43 YALE L.J. 424,429-43 (1940). Following the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, the building trades adopted a
new plan for the resolution of jurisdictional disputes. In brief, the parties to a
jurisdictional conflict created, by multi-lateral agreement, a Plan for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Agreements that established, among other things, a national joint board to arbitrate jurisdictional conflicts. See Document, The
Agreement Establishinga NationalJoint Boardfor the Settlement ofJurisdictionalDisputes
in Building and Construction Industries, 2 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 411 (1948). In
making jurisdictional awards, the joint board considers a host of factors, including bilateral inter-union jurisdictional agreements that have been collected in
the so-called "green book." For a general introduction, see Douglas Leslie, The
Role of the NLRB and the Courts in Resolving UnionJurisdictionalDisputes, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 1470, 1488-90 (1975). For a description of the evolution of the Plan
since its adoption in 1948, see FORREST A. HENRY, WORK ASSIGNMENT DISPUTES
UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 132-38 (1985).
55. Between December 1955, the effective date of the merger of the AFL
and the CIO, and 1978, some 57 mergers of national labor unions took place.
See GIDEON CHITAYAT, TRADE UNION MERGERS AND LABOR CONGLOMERATES 1
(1979). See generally WALLIHAN, supra note 2, at 144-47. As Professor Chaison
makes clear in an interesting historical survey, the relative frequency of merger
activity during this recent period appears to reflect the explicit encouragement
that officials of the merged AFL-CIO gave to union mergers. See GARY N.
CHAISON, WHEN UNIONS MERGE 28-30 (1986). Indeed, one can link the AFLCIO's efforts to encourage rival affiliates to enter into no-raid agreements in the
years before 1955 with its efforts to encourage mergers between competing affiliates after that date. The linkage between merger and no-raid agreements simply reflects the fact that the two forms of inter-union agreement both may act as
devices through which unions attempt to limit or regularize jurisdictional conflict. See CHAISON, supra, at 53-55.
Against this backdrop, one can conceive of the no-raid provisions of article
XX of the AFL-CIO constitution as a form of multilateral inter-union agreement.
Unions that affiliate with the AFL-CIO receive this no-raid protection as a matter
of course. Independent unions-those that have either chosen to remain unaffiliated or those that, like the Teamsters until their recent reaffiliation, were expelled from the AFL-CIO-lack article XX protection against raids. As a
consequence, strong independents, such as the Teamsters, may enter into a web
of bilateral no-raid agreements that substitute for the protections of affiliation;
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exchanges between autonomous national unions and bear the signatures of relevant union officials-elements that bring them
comfortably within the between-labor-organizations clause of section 301.56 Understood in its institutional context, therefore, the

language of section 301(a) appears to contemplate federal enforcement of contracts between autonomous national labor unions
rather than the constitutional rules that govern the internal relations within such unions.
B.

Section 301(a) as Originally Understood

The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act confirms that
Congress did not intend to provide for federal enforcement of
union constitutions. While the debates and reports on the statute
fail to explain section 301 (a)'s between-labor-organizations
clause, both the structure and the drafting history of the statute
suggest that the sponsors of Taft-Hartley added the clause to au57
thorize enforcement of agreements between national unions.
1. The Argument From Structure
Section 301 primarily sought to ensure that unions would
comply with the no-strike obligations that appear in many collective bargaining agreements. 58 In justifying the creation of a federally-imposed duty to comply, the statute's principal sponsor,
Senator Robert Taft, first argued that the collective agreement
weak independents may seek to obtain no-raid protection through merger with
an affiliate. See id. at 82-83 (describing Brewery Workers' unsuccessful efforts to
identify merger partner within AFL-CIO before they were absorbed by
Teamsters).
56. For a representative sample of "jurisdictional" agreements, see BuREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 54. For examples of merger agreements,
see CHITAYAT, supra note 55, at 170-204. Such forms of agreement bear the signatures of union officials and emerge from often protracted negotiations.
57. For the text of § 301(a), see supra note 8. The between-labor-organizations clause was added to § 301(a) by the House-Senate conferees but was not
mentioned in either the Conference Report or the post-conference debates.
The absence of any overt legislative history provides federal courts with considerable interpretive freedom. See Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 623 (1981); Parks v.
International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 314 F.2d 886, 915 (4th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963).
58. Congress was concerned that unions had largely escaped responsibility
for compliance with no-strike clauses by virtue of their status as unincorporated
associations. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18 (1947), reprintedin
1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 421-24. It thus conceived § 301 as an
initiative designed to make unions responsible for their contracts on a collective
or entity basis, "as if they were corporations." 93 CONG. REc. 3839 (1947)
(statement of Sen. Taft).
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was a matter of established federal concern. 59 Second, Senator
Taft claimed that the enforcement of such contracts would preserve industrial peace for the life of the agreement and would
6
thus remove unjustifiable burdens on interstate commerce. 0
Both the federal-province and the labor-peace rationales apply to the enforcement of work assignment and jurisdictional
agreements between competing national unions. The Eightieth
Congress was deeply concerned with rival union strikes and boycotts, which it regarded as unfair to both employers and the public. 6 1 The Taft-Hartley Act thus prohibits unions from using

59. Senator Robert Taft, a principal sponsor of the Act and the legislator
most familiar with § 301, understood that the Wagner Act obliged employers to
bargain in good faith with their employees' designated representative and to
reduce the resulting agreement to writing. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 15-17 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 421-23.
He thus argued that the collective agreement was a creature of federal law that
deserved federal enforcement. See Pfander, supra note 8, at 303 & n.248 (quoting Taft's defense of propriety of making collective agreement enforceable as
matter of federal law).
60. Senator Taft's argument for the statute's adoption specifically relied on
the tendency of § 301 to encourage compliance with no-strike clauses and thus
to furnish a solution to what he described as an interstate commerce difficulty.
See Pfander, supra note 8, at 303 & n.248. The industrial peace rationale continues to inform the statute's interpretation. See Groves v. Ring Screw Works Ferndale Fastener Div., 111 S. Ct. 498 (1990) (holding that collective bargaining
agreement clause reserving right to union use of economic weapons did not bar
federal resolution under § 301(a)); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union,
Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (allowing injunction to enforce binding arbitration clause in collective bargaining agreement under § 301).
61. Although other provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act triggered partisan
disputes in Congress, there was broad bipartisan support for legislation to address the problem of inter-union rivalry. President Truman set the tone in his
State of the Union address, which called for legislation that would ban representational strikes and foster "peaceful and binding determination" of work-assignment disputes. 93 CONG. REC. 136 (1947). Members of Congress were virtually
in unanimous accord with the President. See 93 CONG. REC. A1295-97 (1947),
reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 582-84 (remarks of Rep.
Landis describing costs of such disputes in lumber and agricultural industries);
93 CONG. REC. 3534 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 33, at
615 (remarks of Rep. Hartley describing delays in construction of public housing
in New Jersey); 93 CONG. REC. 1890-91 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HisTORY, supra note 33, at 952 (remarks of Sen. Morse collecting statistics on loss of
man-days as a result of jurisdictional and rival union strikes); 93 CONG. REC.
3329-30 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 995-97 (remarks of Sen. Lucas describing jurisdictional dispute between Machinists and
Carpenters over installation of machinery at brewery in Belleville, Illinois). See
generally HARRY MILLIS & EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFTHARTLEY: A STUDY OF NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS (1950).
The principal drafter of the provisions dealing with inter-union conflict was
Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon. Early in the Senate's consideration of the
Taft-Hartley Act, Morse presented a detailed analysis of the problem of interunion rivalry that not only distinguished rival union disputes from other forms
of jurisdictional conflict, but also set forth statistics detailing the costs of such
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economic force in support of competing representational 6 2 and
jurisdictional demands. 63 In addition to providing an array of
remedies, 64 the Taft-Hartley Act explicitly seeks to encourage unions to enter into agreements with one another that establish a
peaceful method for resolving jurisdictional disputes. 65 Congress
thus expected that rival unions would negotiate agreements, that
such agreements would govern disputes in an identified area of
federal concern and that the federal enforcement of such agree66
ments would help maintain industrial peace.
disputes. See 93 CONG. REC. 1890-91 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 33, at 951-52. The final version of the statute closely resembled
Morse's proposal.
62. Subparagraphs (B) and (C) of § 8(b)(4) declare that unions cannot use
economic force to obtain recognition, suggesting instead that they should seek
representational rights through the Labor Board election process. See Taft-Hartley Act § 8(b)(4)(B)-(C), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B)-(C) (1988). Close students of
the Taft-Hartley Act attribute these provisions to the desire of Congress to suppress rival union disputes between the AFL and the CIO. See MILLIS & BROWN,
supra note 61, at 443-48. For background on the rivalry, see GALENSON, supra
note 51, at 3-74.
63. On the assumption that such disputes were responsible for the loss of
some 600,000 working days in 1945 alone, Congress enacted two interlocking
provisions to prohibit unions from using economic force in support of their demands for the assignment of particular work. Section 8(b)(4)(D) bars strikes in
support of a work-assignment demand unless the employer's assignment fails to
conform with the Board's award. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D). For background
on Congress' assumption regarding lost working days, see 93 CONG. REC. 189091 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 952. Section
10(k) of the Act supplements this provision by empowering the Labor Board to
hear and decide disputes over the assignment of work. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(k).
See generally HENRY, supra note 54. For an argument that the Board, in administering its authority to resolve work-assignment disputes, has given undue weight
to the preferences of employers, see Leslie, supra note 54.
64. Congress provided injured parties with an array of remedies for economic losses resulting from representational and jurisdictional strife. To begin
with, the statute defines such conflict as an unfair labor practice and specifically
gives the Labor Board the power to petition the federal district courts for injunctive relief. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 10(j)-(i), 29
U.S.C. § 160(j)-(l) (1988) (authorizing Labor Board to seek injunctions against
union practices that allegedly violate ban on inter-union strikes and providing
that such matters receive expedited consideration). Moreover, § 303 of the Act
declares inter-union strikes unlawful and authorizes the federal courts to award
damages to any person injured thereby in the person's business or property. See
id. § 303(a)-(b), 29 U.S.C. § 187(a)-(b) (1988).
65. Section 10(k) of the Act authorizes the Board to hear and decide such
disputes but specifies that the Board must dismiss the claim where the parties
submit "satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods
for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute." 29 U.S.C. § 160(k). This requirement of Labor Board deference was taken from Senator Morse's proposed statute and was designed to encourage the parties to work out private methods of
dispute resolution. See 93 CONG. REC. 1911-13 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 33, at 983-87.
66. Members of Congress quite clearly expressed the view that legislation
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While the Taft-Hartley Act clearly articulates a federal interest in the enforcement of rival union agreements, it fails to identify any concern that would justify the federal enforcement of
union constitutions. In marked contrast to its rather extensive
treatment of jurisdictional warfare between rival unions, the
Eightieth Congress declined to regulate the union's internal constitutional relationships. Thus, the statute does not purport to
regulate the relationships between the union and its members on
such matters as fines and expulsion. 6 7 Nor does the Taft-Hartley
was required because unions had failed to adopt binding methods of private
dispute resolution. See 93 CONG. REC. 1890, 1911, 1912 (1947), reprinted in 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 950, 983, 985 (remarks of Sen. Morse);
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 33, at 315 ("Union leaders themselves acknowledge the
evils of [jurisdictional disputes]. .... but they have failed to provide effective
remedies. The Nation must, in self-defense, provide its own remedies."); see also
93 CONG. REC. 136 (1947) (Truman's criticism of work-assignment disputes in
his State of the Union Address focused on failure of unions to resolve such disputes between themselves). Senator Morse emphasized his belief that making
certain kinds of jurisdictional pressure unlawful would prevent many abuses
"because the unions themselves will proceed to establish within their own organizations machinery capable of settling such disputes short of economic action."
Id. at 1911, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 983.
Congress' prediction that the creation of a statutory penalty for jurisdictional conflict would compel unions to work out jurisdictional agreements was
essentially accurate. Professor Dunlop reported that national unions entered
into some 50 such agreements during the period from 1948 to 1954. See
Dunlop, supra note 13, at 105-06. The passage of the Taft-Hartley Act undoubtedly contributed to what Dunlop labeled the "age of bilateral agreements" between competing national unions. Id. at 104; cf. Leslie, supra note 54, at 1488-89
(attributing building trades' plan for settling jurisdictional conflict to passage of
Taft-Hartley Act).
67. To be sure, Congress established a series of union unfair labor practices aimed at particular economic weapons, such as the secondary boycott, and
at union practices viewed as unfairly coercing employees into joining or retaining membership in unions. See generally 1 CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING
LABOR Lw 41-42 (2d ed. 1983); Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, I, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24-34 (1947). Importantly, however, Congress framed its protections for individuals in terms of the job-related
rights of "employees"-a term defined at some length in the statute. See TaftHartley Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988). Although the statute thus protects individual employees from certain coercive acts and limits the manner in
which unions deal with their members, it does not "undertake[]" to protect
union members "in their rights as members." International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 620 (1958) (emphasis added). Individual members did
not receive such protections until Congress adopted the union members' bill of
rights as Title I of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959. See 29 U.S.C. § 411.
The statute's approach to the problem of union security illustrates the regulatory focus of the Taft-Hartley Act on the rights of employees. The Taft-Hartley Act permits so-called "union shop" or "maintenance of membership"
agreements but prohibits closed shop agreements under which the employer
agrees to hire only union members. See generally Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, H, 61 HARV. L. REV. 274, 296-99 (1948).
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Act purport to define the proper allocation of power between a
parent union and its constituents or affiliated locals. 68 These statutory omissions were quite deliberate; Congress considered and
These restrictions on union security made rather dramatic inroads into the
union's power to discipline its members with threats of loss of employment. See
id at 298-99; see also MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 61, at 429-40. The restrictions,
however, were framed in terms of the rights of employees. Thus, Congress added a series of provisos to the Act that made clear its intention to leave other
aspects of the relationship between the union and its members to the ordinary
processes of union government. See Taft-Hartley Act § 8(b)(l)(A), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(1)(A) (1988) (proscribing coercion of employees in exercise of right to
refrain from concerted action, subject to right of organization to enforce membership rules). On the basis of these provisos, a key supporter of the legislation,
Senator Ball, would claim that it "was never the intention of the sponsors of the
pending amendment to interfere with the internal affairs or organization of unions."

93 CONG. REC. 4400 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra

note 33, at 1141 (comment of Sen. Ball regarding proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A)).
68. The House bill contained a variety of provisions that sought to transfer
authority over collective bargaining from the parent union to its affiliated locals.
See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 (1947), reprintedin 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 326-27 (permitting local unions to affiliate, but

only so long as they were free of common control over their collective bargaining demands and decision to strike). H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 62-64
(1947), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 92-94 (subjecting
unions to antitrust treble damages in cases where they engaged in "monopoly"
strikes). The Senate Labor Committee bill, S. 1126, omitted these provisions,
calling instead for a careful study of internal union affairs. See S. REP. No. 105,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
33, at 452. Although Senators Ball and Taft offered amendments on the Senate
floor that would have placed explicit limits on the power of international unions,
the Senate rejected these "industry-wide bargaining" amendments and they
were omitted from the Act. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
46-47 (1947), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 550-51 (noting omission of House's industry-wide bargaining provision from conference
agreement); 93 CONG. REC. 4803 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,

supra note 33, at 1302 (recording vote in Senate).
Perhaps the best explanation of the proposed industry-wide bargaining
amendments appears in the supplemental views that Senators Taft and Ball,
among others, attached to the Senate Labor Committee's report on S. 1126.
Under the heading "More Autonomy for Local Unions," the Senators announced their intention to seek amendments that would check "the trend toward [n]ation-wide bargaining" and provide local employees with "some
freedom from the arbitrary dictates of the leaders of national unions." S. REP.
No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 33, at 457 (providing four supplemental views on S. 1126).
The Senate was well aware of the provisions in union constitutions through
which parent unions exercised control over collective bargaining agreements.
Senator Taft recounted the manner in which the Steelworkers union had invoked asset forfeiture provisions in its constitution to punish local unions in
Southern Ohio that broke ranks and negotiated their own agreement with their
employers. See 93 CONG. REC. 4706-07 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HIS-

TORY, supra note 33, at 1239-40. Elsewhere, he described the use by internationals of fines, charter revocations and receiverships as examples of improper
coercion, and explained that these "are the methods we are trying to stop." Id.
at 4713, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 1253.
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rejected a series of provisions that would have regulated internal
union affairs in some detail. 6 9 In the wake of such a refusal to
legislate, it is difficult to identify a federal interest that would justify a congressional (or judicial) decision to authorize the federal
70
courts to enforce union constitutions.

2.

The Argument From Drafting History

The drafting history of the Taft-Hartley Act confirms that
concern with the enforcement of agreements between unions,
and not the enforcement of union constitutions, led Congress to
add the "between-labor-organizations" clause to section 301.
The conferees agreed to work from the Senate version of the bill,
which provided that the federal courts and the Labor Board
69. In addition to provisions that would have shifted power from the national to the local union, the House version of the bill included many provisions
that explicitly regulated the relationship between the union and its members.
Section 8(c) of the House bill made it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to charge initiation fees in excess of $25 per member, to require members
to participate in benefit plans, to limit the member's ability to resign, to expel or
discriminate against members for having exercised political independence and
to expel members except for defined acts of misconduct or without according
them such due process protections as a fair hearing. See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 8(c), at 22-26 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
33, at 52-56.
The House Minority report criticized these provisions as "attempting the
impossible, i.e., attempting a regulation of the infinite details involved in the
internal functioning of thousands of trade-unions having millions of members."
H. MIN. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1947), reprintedin 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 33, at 367. Similar opposition surfaced in the Senate, and
these provisions were largely dropped in conference. See H.R. CONF. REP. No.
510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 33, at 512.
70. Opponents of Taft's proposal mounted a spirited defense of industrywide bargaining. See 93 CONG. REC. 4570-71 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 33, at 1221-22 (remarks of Sen. Revercomb regarding stability in glass industry bargaining); id. at 4569-70, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HisTORY, supra note 33, at 1220 (remarks of Sen. Lodge regarding stability in shoe
industry with one large union organization); id. at 4791-92, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,

supra note 33, at 1282 (remarks of Sen. Ives citing study results

showing stability in trades with industry-wide bargaining). They also argued
that Congress should refrain from intervening in the structure and government
of labor unions. See id. at 4795, reprintedin 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 33,
at 1287 ("1 do not think it should be considered to be within the prerogatives of
the Congress of the United States to tell the unions by just what delegation procedure they shall reach their collective bargaining agreements." (remarks of
Sen. Morse)); id. at 4794, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 33, at
1287 (criticizing amendment as effort to have Congress "step in and dictate the
terms of the constitution of an international union, adopted by such international union through its locals operating under the government of the international"). After rejecting industry-wide bargaining initiatives, Congress could
scarcely justify an amendment to § 301(a) to provide the federal courts with
power to police relations between the international and its subordinate bodies.
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would share responsibility for the enforcement of labor contracts. 7 ' The Senate effected this division of responsibility by restricting the application of section 301 to suits for violations of
collective bargaining agreements7 2 and by including unfair labor
practice provisions that gave the Labor Board responsibility for
enforcing both collective bargaining agreements and arbitration
agreements. 73 The unfair labor practice provisions were drawn
broadly enough to vest the Labor Board with the power to police
not only employer-union arbitration agreements, but also the inter-union arbitration agreements that Congress expected unions

to draft as a way of avoiding liability for jurisdictional strikes.7"
The House conferees vehemently opposed all provisions that
gave the Labor Board responsibility for policing labor contracts
and arbitation agreements. 75 Their opposition produced a series
71. The House conferees' agreement to work from the Senate bill reflected
their understanding that a presidential veto was likely and that dramatic changes
in the Senate bill would reduce the likelihood of a successful override in that
chamber. An override in the House was virtually assured. See MILLIS & BROWN,
supra note 61, at 384.
72. Although the House and Senate versions of § 301 (a) both provided federal courts with jurisdiction over actions to enforce labor contracts, the two
chambers disagreed concerning the scope of federal power. The House version
conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear any action "involving a violation of an agreement between an employer and a labor organization." H.R.
3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1947), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 33, at 221, (quoting § 302(a)). The Senate version applied more narrowly
to contracts concluded "as a result of collective bargaining." H.R. 3020, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 121 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 33, at
279 (quoting Senate version of § 301(a)).
73. Sections 8(a)(6) and 8(b)(5) of the Senate bill made it unlawful for employers and unions to "violate the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement or
the terms of an agreement to submit a labor dispute to arbitration" and thus
gave the Labor Board a measure of responsibility for enforcing such agreements. See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 33, at 239 (setting forth Senate version of § 8(a)(6)); H.R.
3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 83-84 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 33, at 241-42 (setting forth Senate version of § 8(b)(5)). The Senate
report on the bill makes clear that the upper chamber contemplated that the
Labor Board and the federal courts would exercise overlapping jurisdiction.
The report describes § 301 as applying to actions for breach of collective bargaining agreements and indicates that it "should be read in connection with the
provisions of § 8 of Title I also dealing with breach of contracts." S. REP. No.
105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 33, at 436.
74. By treating collective agreements and arbitration agreements as separate instruments and by making them both enforceable, the language of the deleted unfair labor practice provision contemplated that unions might agree to
arbitration through instruments other than the collective agreement. It thus
contemplated Labor Board enforcement of inter-union arbitration agreements.
For a discussion of the deleted unfair labor practice provision, see supra note 73.
75. The House's hostility towards the Labor Board was clearly reflected in
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of changes in the bill, including the deletion of unfair labor practice provisions that had given the Labor Board power to enforce
arbitration agreements. 76 The conferees also agreed to delete a
reference from section 10(k) that authorized the Labor Board to
appoint an arbitrator to hear and decide jurisdictional disputes
between rival unions. 7 7 Having stripped the Labor Board of all
responsibility for the arbitration of inter-union disputes, the conferees apparently agreed to transfer enforcement authority to the
federal courts. 78 The conferees' desire to complete this transfer
of authority best explains why they provided, in section 301(a),
for federal court enforcement of contracts "between labor
organizations."
its bill. Section 102 of the House bill abolished the National Labor Relations
Board and created in its place a Labor-Management Relations Board. See H.R.
3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 51-53 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 33, at 208-10. Under the House bill, the new Board was to have no
role in the enforcement of labor contracts. See 93 CONG. REC. 6600 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 1539 (statement of Sen. Taft).
Counsel to the Senate Labor Committee later revealed that the House conferees
displayed a consistent pattern of hostility towards arbitration in general and to
the Labor Board's role in arbitration in particular. The House conferees also
strongly favored a judicial, rather than administrative, approach to policing labor contracts. See Gerard D. Reilly, The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 285, 299 (1960). Among other conference changes, this
hostility resulted in the elimination of references to Labor Board-sponsored arbitration from § 10(k). Id.
76. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1947), reprinted

in 1 LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY,

supra note 33, at 511-12 (reflecting deletion of unfair

labor practice provisions in § 8(a)(6), 8(b)(5)). For authority that links the deletion of these unfair labor practice provisions to the House's preference for judicial enforcement, see infra note 78.
77. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1947), reprinted

in 1 LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY,

supra note 33, at 519 (quoting provision of § 10(k));

id. at 57, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 561 (noting deletion of provision for Board-appointed arbitration of jurisdictional strikes). The
conference committee's decision to delete the provision calling for appointment
of an arbitrator to hear and decide the jurisdictional dispute was not explained
in the committee's report.
78. Two sources link the deletion of Senate provisions for arbitration in
§ 8(a)(6) and 8(b)(5) to the conferees' expansion of the language of § 301. First,
a statement by Senator Taft that has been accepted by courts and commentators
as an important guide to the compromises made in conference explains that the
House conferees objected to the Labor Board's contract-enforcement role and
wanted to transfer this responsibility to the courts. See 93 CONG. REC. 6600

(1947), reprinted in 2

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,

supra note 33, at 1539. Second, the

report of the conference committee explained that these changes were intended
to transfer authority for the enforcement of such contracts from the Labor
Board to the federal courts in keeping with "the usual processes of the law."
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 545-46.
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The Emerging Consensus

Early judicial developments were consistent with the language, structure and history of section 301 (a)'s between-labor-organizations clause. Most federal courts during the 1950s took the
view that the union constitution regulated the affairs within a labor
organization 79 and thus did not satisfy section 301 (a)'s reference
to "contracts . . .between any such labor organizations." 8 0 The
federal courts also consistently ruled that the statute gave them
the power to enforce no-raid agreements between rival unions. 8 1
Commentators in the 1950s generally agreed with the judicial
view that section 301 (a)'s between-labor-organizations clause federalized no-raid agreements between national unions, but left internal disputes over the union constitution in the hands of state
79. Early decisions occasionally recognized that the statutory term "contract" might apply to the constitution and laws of labor unions, but avoided the
question whether the union constitution was a § 301 contract by holding that the
statute did not authorize individual union members to bring enforcement proceedings. See Adams v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 262 F.2d 835, 838
(10th Cir. 1958) (holding section 301 limited to suits between employer and
labor unions or suits between labor unions-not suits between labor union and
members); Murphy v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union, 102 F. Supp.
488, 490-92 (E.D. Mich. 1951) (finding effect of § 301 was not to vest general
jurisdiction in federal courts for suits by or against labor unions).
Courts more frequently held that such internal documents governed the affairs of a single labor organization. Thus, "family squabble[s]" between constituent bodies of a single union, see Sun Shipbuilding & Dry-Dock Co. v. Industrial
Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 95 F. Supp. 50, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1950),
even those that ranged "from top to bottom," Kriss v. White, 87 F. Supp. 734,
735 (N.D.N.Y. 1949), failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement that the dispute involve a contract between separate labor organizations. See also United
Elec. Workers v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 109 F. Supp. 675, 684 (E.D. Mo. 1951);
(upholding federal jurisdiction in dispute involving breach of collective agreement where rival unions involved); Snoots v. Vejlupek, 87 F. Supp. 503, 504
(N.D. Ohio 1949) (holding § 301 "not meant to aid the settling of intra-union
fights").
80. For the text of § 301(a), see supra note 8.
81. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Firemen v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 338 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1964) (noting section 301 provides federal court
jurisdiction once requisite jurisdiction over arbiter is found); United Textile
Workers v. Textile Workers Union, 258 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1958) (holding private no-raiding agreement between unions enforceable under § 301); cf.Schatte
v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 182 F.2d 158, 164 (9th
Cir. 1950) (suggesting that no-raid agreement between Carpenters and IATSE
would have been enforceable under § 301(a) but for fact that alleged breach of
contract took place before effective date of statute), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827
(1950). But cf. International Union of Doll & Toy Workers v. Metal Polishers
Int'l Union, 180 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (declining to enforce no-raid
award to avoid interference with primary jurisdiction of NLRB). For accounts of
the Textile Workers' dispute, see Benjamin Aaron, Interunion Representation Disputes and the NLRB, 36 TEX. L. REv. 846, 846- 49 (1958); Meltzer, supra note 8, at
295-301.
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courts .82

The language and history of the LMRDA 83 -the "first comprehensive regulation by Congress of the conduct of internal
union affairs" 84 -appear to confirm the consensus interpretation
of section 301.85 The LMRDA established a series of protections
for individual union members and subjected labor unions and
their officers to a range of reporting, disclosure and fiduciary requirements.8 6 Congress was acutely aware of the possibility that
this wide array of regulations would destroy existing state protections through application of the preemption doctrine. 7 It thus
adopted a series of "savings" provisions that explicitly preserved
state and federal rights.88 As Professor Clyde Summers, a close
82. See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 297 (commenting that no-raid pacts represent primary type of inter-union agreement to which § 301(a) applies); Comment, supra note 8 (arguing that § 301 (a) properly applies to no-raid agreements
and should not be extended to actions for breach of union constitution).
83. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401531 (1988)).
84. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 193 (1967).
85. Although the statements of the 1959 Congress do not provide a definitive guide to the construction of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, the Supreme Court
recognized that, "as another step in an evolving pattern of regulation of union
conduct, the 1959 Act is a relevant consideration." NLRB v. Drivers Local 639,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 362 U.S. 274, 291 (1960).
86. Title I of the LMRDA establishes a so-called "bill of rights" for individual union members, ensuring them the equal right to vote and participate in
union affairs, the right to express their opinions free from retaliation, the right
to due process in internal disciplinary proceedings, and the right to sue. See 29
U.S.C. § 411 (a)(1)-(5) (1988). Title I also creates a federal cause of action to
enforce these rights. See id. § 412. Title II of the LMRDA imposes certain reporting requirements on union, employers and labor persuaders. See id. §§ 431440. Title III limits the duration of trusteeships and requires the parent union
to file periodic reports concerning the status of subordinates under trusteeship.
See id. §§ 461-466. Title IV governs union elections. See id. §§ 481-484. Title V
imposes fiduciary obligations on the officers of labor organizations and requires
such officers to post bonds. See id. §§ 501-504. Title VI includes a series of
miscellaneous provisions including bans on extortionate picketing, and a broad
non-preemption provision. See id. §§ 522-523. For an overview, see Benjamin
Aaron, The Labor-ManagementReporting and DisclosureAct of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REV.
851 (1960); Archibald Cox, InternalAffairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform
Act of 1959, 58 MICH. L. REV. 819 (1960); Russell A. Smith, The Labor-Management
Reporting and DisclosureAct of 1959, 46 VA. L. REV. 195 (1960).
87. The preemptive effect of its legislation became an issue in the Senate
during the debates over the Kennedy-lves bill, a 1958 predecessor to the
LMRDA, when the ACLU raised the possibility that federal regulation of union
elections might displace state remedies. See Summers, Pre-Emption, supra note 5,
at 122.
88. See LMRDA § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 411 (preserving state and federal remedies for individual union members); id. § 306, 29 U.S.C. § 466 (declaring federal
trusteeship relationships supplemental to state remedies); id § 403, 29 U.S.C.
§ 483 (providing exclusive federal remedy for challenges to union elections); 29
U.S.C. § 623 (providing generally that federal regulation, except as specifically
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observer of the LMRDA, remarked shortly after Congress passed
the statute: "Congress considered the union constitution as the
main core of the state law to be preserved and it found no fault in
89
state court interpretation of it."
By the end of the Eisenhower era, in short, there was a broad
consensus that actions to enforce the union constitution were to
be decided in the state court system. Lower federal courts refused to assert jurisdiction over the union constitution under the
between-labor-organizations clause of section 301(a), and the
commentators agreed with their interpretation. Moreover, Congress adopted the LMRDA on the assumption that the state
courts' historic control over disputes arising from the union constitution not only survived the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in
1947, but also flourished sufficiently to deserve congressional
protection. As the next section makes clear, however, the consensus did not survive.
D.

The Judicial Transformation of Section 301(a)

It was not a mere coincidence that the remarkable change in
the interpretation of section 301(a) followed the passage of the
LMRDA. The LMRDA established federal statutory rights to fair
treatment in internal union affairs9" and explicitly authorized
union members and local unions to sue in federal court to vindicate such rights. 9 ' The statute thus transferred a host of disputes
to federal court that had previously been resolved in state fora.
Such disputes often raised questions of federal law that indirectly
implicated the union constitution. 92 Moreover, union members
stated to contrary, shall not limit obligations of labor organizations and their
officers under state law). Congress also amended § 14 of the NLRA in response
to the Supreme Court's preemption decision in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations
Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957). See 29 U.S.C. § 164(c).
89. Summers, Pre-Emption, supra note 5, at 144. It is worth noting that Professor Summers' exhaustive discussion of the preemptive effect of the 1959 labor reform act fails to admit the possibility that § 301 had transferred litigation
over the meaning of the union constitution into the federal domain. Indeed,
Summers assumes that state law would continue to govern the interpretation of
the union constitution and proceeds to review at some length the interpretive
problems posed by overlapping or coexisting state and federal rights. Id. at 14352.
90. For a description of the LMRDA protections, see supra note 86.
91. See 29 U.S.C. § 411 (d) (1988) (protection of right to sue); id. § 412 (civil
action for enforcement); id. § 413 (retention of existing rights). For a discussion
of individual member suits, see infra notes 143-73 and accompanying text.
92. Federal courts must construe union constitutions to decide such questions under the LMRDA as whether (1) a union's violation of its members' equal
right to vote violates 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(l); (2) a union's proposed justification
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and local unions often joined their federal statutory claims with
actions for breach of the union constitution. 9 3 Litigants who
sought to enforce rights under the LMRDA thus more frequently
argued that the open-ended language of section 301 (a) embraced
94
suits to enforce the union constitution.
A close review of the leading decisions suggests that the
lower federal courts accepted this argument, in the face of strong
contrary authority, for essentially pragmatic reasons. Indeed, in
Parks v. InternationalBrotherhood of Electrical Workers, 9 5 the leading
analysis of the Taft-Hartley Act's between-labor-organizations
clause in the years immediately following the passage of the
LMRDA, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit relied
specifically on the capacity of section 301(a) to fill gaps in
96
the LMRDA and to provide litigants with complete relief.
These practical concerns played a large part in the court's decision that section 301(a) applied to actions to enforce the union
constitution.
The difficulty for the Parks court stemmed from the local
union's claim that the revocation of its charter violated both the
LMRDA and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
of member discipline meets the "reasonable rules" test under 29 U.S.C.
§ 411(a)(2); (3) a union constitution authorizes imposition of a trusteeship as
allowed under 29 U.S.C. § 426; or (4) an officer charged with fiduciary breach
has complied with the constitution as required by 29 U.S.C. § 501(a).
93. For examples of such joinder and a discussion of attendant issues, see
infra note 117. Professor Summers recognized the inevitability of such joinder
in litigation arising under the LMRDA and argued for an expansive interpretation of state concurrent and federal pendent jurisdiction to allow both fora to
hear the entire dispute. Summers, Pre-Emption, supra note 5, at 143-53.
94. For example, many local union members challenged the denial of their
right to ratify collective bargaining agreements as a violation of the union constitution and of their equal right to vote under the LMRDA. For examples of such
cases, see infra note 117. Union members removed from office or subjected to
disciplinary proceedings frequently assert claims under both the LMRDA and
the union constitution. See, e.g., Kinney v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
669 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1981) (union officer arguing removal from position violated 29 U.S.C. §§ 411, 529 and union constitution); Cehaich v. International Union of Automobile Workers, 496 F. Supp. 912, 913 (E.D. Mich. 1980)
(union member challenged removal as unpaid benefits representative under
LMRDA and union constitution), aff'd, 710 F.2d 234 (1983); Vincent v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No. 198, 384 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D. La. 1974) (union
member denied membership when he moved to new state challenged action
under provisions of 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-412).
95. 314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963).
96. Id. at 916. An earlier decision by the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit relied exclusively on the open-ended language of § 301(a) and failed to
consider the history or previous interpretation of the Taft-Hartley Act. See Local
33, Int'l Hod Carriers v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council, 291 F.2d 496, 501-02 (2d
Cir. 1961) (declaring that "provisions of section 301(a) are simple and direct").
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(IBEW) constitution. 97 Although the court readily disposed of
the LMRDA claims, 9 8 the appeal was complicated by the international union's argument that federal courts lacked power to hear
the parties' dispute over the proper interpretation of the union
constitution.9 9 A dismissal on jurisdictional grounds would have
97. Parks, 314 F.2d at 890-91. In Parks, the Baltimore local of the Electrical
Workers called a strike in support of its demand for higher wages without first
obtaining approval from the international union as the constitution apparently
required. Id. at 899. After conducting a hearing, the international revoked the
local's charter, issued a charter to a new local union and took steps to foster
collective bargaining between the new local and the contractors' association. Id.
at 900-01. The old local and its members brought suit in federal district court
claiming that the charter revocation violated the LMRDA and the union constitution. Id. at 902. From an order of the district court granting a portion of the
relief sought, both parties appealed. Id. at 891-92.
The dispute in Parks focused on the power of the international to insist that
the Maryland local surrender its right to strike for higher wages in exchange for
the right to submit disputes over wages and working conditions to an industrywide interest arbitration panel comprised of representatives from the union and
the national contractors' association. Id. at 898. The Maryland local had grown
disenchanted with interest arbitration after the panel issued a wage award lower
than that the membership desired. The local's attempt to escape from the interest arbitration process and reestablish its right to strike was foiled by an "evergreen" clause that required future submission to interest arbitration as an
element of each panel award. Id. The district court's view that this "evergreen"
clause represented an illegal curtailment of the local's right to strike lay at the
center of its decision to grant relief. Id. at 909. The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the "evergreen" clause rendered the international's action in disciplining the local unlawful. Id. at 909-10.
The district court rejected the old local's claim that the international had
evaded the trusteeship provisions of Title III of the LMRDA by revoking its
charter-a determination the Fourth Circuit upheld on appeal. Id. at 924. The
district court found, however, that the decision of the international president to
revoke the charter denied the local its statutory right to an impartial tribunal and
violated the president's fiduciary obligations under the union constitution. Id. at
904. Although the Fourth Circuit agreed that these violations were legitimate
theoretical grounds for intervention under the LMRDA, it disagreed that actual
violations of the statute had been shown. Id. at 904, 913-14.
98. Id. at 906-07. The court was satisfied that the international president
acted within his authority under the constitution in effecting the charter revocation and that federal courts had no roving authority, in the name of local autonomy, to alter the allocation of power set forth in the union's fundamental laws.
Id. On this basis, the court concluded that the international did not violate the
LMRDA, either by failing to provide the local with an unbiased tribunal or by
imposing an excessively harsh sanction. Id. at 907.
99. The local argued strenuously that the international had no power under
the constitution to exercise supervisory authority over its strike. Id. at 890.
Even assuming that the international acted within its constitutional rights in suspending the local's charter, the local and its members raised substantial questions concerning the members' right to transfer their membership to the new
local and to retain their stake in certain local pension and benefit plans. Id. at
926. Although the union constitution governed both questions, the IBEW argued that the court lacked power under § 301(a) to resolve them. Id. at 914.
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enabled the old local and its members to relitigate their challenge
to the exercise of parental discipline in a subsequent state court
proceeding.
The court averted this distasteful possibility by holding that
section 301 (a) embraced suits for violation of the union constitution,100 at least in cases where the dispute had "traumatic indus-

trial and economic repercussions."' 0 1 In a remarkably frank
opinion for the court, Judge Sobeloff admitted that neither the
history of section 301(a) nor the decided cases supported the assertion of jurisdiction over the union constitution. 0 2 The court
nonetheless deemed it permissible to adopt what it termed a literal interpretation of the statute-one that supported jurisdiction. In a footnote, the court observed that a broad construction
of section 301 (a) advanced the regulatory scheme of the LMRDA
by "making a whole remedy available in a federal court when the
same conduct inflicts injury, adjudicable under LMRDA, upon individual members and also injury, not adjudicable under
LMRDA, upon local unions.'1 0 3
As construed in Parks, section 301(a) established less an independent federal right to enforcement of the union constitution
than a source of discretionary federal power over disputes under
the LMRDA, a source of power closely resembling that available
today under the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction. 0 4 First ar100. Id. at 916. This holding, coupled with the court's finding that the Norris-LaGuardia bar to the issuance of labor injunctions had no application in enforcing the union constitution, clothed the district court with the power, on
remand, to resolve all matters in dispute between the parties. Id. at 917-19. The
court carefully protected the thrust of its decision upholding the assertion of
parental control by making clear that the recognition of federal court jurisdiction to enforce the union constitution did not imply any judicial power to "remake the contract by introducing even salutary provisions not legislatively
prescribed or necessarily implied." Id. at 917.
101. Id. at 916. This reference to the importance of some industrial impact
was apparently drawn from Retail Clerks International Ass'n, Local Unions Nos.
128 & 633 v. Red Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962). In Retail Clerks, the
Supreme Court asserted jurisdiction over a strike settlement agreement on the
ground that it was a contract between an employer and a union "significant to
the maintenance of labor peace between them." Id. at 28.
102. The Fourth Circuit noted that the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act failed to disclose a definitive interpretation of the between-labor-organizations clause of § 301. Parks, 314 F.2d at 915. The court went on to collect
authority from courts and commentators to the effect that the clause was not
meant to apply to the union constitution. Id. at 915 nn.47-48.
103. Id. at 916 n.50.
104. Supplemental jurisdiction, which refers to the power of federal courts
to hear claims over which they lack an independent basis of jurisdiction, embraces both pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. For useful reviews of the origins
of the doctrine, see WRIGHT et al., supra note 11, § 3567, at 106-61; Thomas M.
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ticulated in its modern form three years after the Parks decision, 10 5 the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction enables federal
district courts to hear state law claims that arise from the same
common nucleus of operative facts that give rise to jurisdictionally sufficient federal claims. 10 6 As recently codified by Congress, 10 7 the doctrine would have enabled the Parks district court
to hear the local union's claims for breach of the union constitution, by treating them not as federal law claims under section
301(a), but as state law claims cognizable under supplemental
08
jurisdiction.'
Whatever one's view of the Fourth Circuit's use of section
301 (a) to solve litigation problems that courts today might choose
to address by invoking supplemental jurisdiction, 0 9 the Parks apMengler, The Demise of Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 247,
250-55; Wendy C. Perdue, Finley v. United States: UnstringingPendentJurisdiction,
76 VA. L. REV. 539, 541-51 (1990).
105. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
106. Id. at 725. In adopting the common nucleus test, the Gibbs Court rejected as "unnecessarily grudging" earlier decisions that authorized the exercise
of pendent jurisdiction only in cases where state law claims could be considered
but a single "cause of action." Id. See generally Note, The Evolution and Scope of the
Doctrine of PendentJurisdictionin the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1018 (1962)
(surveying exercises of pendent jurisdiction under "single cause of action"
standard).
107. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. 1990) (codifying doctrine of supplemental
jurisdiction). For a summary of the factors that led to the doctrine's codification,
see Thomas M. Mengler et al., Congress Accepts Supreme Court's Invitation to Codify
Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 JUDICATURE 213 (1991). For a critique of the new
statute, see Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity. Life
After Finley and the SupplementalJurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445 (1991) (arguing that statute is biased against diversity jurisdiction, restricts pendent party
jurisdiction in alienage cases and is generally poorly drafted and confusing).
108. The state law claims for breach of the IBEW constitution in Parks
plainly arose from the same "common nucleus" of operative facts as the local's
challenge to its charter revocation under the LMRDA. They would thus satisfy
the supplemental jurisdiction test as claims arising from a single constitutional
case or controversy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. For a discussion of the facts in Parks,
see supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
109. The availability of the supplemental jurisdiction alternative complicates the assessment of the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of § 301 (a) in Parks, at
least for those who believe that the absence of historical support does not end
the discussion. On the one hand, the availability of an alternative basis for the
assertion of federal power suggests that courts can achieve the Parks court's efficiency goals without reading § 301(a) in a way that threatens state control over
actions to enforce the union constitution. On the other hand, the theoretical
difference in the basis on which federal courts assert jurisdiction over the union
constitution may not affect the outcome of every dispute, especially in areas
where the undeveloped character of state law provides federal courts with discretion in "finding" the state law that would control pendent claims. The debate
over the approach in Parks focuses less on its concrete impact on a specific dispute than on its threat to state court competence through the application of the
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proach proved extremely influential. Appellate courts generally
agreed with the conclusion in Parks that while section 301 (a) embraced certain internal disputes, state courts were to retain control over many claims for breach of the union constitution.' 10
Other courts thus followed the Fourth Circuit's lead in holding
that section 301(a) embraced only those claims that arose from
internal union disputes that produce what later became known as
a "significant impact" on industrial relations."' Finally, as they
struggled to define the scope of federal power, the courts were
often reluctant to assert jurisdiction except in cases where enforcement of the union constitution would provide relief that was
required by the structure of the LMRDA.
Decisions that invoked Parks as authority for enforcing union
trusteeships illustrate the influence of the LMRDA in the assertion of section 301 (a) jurisdiction. 1 12 Although the LMRDA does
not explicitly authorize parent unions to sue in federal court to
obtain an order compelling a defiant local union to comply, it
does declare, as a matter of federal law, that lawful trusteeships
enjoy a presumption of validity." 13 The presumption attaches for
a period of eighteen months to any trusteeship that the parent
union imposes, after a fair hearing, for one of four statutorily§ 301 preemption-removal doctrine. For a discussion of the role of § 301 in the
Parks decision, see supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
110. See Local Union 1219, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters, 493 F.2d 93, 96 (1st Cir. 1974) (citing Parks in support of decision
upholding assertion of § 301 jurisdiction); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d
1234, 1248 (2d Cir. 1970) (same); Brotherhood of Painters v. Brotherhood of
Painters, Local Union 127, 264 F. Supp. 301, 305 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (same).
111. See, e.g., Local 334, 628 F.2d 812, 818 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S.
615 (1981). The federal courts expressed concern that a completely openended assertion of jurisdiction would invite a flood of litigation. As a consequence, they limited the scope of § 301 jurisdiction to disputes that entailed a
"significant impact on labor-management relations or industrial peace." Id.; see
also Stelling v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union No. 1547, 587
F.2d 1379, 1384 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that § 301 provides basis for jurisdiction when controversy will have a major impact on external labor relations), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979); Local Union No. 657 of United Bhd. of Carpenters
v. Sidell, 552 F.2d 1250, 1255 (7th Cir.) (holding that § 301 does not apply
where there are no extrinsic effects that would adversely impact labor-management relationships), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 862 (1977). The test was clearly aimed
at limiting federal jurisdiction to those disputes that posed some threat to stable
labor-management relations and to avoid hearing disputes over purely internal
union affairs that touched upon little of federal concern.
112. For background on the origins of the union trusteeship regulations in
Title III of the LMRDA, see infra notes 183-98 and accompanying text.
113. See LMRDA § 304(c), 29 U.S.C. § 464(c) (1988) (trusteeships established in conformance with union constitution or bylaws and properly authorized and ratified "shall be presumed valid").
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approved purposes.' 1 4 Reasoning that such statutory provisions
implicitly approve of proper trusteeships, the federal courts have
held that section 301(a) empowers them to entertain a parent's
action to enjoin its local union from disobeying a trusteeship that
passes muster under the LMRDA. 11 5
While the federal courts were thus occasionally successful in
using section 301(a) to supplement the LMRDA, they proved
largely incapable of developing a consistent approach to the exercise of federal power. Some courts refused to assert jurisdiction
over certain kinds of disputes on the ground that the required
impact on industrial relations was missing. 1 6 Other courts held
114. Id. Parent unions may lawfully impose trusteeships to correct corruption or financial malpractice, to assure the performance of collective bargaining
agreements, to restore democratic procedures and to otherwise carry out the
legitimate objects of the organization. Id. § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 462.
115. The LMRDA explicitly provides for suits by individual union members
and subordinate bodies to challenge a trusteeship. Id. § 304(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 464(a). The statute does not provide, however, for federal court enforcement
of the trusteeship by the union or trustee. See Beaird, supra note 43, at 517
("[N]o provision is made in the Act for suits to effectuate a trusteeship by either
the union imposing it or the designated trustee."). In early decisions in Puerto
Rico, the federal courts refused to take cognizance of actions by the parent to
enforce trusteeships. See Union de Trabajadores Industriales v. Union de Empleados, 55 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 11,938 (D.P.R. 1967) (holding that Title III does
not contemplate suit against employer who has nothing to do with administration or imposition of trusteeship); Ramos Ducos v. Maldonado, 207 F. Supp.
271, 273 (D.P.R. 1962) (holding no jurisdiction provided for action by trustee
against subordinate body).
The late Judge Friendly recognized that the prospect of local union noncompliance was inconsistent with the structure of federal trusteeship provisions,
which assumed that litigation over the propriety of the trusteeship would proceed with the trusteeship in place. In National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1971), he relied upon Parks to support his decision
that § 301 supplied a jurisdictional basis for a parent union's action to obtain an
injunction directing local union officials to comply with a trusteeship that otherwise met federal standards. Id. at 918-21. Other federal courts had previously
upheld the use of § 301 to implement a trusteeship. See Brotherhood of Painters
v. Brotherhood of Painters, Local 127, 264 F. Supp. 301, 306 (N.D. Cal. 1966)
(stating that international may bring suit under § 301 to have trusteeship enforced). Judge Friendly's opinion in Sombrotto, however, has been the decisive
factor in the widespread federal recognition of the availability of injunctive relief
to implement trusteeships. See International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Olympic
Plating Indus., Inc., 870 F.2d 1085, 1088 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Sombrotto); International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Local Lodge 714, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers,
845 F.2d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 1988) (same); Hansen v. Guyette, 814 F.2d 547, 552
(8th Cir. 1987) (same).
116. One can understand the "significant impact" test as permitting federal
courts to hear only those disputes that implicate the federal interest in avoiding
work stoppages. Compare Local Union No. 657 of United Bhd. of Carpenters v.
Sidell, 552 F.2d 1250, 1252-56 (7th Cir. 1977) (asserting jurisdiction over local
union's challenge to order from international union directing it to affiliate with
district council) and Local Union 1219, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United
Bhd. of Carpenters, 493 F.2d 93, 96 (1st Cir. 1974) (upholding § 301 jurisdic-
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that section 301 (a) jurisdiction was a doctrine of last resort, available for use in cases where they could not definitively resolve a
dispute under other federal labor statutes but unavailable in cases
where such federal statutes would dispose of the claim.' 17 As a
tion over suit in which newly chartered local asserted that parent failed to provide support in local's jurisdictional disputes with other locals) with Hotel &
Restaurant Employees Local 400 v. Svacek, 431 F.2d 705, 706 (9th Cir. 1970)
(refusing to hear local union's action to collect fine from wayward member by
stating union constitution not "contract" authorizing district court jurisdiction
where dispute is intra-union problem not related to collective bargaining
agreement).
Unfortunately, the ad hoc character of the decisions left the federal interest
in enforcing union constitutions largely undefined. In disputes over changes in
work standards that the parent imposed from above, courts have found a significant impact where the local brought suit but failed to recognize such an impact
where the local's acceptance of the parent's authority forced members to bring
suit. See Trail v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 542 F.2d 961, 963-65, 968
(6th Cir. 1976) (refusing to assert jurisdiction over action brought by individual
union members who challenged action by local and international union implementing amendment to collective contract without submitting change for membership ratification; no analysis of impact). Compare Stelling v. International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union No. 1547, 587 F.2d 1379, 1382, 1384 (9th
Cir. 1978) (concluding that members' suit challenging national pension plan
agreement that local's business agent signed over members' protest at specific
direction of international president failed to allege sufficient impact on labormanagement relations), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979) and Alexander v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 624 F.2d 1235, 1236, 1239 (5th Cir. 1980)
(same; international project agreement) with Sidell, 552 F.2d at 1251, 1255-56
(finding significant impact where local union opposed parental directive to affiliate with district council and asserted that order would affect stable bargaining
relationships with employers in its jurisdiction) and Local Union 1219, 493 F.2d at
95-96 (same; action by local union seeking parental support in jurisdictional dispute with other locals). Relatively compliant locals that presented their trade
jurisdiction claims to dispute resolution machinery under the union constitution
and then challenged the outcome in court were denied a federal forum that may
have been extended to a more bellicose local. See, e.g., Studio Elec. Technicians
Local 728 v. International Photographers of Motion Picture Indus., Local 659,
598 F.2d 551, 554 (9th Cir. 1979) (refusing to assert jurisdiction over suit by
local to set aside several union board decisions awarding work in question to
competing local). Such cases suggest that the outcome of the jurisdictional inquiry might turn on the grace with which the local accepts parental control. In
two cases where local unions brought suit to challenge parental actions that produced essentially identical industrial consequences, however, courts disagreed
as to their significance for jurisdictional purposes. Compare Sidell, 552 F.2d at
1255 (finding of impact predicated on disruption of established bargaining relationships that would accompany affiliation with district council) with Local 334,
628 F.2d 812, 820 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding no impact despite local's claim that
consolidation order would disrupt bargaining relationships similar to those at
issue in Sidell), rev'd, 452 U.S. 615 (1981).
117. Cases in which international unions denied local unions their constitutional right to ratify the terms of a new collective bargaining agreement illustrate
the tendency of the federal courts to use § 301 less as an independent source of
federal rights than as a source of power to supplement other federal statutes. See
Stelling, 587 F.2d at 1382 (discussing ratification of agreement made by local's
business manager at direction of international president over members' opposi-
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consequence, it was difficult for litigants to know whether to bring
their claims for violation of the union constitution in state or federal court and whether to measure their rights and obligations
under the union constitution by state or federal standards.
Although the lower court decisions that transformed section
301(a) thus depended to a large extent on the LMRDA, they left
the LMRDA out of the jurisdictional calculus. Instead, the courts
deployed a variety of techniques to pick and choose among the
disputes that would support section 301 (a) jurisdiction. Although
the courts' choices can be understood and perhaps defended on
pragmatic grounds, they failed to generate consistent answers to
jurisdictional questions.' 1 8 Indeed, they left the federal interest
tion); Trail, 542 F.2d at 964-65 (noting amendment to collective bargaining
agreement implemented without local member approval). In each case, the appellate court refused to assert jurisdiction over the members' § 301 claim, despite the fact that other courts had done so on similar facts. In each case, the
refusal to assert § 301 jurisdiction accompanied a finding that other federal statutes provided the members with a basis for challenging the alleged denial of
ratification rights. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that
union officers violated their fiduciary duty under the LMRDA by denying ratification rights under the constitution and proceeded to definitively resolve the
constitutional question on that ground. Stelling, 587 F.2d at 1385-89. The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached the constitutional issue by finding that
the denial of ratification rights violated the union's duty of fair representation.
Alexander, 624 F.2d at 1240-4 1. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that the alleged denial of ratification rights stated a claim for relief under both
the duty of fair representation and under the equal right to vote provisions of
the LMRDA. Trail, 542 F.2d at 966, 968.
Although they disagreed in certain respects about the proper interpretation
of the other federal statutes at issue, the courts' agreement on the question of
§ 301 jurisdiction suggests a willingness to use that provision only where a constitutional determination necessary to dispose of the case could not be reached
on other grounds. The Sixth Circuit made this point explicitly during its discussion of § 301. See Trail, 542 F.2d at 968. After observing that the plaintiffs could
tender evidence in support of their claims either under their LMRDA or duty of
fair representation theories, the court went on to explain that the availability of
these alternative remedies undercut the necessity for a finding of § 301
jurisdiction:
Since Congress and the courts have provided specific and complete
remedies for the instant case, we see no need to employ [§ 301] to
make a decision on the difficult general question of individual union
member third party beneficiary suits against unions based on union
constitution and charter; and we specifically decline to do so.
Id.
118. Decisions that refuse to hear the claims of individual union members,
either on the basis that the statute does not embrace such claims or on the basis
that the particular dispute did not threaten a work stoppage or other significant
impact on industrial relations, reflect the view that such claims often fail to implicate matters of federal concern. Such decisions also indicate an understandable reluctance to open federal dockets to a host of claims that were previously
handled in state courts. Commentators have suggested that such pragmatic considerations properly inform the analysis of other federal jurisdictional questions.
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in the enforcement of union constitutions largely undefined.'
III.

SECTION

19

301 (a) AND THE SEARCH FOR A FEDERAL INTEREST

The federal role in enforcing union constitutions remains undefined, despite the fact that the federal courts continue to struggle with the task of defining the boundaries between state and
federal power. In tracing this continuing struggle to the present
date, this part of the Article first reviews the Supreme Court's
opinion in Local 334. This part next explores the division of
lower court authority that remains in place following the Wooddell
decision. Finally, this part concludes that the federal courts have
thus far failed to articulate a federal interest in the enforcement of
union constitutions that justifies, and properly delimits, the exercise of federal power.
A.

The Decision in Local 334

The Local 334 case arose as a dispute between the United Association of Plumbers and Pipe Fitters (the UA) and a mixed local
of plumbers and pipefitters in northern New Jersey. During the
1970s, the UA developed a plan to consolidate some twentyseven such mixed locals throughout the state into a smaller
number of plumber and pipefitter locals. 120 Local 334 brought
See William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise "Directly"
Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 890 (1967) (arguing for recognition of
pragmatic limit on federal question jurisdiction). Others, however, have criticized the apparently ad hoc nature of such a pragmatic inquiry and favor the
return to bright line rules. See Linda R. Hirshman, Whose Law Is It, Anyway? A
Reconsideration of Federal Question Jurisdiction Over Cases of Mixed State and Federal
Law, 60 IND. L.J. 17 (1984).
119. If the justification for an expanded interpretation of § 301(a) in Parks
v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963), resembles the efficiency rationale of supplemental
jurisdiction, then one might suppose that the results in subsequent "significant
impact" cases would resemble those results the courts would achieve through
the careful application of supplemental jurisdiction. For background on supplemental jurisdiction, see supra notes 104-07. Such a theory might explain the
federal courts' reluctance to hear disputes absent some clear federal interest
under the LMRDA. Courts may invoke the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction, after all, only where the assertion of a substantial federal claim supplies
jurisdiction to which state law claims may be appended. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (holding that federal claim "must have
substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court"). In
many cases where the dispute failed the "significant impact" test, such a substantial federal claim was missing from pleadings alleging only a violation of the
union constitution.
120. The plan called for Local 334, and eight other northern locals, to
transfer their plumbers to Local 14 and their pipefitters to Local 274. Local 334,
452 U.S. 615, 616-17 (1981). After effecting the transfer, Local 334 would cease
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suit in state court, seeking to block the ordered consolidation as a
violation of the union constitution. After removing the action to
federal court, the UA obtained summary judgment on alternative
grounds. 1 2 1 . On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit joined the majority of appellate courts in ruling that the federal courts enjoy jurisdiction over only those internal union
122
disputes that have a significant impact on labor relations.
Finding no such impact in the facts before it, the court ordered
the case dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. 123
Perhaps we expect too much of the Supreme Court. A thorough review of the jurisdictional question in Local 334 would have
shown that, as a historical matter, contracts "between any such
labor organizations" were agreements between autonomous national unions. 124 It would also have recognized that the LMRDA
played an enormously influential role in the decisions by lower
courts to reject the historically correct interpretation and apply
section 301(a) to union constitutions as well.' 2 5 Instead of wrestling with the legitimacy of the expanded reading, however,
the Court's opinion in Local 334 denied the relevance of the
LMRDA and simply held that section 301(a) provides a basis for
federal court jurisdiction over suits for violation of the union
26
constitution.
to exist. When resistance to the plan surfaced, the UA invoked a provision in its
constitution that authorized the president of the parent union to order consolidation of superfluous locals when such action was in the "best interest" of the
association. Id. at 617.
121. The district court dismissed the suit on the ground that the UA was
entitled to judgment against Local 334 because the local failed to exhaust its
internal union remedies before bringing suit, and, in the alternative, because the
union constitution authorized the UA to order the contested consolidation. See
Local 334, 628 F.2d 812, 814 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 615 (1981).
122. Id. at 818 ("[C]ourts are uniform in holding that intra-union disputes
do not present a federal question under § 301(a) ....
[D]isputes between local
and parent unions must involve ... a significant impact on labor-management
relations or industrial peace in order for there to be jurisdiction under
§ 301 (a).").
•
123. Id. at 820.
124. For a discussion of the history of the between-labor-organizations
clause, see supra notes 30-56 and accompanying text.
125. For a discussion of the role of the LMRDA in lower courts' decisions
to apply § 301 to union constitutions, see supra notes 90-119 and accompanying
text.
126. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 625-27 (1981). Nothing obliged the Court to
ignore the LMRDA. Its earlier decisions had recognized that, as part of the
evolving federal regulation of industrial relations, the LMRDA might shed light
on the reach of the Taft-Hartley Act. For an early comment by the Court on the
role of the LMRDA, see supra note 85. In deciding to dismiss the LMRDA, probably to dodge the implications of the statute's non-preemption provisions, the
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The Supreme Court offered a surprisingly cursory, even glib,
analysis of the jurisdictional question. The Court proceeded essentially by syllogism, first observing that the state and federal
courts had long regarded the union constitution as a "contract." 12 7 Next, the Court observed that both the parent union,
the UA, and its affiliate, Local 334, were labor organizations
within the terms of the Taft-Hartley Act.' 2 8 On this basis, the
Court concluded that the plain meaning of section 301 supported
the assertion of jurisdiction over the union constitution as a contract between labor organizations. 129 It found nothing in its brisk
30
tour of the legislative history to undermine this conclusion.'
Thus, the Court observed that the Eightieth Congress was undoubtedly familiar with state courts' use of contract doctrine to
enforce union constitutions and would not have used the unqualified term "contract" if it had not intended to bring such contracts
3
within the federal domain.' '
Court lost any chance for a candid elaboration of the application of § 301 (a) to
union constitutions. For a discussion of the virtues and vices of judicial candor,
see Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEo. L.J.
353, 412-13 (1989) (suggesting that call by Guido Calabresi and William Eskridge for candor in dynamic statutory interpretation may lead courts beyond
the boundary of legitimate interpretation and into judicial lawmaking).
127. Local 334, 452 U.S. at 621.
128. Id. at 622. The Court failed to establish by reference to anything in
the record that both the parent and the local were in fact engaged in representing employees. Id. Rather, the Court relied upon earlier decisions involving
suits for violation of collective bargaining agreements in which parent and local
unions were treated as labor organizations within the meaning of § 301. Id.
129. Id. at 627.
130. Id. at 622-25. The Court noted that the conference committee failed
to explain its decision to add the between-labor-organizations clause to the statute, and also noted that the primary purpose of the Taft-Hartley Act was to promote collective bargaining. Id. at 623. The Court then recited a series of
statements from the legislative history suggesting that Congress also sought to
counteract jurisdictional defects that contributed to the instability of labor
agreements by making unions subject to suit as entities in federal court. Id. The
Court concluded, without pointing to any support in the legislative history, that
the policy supporting enforcement of labor contracts was equally applicable to
suits to enforce union constitutions. Id. at 624-25 ("Surely Congress could conclude that the enforcement of the terms of union constitutions .. .would contribute to the enforcement of labor stability."). The Court thus extended the
policy of stability that Congress had fashioned for negotiated agreements to the
enforcement of constitutional rules that unions rarely negotiate.
131. Id. at 624. In support of its claim that Congress undoubtedly meant its
reference to contracts between labor organizations to encompass the union constitution, the Court claimed, without citation, that at the time the statute was
enacted such constitutions were "probably the most commonplace form of contract between labor organizations." Id. Whatever light this unsupported assertion sheds on the literal meaning of the statute, it simply begs the question
whether union constitutions were among the inter-union agreements with which
Congress was concerned in adding the second clause to § 301(a).
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Although the opinion thus briefly considered the language
and history of section 301(a), the Court appeared more intent on
masking, rather than elaborating on, the meaning of the betweenlabor-organizations clause. 132 To begin with, the Court simply ignored arguments that would undermine its literal reading of the
statute. Local 334 argued that section 301 applied to agreements
such as no-raid agreements, but the Court's opinion never mentioned the existence of such agreements, let alone the possibility
that section 301(a) had been drafted with them in mind.13 3 Local
334 also argued that the non-preemption provisions of the
LMRDA reflected a legislative understanding that state court control of actions to enforce union constitutions survived the passage
of the Taft-Hartley Act. 134 The Court dismissed the LMRDA as
35
irrelevant to the task of interpreting the earlier statute.
In a maneuver more telling than the Court's deliberate failure to address arguments that would undermine its reading of
section 301(a), the Court invoked its "wide-ranging" authority
132. 1 argue in a separate article that the Court was on solid ground in
concluding that § 301(a) makes the collective agreement federally enforceable.
See Pfander, supra note 8, at 287-309 (contending that "the language, structure,
and history of section 301" support this view). The same can be said of the
Court's decision that § 301(a) embraces the arbitration provisions of a strike
settlement agreement. See Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local Unions Nos. 128 &
633 v. Red Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962) (holding strike settlement
agreement fell plainly within § 301(a)). As the Court noted, the deliberate decision of Congress to use the term "contracts" in § 301, rather than the more
restrictive term "collective bargaining agreements," suggests that Congress intended the statute to reach beyond the collective agreement. Id. at 25-26.
Moreover, the conferees' decision to broaden the Senate bill by striking the limiting reference to contracts "concluded as a result of collective bargaining,"
though not relied upon by the Court, certainly suggests that § 301 includes
other forms of agreement between employers and unions. For a comparison of
the language in the Senate and House bills, see supra note 72. Finally, the conferees' decision to transfer jurisdiction over arbitration agreements from the Labor Board to the federal courts suggests that the arbitration provision of a strike
settlement agreement that contributed to labor peace was precisely the kind of
contract that Congress meant to bring within § 301. See Retail Clerks, 369 U.S. at
28 (stating that § 301 threshold is "agreement between employers and labor
organizations significant to the maintenance of labor peace between them").
For comments on the transfer of enforcement authority from the Labor Board to
the courts, see supra notes 75-78.
133. Local 334 contended that Congress intended the second clause of
§ 301 to encompass no-raid and other jurisdictional agreements. Respondent's
Brief at 21-24, Local 334, 452 U.S. 615 (1981) (No. 80-710). Additionally, such
an argument was made in secondary authority that the Court noted and purported to rely on in its opinion. See Local 334, 452 U.S. at 624 (citing Comment,
supra note 8). No explicit reference to this argument appears in the opinion,
however.
134. Local 334, 452 U.S. at 625-26 & nn.10-15.
135. Id. at 626.
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over federal labor contracts to support its decision.136 The existence of such authority as a general matter sheds little light on the
question whether Congress intended to bring the union constitution within the federal domain of section 301(a).' 37 It does suggest, however, that the Court was conscious of flaws in its
interpretation and was nonetheless determined to uphold the as38
sertion of federal power.'
The opinion in Local 334 can thus be criticized for failing to
justify its assertion ofjurisdiction in the history of section 301 or
in an asserted need to carry out a mission articulated in other federal statutory schemes.' 39 Consequently, the opinion fails to pro136. Id. at 627 ("Congress intended the federal courts to enjoy wide-ranging authority to enforce labor contracts under § 301.").
137. Since the Court's decision in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, it has
been clear that federal courts must develop a body of federal common law to
govern the outcome of disputes over labor contracts that come within its terms.
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957). The
Court noted that "[t]he range ofjudicial inventiveness will be determined by the
nature of the problem." Id. at 457. The Court's decision to unleash such "judicial inventiveness" drew criticism from judges and commentators who regarded
the development of principles to govern the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements as a matter for which federal judges were unsuited. Pfander,
supra note 8, at 274-78.
Whatever the merit of the critique, Congress clearly intended to authorize
the federal courts to play a wide-ranging role in the enforcement of the collective agreement. Id. at 304 ("Congress intended for the federal courts to work
out the detailed rules that would govern the enforcement of labor contracts.").
The fact that Congress approved of such a role as to the collective agreement,
however, furnishes no warrant for extending such inventiveness to union
constitutions.
138. Although the opinion fails to identify any such federal interest, it
seems likely that the Court based its decision on its perception that the growing
assertion of federal control over internal union affairs in the LMRDA made it
appropriate to federalize at least some obligations found in the union
constitution.
139. In a dissent joined by then-Associate Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens forcefully criticized the majority's conclusion that § 301 conferred jurisdiction over suits for violations of the union constitution. Local 334, 452 U.S. at
634-69 (StevensJ., dissenting). Justice Stevens found the legislative history utterly devoid of any suggestion that Congress was concerned with ensuring the
enforcement of union constitutions or that such constitutions involve "any federal interest sufficient to warrant the creation of federal rights." Id. at 635 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Noting the absence of the expressions of congressional
concern and related statutory provisions that guided the Court in Lincoln Mills,
Justice Stevens concluded that the action failed to present a federal question
arising under the laws of the United States within the meaning of Article III of
the Constitution. Id. at 635, 638-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
As Part II of this Article makes clear, Justice Stevens argued correctly that
the history of § 301(a) furnished no support for the majority's decision. For a
critique of the majority opinion, see supra notes 127-38 and accompanying text.
Justice Stevens argued that the "arising under" clause of Article III of the
United States Constitution barred the assertion ofjurisdiction over union constitutions. Local 334, 452 U.S. at 633-34, 637-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
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vide the lower federal courts with meaningful guidance as to what
kind of union constitution disputes they may hear. On the one
hand, the Court suggested that essentially every dispute arising
from the constitution will satisfy the statute. Thus, the Court indicated that union constitutions are "contracts" within the meaning of section 301-a term, the Court noted, that Congress used
' 40
without "any special qualification or limitation on its reach."'
On this basis, the Court reversed the Third Circuit's decision that
jurisdiction under section 301 was limited to disputes with a "significant impact" on industrial peace. 14 1 On the other hand, the
Court suggested a willingness to tolerate limits on the statute's
scope by leaving open the question whether individual union
members may bring actions under section 301 to enforce union
constitutions. 142
B.

Individual Member Suits and the Decision in Wooddell

The question left open by the Local 334 decision produced a
division in lower court authority. Most lower federal courts
agreed to hear member claims,' 43 reasoning by analogy to the
Stevens thus echoed Justice Frankfurter's challenge to the constitutionality of
§ 301(a)'s application to the collective bargaining agreement. See Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. at 460-84 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
In brief, the Frankfurter-Stevens argument rests on the contention that the
jurisdictional provisions of § 301 (a) fail to make labor contracts enforceable as a
matter of federal law and fail to offer guidance to courts charged with policing
the agreements. See id. at 469 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Lacking guidance,
federal courts will simply borrow state law. Actions to enforce labor contracts
under such a borrowed body of state law, so the argument goes, do not "arise
under" federal law for purposes of Article III. Id. at 469-70 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Frankfurter's deployment of this argument against the enforcement
of collective agreements under the statute's first clause was more than a little
overdrawn. See Pfander, supra note 8, at 279-309 (collecting historical support
for enforcement under § 301). Justice Stevens' use of the same argument to
attack the enforcement of union constitutions under the between-labor-organizations clause enjoys a good deal more historical support because one has difficulty finding in the history of the Taft-Hartley Act either a declaration of the
federal enforceability of union constitutions or a body of legislative standards to
guide the creation of federal common law.
140. Local 334, 452 U.S. at 624-25 ("[W]e cannot believe that Congress
would have used the unqualified term 'contract' without intending to encompass
that category of contracts represented by union constitutions.").
141. Id. at 619.
142. See id. at 627 n.16.
143. See DeSantiago v. Laborers Int'l Union, Local No. 1140, 914 F.2d 125,
128-29 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that federal question jurisdiction arose where
claims against local union based on local and international constitutions were
preempted by § 301); Pruitt v. Carpenters' Local Union No. 225, 893 F.2d 1216,
1219 (11 th Cir. 1990) (holding that § 301 covers suits for contract violations
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claims the Court permitted individual employees to bring to enforce the collective bargaining agreement in Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n. 14 4 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, rejected the analogy to Smith. The Sixth Circuit had previously declined to hear actions brought by individual members for breach
of the union constitution,1 4 5 and nothing in the Local 334 decision
persuaded the court to change its mind. 14 6 In Wooddell v. Internabetween employers and labor organizations and term "contract" includes union
constitutions); Lewis v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 771, 826 F.2d
1310, 1314 (3d Cir. 1987) ("If individual union members are third party beneficiaries of collective bargaining agreements, it follows that they have the same
status with respect to union constitutions."); Kinney v. International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, 669 F.2d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that Ninth Circuit's
position is clear that individuals can use § 301 to sue on union constitution);
Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95 of Laborers' Int'l Union, 624 F.
Supp. 678, 682-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing Kinney as controlling law on issue);
Legutko v. Local 816, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 606 F. Supp. 352, 356 (E.D.N.Y.)
(allowing suit for breach of voting rights by local union and likening to suits
brought for breach of unique personal rights), aff'd, 853 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir.
1985); Davis v. American Postal Workers Union, 582 F. Supp. 1574, 1575 (S.D.
Fla. 1984) (holding that federal jurisdiction conferred where member sues union
for breach of union constitution); Gordon v. Winpisinger, 581 F. Supp. 234, 239
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (same as Legutko); Alford v. National Post Office Mail Handlers,
576 F. Supp. 278, 285 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (holding that union member may sue for
violation of constitution under same circumstances that would allow union itself
to sue); Doby v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 1162, 1166 (E.D. Va. 1981)
(finding that "member's right to sue under a collective bargaining agreement
applies equally to suits by members for breach of a contract in the form of a
constitution").
144. 371 U.S. 195 (1962). In Smith, the Court rejected the employer's claim
that the language of § 301 limited the scope ofjurisdiction to suits between parties to the collective bargaining agreement and thus barred individuals' suits. Id.
at 200. The Court emphasized that § 301 required only a contract between an
employer and a union, not a lawsuit between such parties. Id. The Court upheld the assertion of jurisdiction over claims of the individual employees based,
in part, on the fact that the individual claims "lie at the heart of the grievance
and arbitration machinery [and] are ... inevitably intertwined with union interests."). Id.
For cases that extend Smith by analogy to individual claims to enforce union
constitutions, see, e.g., Kinney, 669 F.2d at 1229 (incorporating discussion of
Smith by citing Stelling v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union No.
1547, 587 F.2d 1379, 1382-83 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979));
Doby, 523 F. Supp. at 1166 (stating that because constitution is contract within
meaning of § 185, Smith reasoning applies to constitutions as well as collective
bargaining agreements).
145. See Trail v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 542 F.2d 961, 967 (6th
Cir. 1976) (explaining that Smith does not compel expanded reading of § 301 to
include suits concerning intra-union disputes (citing Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957))).
146. See Corea v. Weio, 937 F.2d 1132, 1145-46 (6th Cir. 1991) (declining
to adopt Smith to permit plaintiffs' suit for alleged violations of union constitution and bylaws); Tucker v. Bieber, 900 F.2d 973, 980 (6th Cir.) (reaffirming
Trail and holding that § 301 does not reach suits brought by individual members), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 135 (1990).
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tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 71,147 the Supreme
Court agreed to decide whether the Sixth Circuit's ongoing interpretation remained correct.
The dispute began when Guy Wooddell, a member of the
Electrical Workers, Local 71 in Ohio, opposed amendments to
the Local's bylaws.1 48 Wooddell's brother, the president of Local
71, brought internal union disciplinary charges against him and
allegedly caused Local 71 to refuse to give Wooddelljob referrals
through its hiring hall.14 9 Wooddell brought suit in federal court,
alleging that the disciplinary proceeding1 50 and the denial of job
referrals violated the LMRDA and the duty of fair representation.' 5 ' He also charged Local 71 with violations of its contrac152
tual duties under the IBEW constitution and its own bylaws.
147. 112 S. Ct, 494 (1991).
148. Id. at 497, Wooddell's complaint alleged that Local 71 commenced a
campaign in January 1986 to amend the Local's bylaws to raise union dues and
assessments. Wooddell claimed that his opposition to the amendments led to
retaliation at the hands of the Local's president. Joint Appendix at 7-8, Wooddell,
112 S. Ct. 494 (1991) (No. 90-967).
149. Wooddell, 112 S. Ct. at 497; see also Joint Appendix at 8-10, Wooddell
(No. 90-967).
150. Joint Appendix at 11, Wooddell (No. 90-967). Wooddell challenged the
fairness and propriety of the disciplinary proceeding his brother initiated against
him as a violation of both the LMRDA and the IBEW constitution. Wooddell, 112
S. Ct. at 497. Under the LMRDA claims, Wooddell asserted that the procedural
protections were inadequate and that, in any case, the proceeding was initiated
against him in retaliation for his assertion of his right to oppose the dues increase. Joint Appendix at 11, Wooddell (No. 90-967). The IBEW constitutional
claims were based on a provision of the IBEW constitution that requires local
unions to grant accused members a "fair and impartial trial." Id. at 12, 37.
151. Joint Appendix at 13, Wooddell (No. 90-967). Wooddell's theory was
that Local 71 had an obligation under the duty of fair representation to refer
him for work fairly and without discrimination. Id. As a consequence, he attacked the discrimination both as a violation of the duty of fair representation
and as a form of retaliation prohibited by the LMRDA. Id. at 11, 13. Local 71
obtained the dismissal of these claims on the theory that they came within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. Wooddell v. Electrical Workers, Local 71,
135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2926, 2929-30 (S.D. Ohio 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
907 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 494 (1991).
Wooddell also attacked the discrimination in job referrals as a violation of
provisions in Local 7 1's collective bargaining agreement that required the Local
to refer members in accordance with seniority. Joint Appendix at 9, Wfooddell
(No. 90-967). This violation, in turn, was said to violate Local 71's obligation
under the IBEW constitution to comply with its collective bargaining agreements, as well as a parallel obligation under the Local's bylaws. Id. at 12, 24.
152. Joint Appendix at 12-13, Wooddell (No. 90-967). Wooddell first
claimed that Local 71 violated its duty under the IBEW constitution to comply
with its collective agreements. Article XVII, § 10 of the IBEW constitution provides: "All L.U.'s [local unions] shall be compelled to live up to all approved
agreements unless broken or terminated by the other party or parties, which fact
shall first be ascertained by the I.P. [International President]. No agreement of
any kind or nature shall be abrogated without sanction of the I.P." Id. at 24
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Finally, Wooddell charged his brother and the business manager
individually with violations of their constitutional obligations as
53
officers of Local 71.1
After the district court's dismissal of Wooddell's action was
largely upheld on appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to decide whether section 301 extended to Wooddell's claims
under the union constitution.1 54 Justice White's opinion for a
(quoting IBEW constitution). Wooddell also charged that Local 71 violated its
obligation to provide union members with a fair trial. Id. at 11. Article XXVII,
§ 5 of the IBEW constitution provides: "The trial board [made up of the executive board of the local union] shall proceed with the case .... The accused shall
be granted a fair and impartial trial. He must, upon request, be allowed an
I.B.E.W. member to represent him." Id. at 37 (quoting IBEW constitution). In
addition to these claims under the IBEW constitution, Wooddell asserted claims
under bylaws of Local 71 that were not made part of the Joint Appendix. See
Wooddell, 112 S. Ct. at 497 (petitioner's complaint included alleged violations of
Local 71 bylaws). These claims alleged that certain bylaw provisions obligated
Local 71 to provide Wooddell with a fair trial, to provide for his material welfare
and to comply with its collective agreements. Id.
153. Joint Appendix at 12-13, Wooddell (No. 90-967). The claims against
Wooddell's brother, the president of the Local, were predicated on provisions of
the IBEW constitution stating that the Local's president "shall be held responsible for the strict enforcement of this Constitution and the rules herein and the
L.U. bylaws." Id. at 13, 29 (quoting IBEW constitution). The basis for the claim
against the business manager was less clear. It may have been based on vaguely
worded constitutionally-based obligations of the business manager, or on general constitutional provisions stating that "member[s] may be penalized for ...
[v]iolation of any provision of this Constitution and the rules herein, or the bylaws, working agreements, or rules of a L.U." Id. at 32 (quoting IBEW
constitution).
In addition, Wooddell claimed that the individual defendants tortiously interfered with his contract rights in violation of state law. Id. at 13-14. Whether
such tortious interference claims may be based on contracts within the exclusively federal domain of § 301 has been the subject of much lower court discussion. For the flavor of the debate, compare Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co. v.
Newspaper Guild, Local 120, 647 F.2d 372, 381-82 (3d Cir. 1981) (determining
that § 301 jurisdiction encompasses tortious interference claims against non-signatory to federal labor contract) with Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. PrattFarnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 502 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding no federal jurisdiction). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted the position that while
§ 301 preempts state law claims for tortious interference, it does not create a
federal claim to fill the void. See Dougherty v. Parsec, Inc., 824 F.2d 1477, 147879 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding § 301 preempts state law claims); Service Employees
Union, Local 47 v. Commercial Prop. Servs., Inc., 755 F.2d 499, 506 (6th Cir.)
(holding there was no § 301 subject matter jurisdiction and dismissing pendent
state claim), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985).
154. Wooddell, 112 S. Ct. at 497. The Court adopted the issue presented by
the parties-whether § 301 creates a "federal cause of action under which a
union member may sue his union for a violation of the union constitution?" Id.
at 498 n.3. The Court's analysis, however, clearly focused on the question of
jurisdiction. Indeed, the Court opened its textual discussion of the question by
asking "[w]hether the subject-matter jurisdiction conferred on the district courts
by § 301 extends to suits on union constitutions brought by individual union
members." Id. at 498.
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unanimous Court answered the question in the affirmative, but
did so on extremely narrow grounds. 15 5 For jurisdictional purposes, the Court ignored much of Wooddell's complaint and focused on the allegation charging Local 71 with violating an IBEW
constitutional provision that obligated local unions to comply
with their collective bargaining agreements. 56 Such a provision,
as the Court repeatedly emphasized, established a parent-local
contract between the IBEW and Local 71 within the meaning of
57
existing law.'
Having found in the complaint an alleged breach of the parent-local contract, Justice White based the remainder of his opinion for the Court on well-established law. The IBEW could bring
suit under section 301 to enforce Local 71's obligation to comply
with its collective agreements; prior decisions made at least that
much clear and had also held that federal law would govern the
resolution of the dispute. 5 8 Because Local 71 was charged with
violating a contract between unions, the decisive question in the
case was whether section 301 also applied where the claim was
brought by an individual, such as Wooddell, who was not himself
a party to the contract. That question had also been answered
previously, albeit in the context of an action brought by an individual employee to enforce the collective agreement against an
employer.' 59 Wooddell's only innovation-its assertion that individual union members "are often the beneficiaries of ... interunion contracts, and when they are, they likewise may bring suit
on these contracts" 6 0-was hardly startling news.
Understandably, the Court gave short shrift to the Local's arguments. Local 71 contended, as had Local 334 before it, that
the Taft-Hartley Act left disputes over union constitutions in the
hands of state courts and that the LMRDA preserved that state
155. Id. at 498-99 & n.4. In addition to the jurisdictional question, the
Court decided that Wooddell was entitled to trial by jury on his claims under the
LMRDA. Id. at 498.
156. Id. at 499. For the text of the relevant provision of the IBEW constitution, see supra note 152.
157. Wooddell, 112 S. Ct. at 499. By identifying this provision as one Local
71 allegedly breached, the Court explained, Wooddell had charged a "violation
of a contract between two unions" within the meaning of § 301. Id. The related
footnote observed that both parties to the "contract," the IBEW and Local 71,
were indisputably labor organizations as the statute defines the term. Id. at 499
n.5.
158. Id. at 499-500 (citing Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 624 (1981); Local 174,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962)).
159. Id. (citing Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962)).
160. Id. at 500.
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role.' 6 ' Just as it had done previously, the Court refused to confront the LMRDA directly. 16 2 The Court also quickly dismissed
the Local's contention that the assertion of jurisdiction would
flood federal courthouses with trivial disputes over internal union
affairs.' 6 3 The Court expressed doubt that it could properly consider such a factor but nonetheless cited leading cases in which
the federal courts agreed to hear individual claims, apparently to
16 4
illustrate its point that such claims were anything but trivial.
The ease with which the Court resolved the jurisdictional
question should not obscure the important fact that Justice White
took pains to characterize Wooddell's claim as one brought by a
third-party beneficiary to enforce the contract between Local 71
and the IBEW. Such an approach differs markedly from the manner in which many common law courts of general jurisdiction
might have characterized Wooddell's complaint.16 5 Those courts
might well treat Local 71's duty to refrain from violating its col161. See Brief for Respondents at 10-14, Wooddell (No. 90-967).
162. Instead, the Court reformulated the Local's argument. Assuming that
§ 301 embraced the individual claim, the Court focused on the question whether
the LMRDA purported to restrict the reach of the earlier statute. Wooddell, 112
S. Ct. at 500. Needless to say, the Court found no evidence that the LMRDA
meant to curtail the federal courts' authority to interpret union constitutions; no
one regarded § 301 as having conferred such authority on the federal courts at
the time the LMRDA was adopted. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. Interestingly, the Court's illustrative cases arise from disputes over
internal union affairs that implicate other provisions of federal law. See DeSantiago v. Laborers Int'l Union, Local No. 1140, 914 F.2d 125, 126-27 (8th Cir.
1990) (member who charged local with violating union constitution in operation
of hiring hall had earlier filed claims with NLRB); Pruitt v. Carpenters' Local
225, 893 F.2d 1216, 1218-19 (1lth Cir. 1990) (member's challenge to local's
failure to instate him in office alleged separate violations of LMRDA and union
constitution); Kinney v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 669 F.2d 1222,
1225-27 (9th Cir. 1981) (complaint for unlawful removal from union office
based both on LMRDA and on union constitution).
In Lewis v. InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamnsters, Local Union No. 771, the members based their challenge to their local union's failure to permit them to ratify a
change in their collective bargaining agreement entirely on provisions in the
national constitution. Lewis v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union
No. 771, 826 F.2d 1310 (3d Cir. 1987). Other plaintiffs in such cases often allege breaches of either the officer's fiduciary duty under LMRDA or the union's
duty of fair representation. For a discussion of cases in which both LMRDA and
constitutional challenges have been made, see supra note 117 and accompanying
text.
165. Common law courts viewed the union constitution as establishing contracts between the union and the members, among the members themselves,
and between the parent and the local. For a discussion of common law treatment of union constitutions, see supra note 49 and accompanying text. As courts
of general jurisdiction, they did not face the problem of characterization that the
Court faced in Wooddell.
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lective bargaining agreements as establishing a contract with both
the IBEW and with each of its individual members; they might
thus view Wooddell's complaint as one to enforce not the rights
of the parent union, but Wooddell's own rights under his separate union-member contract with Local 71.166
At a minimum, Justice White's deliberate decision to characterize Wooddell's claim as one for breach of the parent-local contract rather than as one to enforce Wooddell's own contract
suggests that the Court sought the narrowest ground of decision. 16 7 There is some evidence to indicate that the Court went
further, implicitly rejecting the assertion of section 301 jurisdiction over actions that implicate the union-member and union-officer contracts. For example, the Court repeatedly described
Wooddell's claim as one that alleged a violation of an "interunion
contract" instead of using the more generic reference to union
constitutions. Such a deliberate choice of the more narrow
phrase reflects a conception of section 301 as limited to that subset of provisions in a national constitution that regulate the par68
ent-local relationship. 1
The Court's handling of the standing question further underscores its narrow view of the scope of section 301. Justice White
observed in a footnote that the parties did not dispute Wooddell's
standing to bring suit against Local 71, a remark designed to reserve that question for future determination. 169 Although Wood166. State courts generally viewed claims by members to remedy procedural flaws in union discipline as suits to enforce the members' own contract
with the union. They thus might well have viewed Wooddell's contract claim
against Local 71 for breach of the fair trial requirement in the national constitution as one for violation of the union-member contract. For a discussion of
Wooddell's claims, see supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text. Such a characterization may have little relevance for purposes of defining the scope of § 301
jurisdiction, however. Indeed, as I show below, virtually every claim that
charges a union with a violation of its duties under a national constitution appears to allege the breach of a parent-local contract. For a discussion of this
issue, see infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
167. As part of its deliberately narrow reach, the Court's opinion refrained
from addressing a variety of contract claims in Wooddell. Wooddell charged Local 71 with violations of its own bylaws and charged individual defendants with a
violation of their duties as officers of Local 71. Wooddell, 112 S. Ct. at 497. For a
discussion of these claims and the Court's actual focus, see supra notes 152-54
and accompanying text. The Court refused to address the jurisdictional sufficiency of both claims, perhaps because it could not characterize them as alleging
a violation of a contract between unions.
168. In other sections of the opinion, the Court repeatedly refrains from
referring ambiguously to the union constitution and refers instead to a "contract
between unions." See, e.g., Wooddell, 112 S. Ct. at 498 n.3 ("contract between two
labor organizations"); id. at 499, 500 ("interunion contract").
169. Id. at 498-99 n.4. The Court's handling of the issue for decision ex-
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dell clearly had standing to enforce his own contract with Local
71, he might not enjoy standing to enforce the IBEW's right
under the national constitution to insist on local union compliance with the collective agreement.' 70 By leaving the standing
question open, Justice White's opinion emphasizes that section
301 jurisdiction applies to individual claims not because they implicate the IBEW constitution, but rather because they seek to enforce the provisions in the constitution that specifically regulate
the parent-local relationship.
It appears, nonetheless, that lower courts will adopt an exceedingly broad view of the scope of federal power in the wake of
Wooddell. In Shea v. McCarthy, 17 1 for example, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that section 301 embraced a suit
brought by individual members that charged a former president
of the Teamsters union with a violation of his duties under the
national constitution. 72 Though limited on its facts to suits
against union officers, the rationale of Shea extends federal power
to claims for breach of virtually every provision of the national
plains why it was so careful to leave the standing question open. An early footnote noted that the issue on which certiorari had been granted was whether
§ 301 "create[s] a federal cause of action under which a union member may sue
his union for a violation of the union constitution." Id. at 498 n.3. The Court
did its best to recast its discussion in terms ofjurisdiction, but it was still obliged
to answer the "cause of action" question in the affirmative. Id. at 499. Recognizing potential problems with a decision that cleared the way for Wooddell to
enforce his local union's collective agreements, the Court thus chose to leave
open the standing question. Id. at 498 n.4 (noting that sole issue was subject
matter jurisdiction; petitioner's standing was "not disputed before this Court").
170. For a discussion of individual member standing to enforce compliance
with the collective agreement, see infra note 236 and accompanying text.
171. 953 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992).
172. Id. at 30. Shea brought suit against Teamsters President William McCarthy, alleging that McCarthy fired him as part of a deliberate plan to suppress
dissent within the union. Id. Specifically, Shea alleged that McCarthy violated
two separate provisions of the Teamsters constitution: one that imposed on the
president the obligation to "act to the best of his ability in furthering the interests of the organization," and one that allowed the president to remove union
officials such as Shea only "for the best interests of the International Union."
Appendix to Appellant's Brief on Appeal to United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit at 5, Shea, 953 F.2d 29 (No. 91-7483) (quoting Teamsters
constitution, article VI, § 1(a)).
The District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed all
claims. Shea, 953 F.2d at 30. The court found that § 301 did not extend to
Shea's allegation in the first count of his complaint that McCarthy's plan violated
his obligation under the constitution to manage the union's affairs in good faith
and in compliance with union law. Id. Shea made the strategic decision to exhaust his LMRDA claims and to appeal only from the dismissal of the first count.
Id. As it came to the Second Circuit, therefore, the appeal presented only the
question whether § 301 applies to claims against individual union officials. Id.
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union constitution and, if widely followed, would lead to the vir3
tual displacement of state control.17
IV.

TOWARD A THEORY OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION

This part of the Article proposes to define the scope of section 301 jurisdiction more narrowly to apply only to suits that implicate the parent-local relationship in a national union
constitution. The proposed interpretation finds support in both
the language of section 301 and the pains the Wooddell Court took
to limit its decision to suits for violation of the parent-local contract. The proposed interpretation would rest uneasily, however,
on nothing more substantial than the language of a provision that
the framers of the Taft-Hartley Act drafted for reasons other than
to authorize the federal enforcement of union constitutions. 174
Accordingly, this part of the Article considers more explicitly
the structure of the statute that doubtless led to the federal enforcement of union constitutions-the oft-ignored LMRDA. It
shows that although the LMRDA offers some federal guidelines to
courts facing disputes between the parent and subordinate bodies
of national labor unions, the statute deliberately leaves one side
of the relationship between the union and its individual members
and officers in the hands of the state courts. The proposed limitation on the scope of section 301 jurisdiction to suits that allege a
violation of the parent-local contract thus would allow federal
courts to hear all disputes that plausibly implicate the interest in
internal union affairs that Congress defined in the LMRDA. At
the same time, it would permit state courts to retain control over
claims brought by the union against its individual members and
officers, in keeping with the LMRDA's non-preemption
provisions.
173. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized that Wooddell
involved a claim by individual members against the union and thus did not
squarely answer the question it faced on appeal. Id. at 31. It nonetheless read
Wooddell as support for the assertion of jurisdiction over Shea's claims against
McCarthy. Reasoning that Wooddell permitted Shea to sue his union, the court
argued that the policies of uniform contract interpretation and judicial economy
also supported the assertion ofjurisdiction over Shea's claims against McCarthy.
Id. at 31-32. Otherwise, Shea would be forced "to seek equitable relief from the
wrongdoing individuals in a separate forum, where different rules of law might
apply." Id. at 33. Such an assertion fails to recognize that the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction would apparently permit Shea to join McCarthy as a pendent party defendant to the state law claims that arise from the same
constitutional case or controversy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. 1990).
174. For a discussion of the original understanding of § 301, see supra
notes 30-119 and accompanying text.
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The LMRDA and the Union Constitution

In passing the LMRDA, Congress generally chose to regulate
only one side of the many two-sided relationships addressed in
union constitutions. In Title I, Congress established a bill of
rights for union members 7 5 and specifically authorized them to
bring suit for violations of these rights against either their local or
parent union.' 7 6 Congress did not, however, impose any federally enforceable obligations on the union's members and did not
authorize unions to bring suit against members to collect fines or
assessments. The union's interest in disciplining members thus
received no federal protection, aside from the LMRDA's requirement that members exhaust internal remedies before suing the
177
union, and the statute's creation of a reasonable-rules defense.
The same unilateral regulatory approach characterizes Title
V of the LMRDA. There, Congress imposed a range of fiduciary
obligations on union officials, including the obligations to obtain
a performance bond and to hold union property solely for the
benefit of the union. 7 8 Although it made the union, as a whole,
175. LMRDA, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 101, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 411 (1988)). For background on the origins of Title I, see R. ALTON
LEE, EISENHOWER AND LANDRUM-GRIFFIN: A STUDY IN LABOR-MANAGEMENT POLITICS 95-116 (1990); MCLAUGHLIN & SCHOOMAKER, supra note 43, at 74-76; Sum-

mers, American Legislation, supra note 5, at 283-90.
176. LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1988).
177. Id. § 101(a)(l)-(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1)-(2) (recognizing "reasonable
rules" defense); id. § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (imposing exhaustion
requirement).
178. Id. §§ 501-504, 29 U.S.C. §§ 501-504. Section 501 appeared in Title
V of the LMRDA as part of a group of provisions designed to protect labor
organizations from irresponsible officials. Thus, § 501 establishes the officers'
fiduciary duty to the organization, creates a derivative action in favor of members who may sue the officer following demand upon the organization, and establishes criminal penalties for embezzlement or conversion of union funds. Id.
§ 501, 29 U.S.C. § 501. Section 502 establishes a bonding requirement applicable to officers and agents who handle union funds. Id. § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 502.
Section 503 prohibits loans to union officers. Id. § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 503. Section 504 prohibits certain persons, including members of the Communist Party
and those convicted of crimes, from engaging in labor relations work. Id. § 504,
29 U.S.C. § 504.
Title V evolved rather substantially during congressional consideration of
the LMRDA. It initially appeared in the Senate version of the bill reported out
of committee as a hortatory suggestion to labor unions that federal policy supported the establishment of ethical practice codes to govern internal affairs-a
suggestion that reflected the efforts of the AFL-CIO to head off detailed regulation by establishing such codes. See S. REP. No. 187, 86 Cong., 1st Sess. 50-52
(1959). The minority report on the bill criticized the failure of the committee to
establish firm fiduciary obligations and to provide members with a right to sue to
enforce them. Id. at 72. On the Senate floor, the minority view prevailed and an
explicit fiduciary obligation was inserted in the bill. See S. 1555, 86th Cong., Ist
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the object of these fiduciary obligations, the LMRDA nevertheless
specifically refrained from permitting the union itself to bring actions against its officers. Instead, the statute conferred the right
to sue only on individual union members.' 79 It also refrained
from creating any rights in favor of union officers, apart from
those they enjoy as members of the union. 180
Sess. (1959). The House referred the Senate bill to Rep. Bardin's labor committee, which adopted the fiduciary provisions that appear in the statute. See H.R.
REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 44-47 (1959). The House report included a
majority statement describing the purpose of the provisions as well as a plethora
of supplementary and minority views. See id. at 1 (purpose), 77-92 & 100-06
(supplementary), 94-99 (minority). See generally R. Theodore Clark, Jr., The Fiduciary Duties of Union Officials Under Section 501 of the LMRDA, 52 MINN. L. REV. 437
(1967) (discussing ambiguities in § 501); Frank J. Dugan, Fiduciary Obligations
Under the New Act, 48 GEO. L.J. 277 (1950) (discussing common law development
of fiduciary concept through enactment of § 501, its effect on union officials and
its interpretation by courts); Douglas Leslie, Federal Courts and Union Fiduciaries,
76 COLUM. L. REV. 1314 (1976) (describing scope accorded Title V by courts
and suggesting more appropriate modes of analysis); Donald H. Wollett, Fiduciary Problems Under Landrum-Griffin, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
THIRTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 267 (Emanuel Stein ed., 1960) (dis-

cussing fiduciary problems under § 501); Comment, Determining Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act: Gabauer v.
Woodcock, 93 HARV. L. REV. 608 (1980); (discussing § 501 challenge to political
contributions made by union);John M. McEnany, Note, The Fiduciary Duty Under
Section 501 of the LMRDA, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1189 (1975) (studying judicial extension of § 501 beyond pecuniary matters).
179. LMRDA § 501(b), 29 U.S.C. § 501(b). Section 501 imposes a fiduciary duty on union officers and specifically entitles the union's members to enforce that duty in an action brought in federal court. Id. § 501(a)-(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 501(a)-(b) (1988). The statute includes a demand requirement that contemplates some attempt by members to convince the union to prosecute the claim.
Id. § 501(b), 29 U.S.C. § 501(b). See Coleman v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S.
Clerks, 340 F.2d 206, 208 (2d Cir. 1965) (stating that individual member can
bring suit only if union refuses or fails to sue within reasonable time after request); Local 443, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Pisano, 753 F. Supp. 434, 436 (D.
Conn. 1991) (holding that union member must first request that union sue
union official suspected of wrongdoing before member is permitted to bring
suit); International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Freeman, 683 F. Supp. 1190, 1192
(N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that union member must first request union to sue and
union must fail or refuse to do so); Safe Workers Org., Chapter No. 2 v. Ballinger, 389 F. Supp. 903, 908 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (stating that before suit can be
brought by individual member, member must first request union to bring suit
and must secure, on showing of good cause, court permission to proceed with
action). The statute does not, however, authorize the union itself to enforce the
fiduciary obligations of officers by suit brought in federal court. For the contrary
view, see MALIN, supra note 8, at 322 (arguing that union may bring implied right
of action against officers). To the extent that § 501 fails to create such a right of
action for the union, state law surely imposes fiduciary obligations on union officials and authorizes the union to bring suit for their breach. See Cox, supra note
86, at 827.
180. Most union constitutions include provisions that limit the class of individuals who may hold union office to members in good standing. The LMRDA
certainly protects the rights of such officers in their capacity as members, but it
does not protect union officials as such. Compare Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431,
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While Titles I and V establish federally enforceable rules to
protect union members, their unilateral character leaves largely
unexplored the role of the courts in protecting the union's institutional interest from officers and members who violate their obligations to the organization.' 8 ' Congress deliberately left these
436-42 (1982) (stating that LMRDA § 102 and § 609 protect rights of union
members as members; appointed union official may not challenge patronagebased removal from office by newly elected president) with Sheet Metal Workers'
Int'l Ass'n v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1989) (holding that removal from
office of elected union official who expressed dissent may violate official's right
as member to freedom from retaliation for expression of protected views).
Provisions in Title IV govern union elections and terms in office. LMRDA
§§ 401-404, 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-482. Aside from those provisions, and in the absence of retaliation for the exercise of protected rights, the LMRDA leaves the
method of choosing and removing union officials in the control of union laws
and state judges.
181. In keeping with a narrow conception of § 501, early decisions of the
lower federal courts generally concluded that the statute applied only to claims
of financial self-dealing on the part of officers and members. See Phillips v. Osborne, 403 F.2d 826, 830 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding that LMRDA applies only to
fiduciary responsibility with respect to money and property of union (citing
Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1964))). But see Kerr v. Shanks, 466 F.2d
1271, 1275 (9th Cir. 1972) (suggesting that breadth of statute remained open);
Johnson v. Nelson, 325 F.2d 646, 649 (8th Cir. 1963) ("Careful analysis of Title
V refutes the notion that the statute is narrow in its terms and scope and that it is
limited solely to pecuniary responsibility or the proper or improper use of union
funds.").
Over time, however, courts concluded that union officials owed an obligation under the statute not only to refrain from self-dealing in financial affairs but
also to administer the union's affairs in keeping with general principles of fairness. See Stelling v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union No. 1547,
587 F.2d 1379, 1387 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding that allegations that appellees
failed to submit collective bargaining agreement to general membership vote is
sufficient assertion of breach of trust), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979); Pignotti
v. Local 3, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 477 F.2d 825, 832-35 (8th Cir.)
(affirming conclusion in Johnson v. Nelson, 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963), that
§ 501 imposes broad fiduciary obligations), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1067 (1973);
Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245, 1250-51 (3d Cir.) (concluding that allegation of financial self-dealing is not required as § 501 "was not intended to be
limited to such a narrow construction"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 853 (1972). Such
decisions read § 501 as providing a roving grant of authority to police the parent
union's administration of internal union affairs.
This broad conception of the federal role receives some support from commentators, see MALIN, supra note 8, at 305; Clark, supra note 178, at 439- 44, but it
lacks historical support. The courts that read § 501 broadly do so on the basis
of a statement that appears in the supplementary views that five representatives
attached to the House's report on its version of the bill. See H.R. REP. No. 741,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1959) (supplementary views). The statement affirmed
that the committee bill was broader and stronger than the provisions of S. 1555
which related to fiduciary responsibilities. Id. It then explained this breadth as
follows:
S. 1555 applied the fiduciary principle to union officials only on their
handling of "money or other property" (see S. 1555, sec. 610), apparently leaving other questions to the common law of the several States.
Although the common law covers the matter, . . . the committee bill
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gaps in the regulatory scheme, assuming that the unions would
enforce their own internal rules against members either by invoking disciplinary procedures or by bringing suit in state court.18 2
As a consequence, the LMRDA does not consider the circumstances under which unions may judicially enforce the obligations
of their members and officers, nor does it address such important
remedial questions as the availability of damages or injunctive
relief.
The LMRDA does establish, however, a more complete
extends the fiduciary principle to all the activities of union officials and other
union agents or representatives.
Id. (emphasis added). Courts that have extended § 501 have done so on the
basis of this suggestion that the fiduciary principle covers all union activities.
See, e.g., Stelling, 587 F.2d at 1387 (collecting cases but failing to note that language appeared in supplementary views of five representatives rather than in
body of House report).
While this statement does suggest that the House version reaches more
broadly than the Senate bill, it does not supply the basis for wide-ranging judicial review of official action. The Senate bill simply imposed a duty of trust on
officers and agents with respect to "money and property" in their possession by
virtue of their positions. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1959) (discussing S. 1555). The House bill broadened this obligation to apply not only to
money and property in the officers' possession but also to forbid officers "from
dealing with such organization as an adverse party . . . and from holding or
acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with the interests of
such organization." H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1959). Thus,
the House bill went beyond "money or property" in the possession of an officer
and reached all traditional self-dealing situations as the majority House report
explains. See id. at 10 (likening fiduciary duty in § 501 to that imposed traditionally on trustees, agents and bank officers). Even if one accepts the supplementary statement as definitive evidence of legislative intent, therefore, it does not
compel a reading of § 501 that would permit courts to review officers' conduct
of union affairs under an open-ended fairness standard.
Further evidence of the limited focus of the fiduciary duty in § 501 appears
in the structure of the statute. The enforcement scheme in § 501(b) permits a
union member to sue an officer to recover funds or profits "for the benefit of the
labor organization." LMRDA § 501, 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1988). Such a scheme
fits well with the traditional derivative action to remedy alleged instances of selfdealing, but does not make sense when used to challenge the general administration of union affairs. See Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 1974)
(stating that § 501 was not meant to be catch-all provision allowing suits against
union officials for any charges of misconduct). See generally Leslie, supra note
178, at 1320-28 (suggesting that courts might limit their intervention to "acts
which confer a financial or political benefit on an officer but are supported by no
significant institutional interests").
182. For recognition that Title I of the LMRDA establishes only minimal
federal guarantees, rather than a comprehensive code, see Summers, Pre-Emption, supra note 5, at 124 (discussing legislative history of Title I). For similar
recognition in the case of Title V, see Aaron, supra note 86, at 894 (stating that
Title V represents minimum ethical and legal standards by which to measure
behavior of union officials) and Summers, Pre-Emption, supra note 5, at 140 (stating that in Title V Congress sought to establish federal minimum fiduciary obligations for union officers).
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scheme to regulate union trusteeships. 18 3 Title III of the LMRDA
generally expresses federal approval of the union trusteeship as a
device by which parent unions may exercise control over affiliated
locals.' 8 4 It declares presumptively valid' 8 5 those trusteeships
imposed by parent unions for federally approved purposes.' 8 6
The presumption of validity lasts for a period of eighteen months
and can be overcome only by "clear and convincing proof" that
87
the parent union acted for a wrongful purpose.
Although such provisions express general congressional approval of the trusteeship, Title III also recognizes that some unions use the trusteeship for improper purposes. The statute thus
prohibits parents from using the trusteeship as a device to acquire
the assets or the voting power of trusteed locals.' 8 8 It also expressly permits local unions and their members to bring suit in
federal court to block the implementation of unlawful trusteeships.' 8 9 Finally, Title III directs the federal courts to develop a
body of common law to determine whether the purposes underlying the trusteeship advance the "legitimate objects" of the
institution. 9 0
183. Useful discussions of the trusteeship provisions of Title III appear in
Beaird, supra note 43;Janice Bellace, Union Trusteeships: Difficulties in Applying Sections 302 and 304(c) of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 337 (1975); William J. Isaacson, Union Trusteeships Under the Landrum-Griffin Act, in PROCEEDINGS
OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY FOURTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 97, 12122 (Emanuel Stein ed., 1961); Arnold R. Weber, Local Union Trusteeship and Public
Policy, 14 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 185 (1960); Donald R. Anderson, Comment,
Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship Imbroglio, 71 YALE LJ. 1460 (1960).
184. See S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st. Sess. 16-17 (1959) (declaring that
trusteeships "are among the most effective devices which responsible international officers have to insure order within their organization").
185. LMRDA § 304(c), 29 U.S.C. § 464(c) (1988).
186. Id. § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 462. For identification of the four permissible
purposes for which the parent union may impose a trusteeship, see supra note
114.
187. LMRDA § 304(c), 29 U.S.C. § 464(c). In addition to adducing "clear
and convincing proof," local unions may, under § 302, overcome the presumption of validity by showing that the trusteeship violates the union constitution or
by showing that the trusteeship was imposed without the fair hearing adverted
to in § 304(c); see id. §§ 302, 304(c), 29 U.S.C. §§ 462, 464(c). See generally
MALIN, supra note 8, at 180-81.
188. LMRDA § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 463 (imposing criminal sanctions on those
who willfully use trusteeships to acquire local unions' political power or assets).
The statute requires reports within 30 days of the imposition of the trusteeship
that specify, inter alia, the subordinate's financial condition and the reason for
the trusteeship. Id. § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 4 61(a). The statute also requires follow-up reports semiannually thereafter. Id. Such reporting provisions seek to
prevent parent unions from using trusteeships to "milk" local treasuries.
189. Id. § 304(a), 29 U.S.C. § 464(a).
190. Id. § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 462. Among the most significant elements of
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Title III, in regulating the union trusteeship, does not necessarily leave other aspects of the relationship between parent and
local untouched. It is true that the LMRDA does not, by its terms,
regulate the method by which a parent union might suspend or
revoke a local's charter or the manner in which a parent, like the
UA in Local 334, may choose to deal with overlapping jurisdiction
by ordering the merger of local unions. 19 1 Nevertheless, many
courts have applied the trusteeship provisions of Title III to such
forms of parental control. 192 Such courts do so either by citing a
provision that defines the concept of trusteeship broadly to include any parental action that suspends local union autonomy 193
or by following the generally deferential thrust of the trusteeship
provisions in litigation over other forms of discipline.' 94
the legislative history of the trusteeship provisions, the Senate report makes
clear that the Eighty-Sixth Congress expressly contemplated that the federal
courts would exercise their common lawmaking powers in the course of deciding
what constitutes "legitimate objects" of the union:
The bill does not specify in detail all of the reasons for which a trusteeship may be imposed. For instance, the elimination of Communist or
other forms of subversion has long been recognized by the courts as a
justification for imposing a trusteeship. More rigid standards than
these might prevent international intervention when fully justified. It
should not be difficult to decide whether the general tests are met in a
particular case after all the facts have been developed. Congress has
followed the same course in dealing with "restraint of trade" and "unfair methods of competition."
S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1959) (discussing S. 1555).
191. The provisions of Title III apply only to trusteeships, which are defined quite broadly as "any receivership, trusteeship, or other method of supervision or control whereby a labor organization suspends the autonomy
otherwise available to a subordinate body under its constitution or bylaws."
LMRDA § 2(h), 29 U.S.C. § 402(h). Title III thus applies to charter suspensions
and revocations, to the merger of local unions and to the removal of local union
officers when such common methods of control suspend the local's "otherwise
available" autonomy. Cf. Parks v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 314 F.2d
886, 923-24 (4th Cir.) (holding charter revocation was not trusteeship), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963). See generally McLAUGHLIN & SCHOOMAKER, supra note
43, at 135-36 (discussing methods of disciplining local unions without implicating Title III); Beaird, supra note 43, at 502-10 (discussing what constitutes imposition of trusteeships).
192. See, e.g., Local No. 2, Int'l Bhd. of Tel. Workers v. International Bhd.
of Tel. Workers, 261 F. Supp. 433, 434 (D. Mass. 1966) (finding charter suspension to compel compliance with international directive constitutes trusteeship).
See generally MALIN, supra note 8, at 178 (noting that courts take case-by-case approach in determining whether to treat forms of local union reorganization as
trusteeships).
193. For a discussion of the Senate's broad construction of trusteeship implementation, see supra note 191 and accompanying text.
194. See Parks v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 314 F.2d 886 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963). In Parks, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit concluded that a parent's revocation of its local's charter was not
a trusteeship within the meaning of the LMRDA. Id. at 924. Yet the court bor-
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In sum, on a structural basis Title III does more than impose
unilateral obligations on unions that the members may enforce in
federal court. 19 5 It appears to create a bilateral regulatory
scheme that establishes rights for both the local union and its
members on the one hand and for the parent union on the
other. 19 6 Accordingly, federal courts permit parent unions to
bring suit in federal court to compel their local unions to comply
with lawful trusteeships. 9 7 Such decisions, which rest on both
the structure of the LMRDA and section 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act, reject the negative implications that would ordinarily flow
from the fact that Title III creates an explicit right of action for
19 8
the local union and its members but not for the parent.
rowed the generally deferential thrust of the trusteeship provisions in concluding that federal courts have no power to alter the allocation of power in the
union's governing documents. Id. at 906-07; see also Local Union No. 657 of
United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Sidell, 552 F.2d 1250, 1256-57 (7th Cir. 1974)
(upholding parent union's power to order local to affiliate with district council
pursuant to its constitutional powers).
195. In this respect, the balance Congress struck in distinguishing between
legitimate trusteeships and those that violate federal standards creates the kind
of continuum that Professor Gottesman recently identified in rethinking traditional rules of labor preemption. See Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor
Law Preemption. State Laws for Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355, 394-4 10
(1990). Gottesman argues that in regulating union behavior, Congress often
draws a line that separates conduct made illegal by federal law from that which
federal law affirmatively protects. Id. at 395. Because the rules governing union
trusteeships in Title III appear to draw such a line, they leave little room for
state law to operate. Professor Gottesman does note, however, that the states
may regulate employer conduct that the NLRA was not intended to protect, even
if the NLRB would reach a different result on the legitimacy of such conduct. Id.
at 404-05.
196. Title III also differs from Title I in that a good deal more care and
committee work went into drafting the trusteeship provisions than the bill of
rights. The provisions of Title III were enacted largely in the form in which they
emerged from committee, where they were drafted by Senator Kennedy with the
assistance of Archibald Cox. See Isaacson, supra note 183, at 122. Title I, by
contrast, was introduced by Senator McClellan on the floor of the Senate and
amended two days later into its final form; it thus did not receive careful committee attention. See Aaron, supra note 86, at 858-59 (discussing adoption of "McClellan amendment").
197. For a discussion of the enforcement of lawfully imposed trusteeships,
see supra note 115 and accompanying text.
198. The Second Circuit's decision in National Ass 'n of Letter Carriers v. Sombrotto made clear that the LMRDA played a central role in the court's influential
decision to take cognizance of the parent union's action to enforce a lawful trusteeship. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d 915, 918-21
(2d Cir. 1971). There, the court concluded that the statutory scheme reflected
an understanding that litigation over the legality of union trusteeships would go
forward with the trusteeship in place. Id. at 919. With federal standards to
guide the assessment of the trusteeship's legality and an evident congressional
assumption that subordinate bodies were to comply with trusteeships that
passed federal muster, the court had little difficulty in holding that parent un-
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The relevant non-preemption provisions confirm the difference between the one-sided character of Titles I and V and the
more complete regulatory approach of Title III. Because Titles I
and V create rights only in favor of union members, they save
from preemption only such rights as existing state and federal
laws confer on union members. 199 That they do not save the
rights of unions thus underscores the fact that no such federal
rights have been created. The provisions also make clear that
although the states must respect the minimum federal standards,
they remain free to establish rules more protective of the rights of
2 00
union members than those set forth in federal law.

The non-preemption provision in Title III, on the other
hand, does not contain the same confirmation of a one-sided regulatory scheme. Rather, it declares that the provisions of Title III
ions were entitled, as a matter of federal law and more or less as a matter of
course, to injunctive relief to enforce lawful trusteeships. Id. at 921. The court's
conclusion in Sombrotto was obviously easier to achieve by reliance on the openended reference in § 301 (a) to the enforcement of contracts between labor organizations. Id. at 918 (noting that § 301 language "constitute[s] a clear predicate
forjurisdiction"); see also LMRDA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988) (allowing suit
to be brought for violation of contract between employer and labor organization
or between labor organizations). The decision to grant injunctive relief to the
parent, however, was clearly designed to implement the LMRDA. Sombrotto, 449
F.2d at 921 (noting that properly created trusteeships are presumed valid for 18
months and "Congress [could] hardly have wanted to leave the local the option
of reversing this statutory burden" by failing to allow judicial enforcement).
199. LMRDA § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 413 (1988). Section 103 of the LMRDA,
the savings provision applicable to Title I's bill of rights, provides as follows:
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall limit the rights and remedies of any
member of a labor organization under any State or Federal law or before any
court or other tribunal, or under the constitution and bylaws of any labor organization." Id.
Section 603, the provision that saves state remedies generally, and those for
breach of fiduciary duty in particular, provides as follows:
Except as explicitly provided to the contrary, nothing in this chapter
shall reduce or limit the responsibilities of any labor organization or
any officer, agent, shop steward, or other representative of a labor organization, or of any trust in which a labor organization is interested,
under any other Federal law or under the laws of any State, and, except
as explicitly provided to the contrary, nothing in this chapter shall take
away any right or bar any remedy to which members of a labor organization are entitled under such other Federal law or law of any State.
LMRDA § 603(d), 29 U.S.C. § 523(a).
Both provisions thus operate in a rather one-sided way, preserving statecreated remedies for union members and state-created responsibilities for unions and their officers, but failing to preserve the union's state-created rights as
against its members. As a result the language of the statute limits federal law to
a supplemental role and prevents it from establishing any rights for unions. For
a discussion of the origins of these provisions and the protections offered to
union members, see Summers, Pre-Emption, supra note 5, at 123-26, 140-4 1.
200. For the text of the relevant LMRDA sections, see supra note 199.
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should be regarded as supplementary to "all other rights and
remedies at law or in equity." 20 ' On its face, the statute appears
to save all state rights, including those that conflict directly with
the federal statute. Professor Summers, a noted authority in this
field, has rejected such a reading. He observes that the statute
contemplates judicial enforcement of trusteeships by parent unions and the application of federal rules to govern such enforcement proceedings. 20 2 The word "other" in Title III thus serves
to distinguish the (preempted) state laws that conflict with federal
standards from the (non-preempted) state rights and remedies
that address matters "other" than those the federal statute regu201. The relevant non-preemption provision provides:
The rights and remedies provided by this subchapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies at law or in equity: Provided, that upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary the
jurisdiction of the district court over such trusteeship shall be exclusive
and the final judgment shall be res judicata.
LMRDA, § 306, 29 U.S.C. § 466 (1988).
The provision originally appeared in a slightly different form in Senate Bill
1555, at a time when Title III failed to create any right of action in federal court
for subordinate unions or their members. See S.1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 306
(1959) ("[n]othing contained in this title shall be deemed to authorize any suit in
any court of the United States except upon complaint of the Secretary"). The
provision as initially drafted thus contemplated that all litigation over the legality of trusteeships would go forward in state court, except in cases where the
Secretary of Labor filed suit in federal court on the complaint of a member. See
S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1959) ("Enactment of the bill will not
affect the right of a local union or its members to challenge a trusteeship in the
State courts."). The retention of the provision in the final version of the bill,
following the creation of a private right of action for local unions and their members, reflects some continuing commitment to state court litigation of trusteeship issues.
202. Summers, Pre-Emption, supra note 5, at 132. Professor Summers notes
that the non-preemption provision in Title III, like those elsewhere in the
LMRDA, makes federal law exclusive when it establishes minimum protections
for union members but not exclusive when it presumptively validates a parent
union's lawful trusteeship. Id. Summers thus argues that state courts remain
free to fashion standards more protective of individual rights than those in the
federal law but that they lack the power to enforce a trusteeship that fails to meet
minimum federal standards. Id. at 131-32.
I find such a one-sided approach difficult to square with the language of the
relevant non-preemption provisions. Title I's non-preemption provision specifically adopts a one-sided approach by preserving only the "rights and remedies
of any member" of a labor union under state law; it does not purport to save a
labor organization's rights. For the text of this provision, see supra note 199.
The same may be said of the non-preemption provision that applies to Title V;
§ 603 prevents preemption of state law that imposes greater responsibilities on
union officials, but does not save state laws that impose less demanding standards. For the text of § 603, see supra note 199. By contrast to such provisions,
both of which emphasize the minimal character of the federal standard, Title
III's provision applies to "all other rights and remedies" without specifying the
rights of locals and members. See LMRDA § 306, 29 U.S.C. § 466.
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lates. On such a reading, Title III's reference to all rights and
remedies, rather than to only the rights and remedies of union
members, takes on greater significance because it suggests a desire to protect the federal rights of both the local and the parent
20 3
unions.
To summarize, Title III differs from other sections of the
LMRDA in the completeness of its regulatory scheme. Although
Titles I and V create rights in union members, they provide the
federal courts with little guidance in deciding whether, and in
what circumstances, the union may vindicate its institutional interest in stability by bringing enforcement actions against members and officers. Title III, by contrast, not only prescribes rights
for local unions and their members, but also expresses approval
of union trusteeships imposed by parent unions for statutorily acceptable reasons. 20 4 Title III thus provides federal courts with far
203. Like Summers, I believe the federal standards should control in state
court litigation. Unlike Summers, however, I believe that those standards
should control where they protect local unions and their members and where
they favor the imposition of parental control. Congress, after all, took the relationship between parent and local closely in hand and struck a nice balance between the parent's interest in administering the union and the local's right to
freedom from oppressive supervision. In recognizing the propriety of parental
control to ensure compliance with the collective bargaining agreement, for example, the LMRDA establishes a federal rule in an area of acknowledged federal
interest.
While my interpretation of the statute thus differs from that of Summers, we
ultimately reach similar conclusions. In a prescient article written shortly after
the LMRDA became law, Professor Summers recognized that litigation over internal affairs would go forward in both state and federal fora but that the content
of law applied to such disputes, though supplied by different sovereigns, would
tend to coalesce around the federal statute into parallel sets of rules. See Summers, State Courts, supra note 5, at 354-58 (discussing advantages and disadvantages of parallel rules). He sought to encourage state courts to continue to
fashion common law in the hope that the federal statute would help them overcome the indecisiveness that had plagued pre-statutory developments. Id. at
351. At the same time, he encouraged the federal courts to use the common law
experience of the state courts as an aid to the interpretation of the federal statute. See id. at 352-53.
At least in the area of parent-local relations, Summers' prophecy has been
only partially fulfilled. The law has tended to coalesce around the federal standards in Title III, but the state courts have all but abdicated their role in the
regulation of trusteeships. Even during the period before Local 334 made the
federal forum available on removal grounds, plaintiffs largely abandoned the
state courts in preference for the federal forum. Moreover, the non-preemption
provision of Title III has never been cited in a litigated case. The LMRDA thus
occupied the field as a practical matter, even if its non-preemption provision
sought to prevent that result.
204. Although their arguments differ from mine in important respects,
other commentators have recognized that Title III offers a fairly complete guide
to the relations between parent and locals and the basis for the development of a
body of federal common law. See, e.g., Beaird, supra note 43, at 518 (arguing that
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more guidance in deciding whether to enforce the union constitution at the parent union's behest than do other provisions in the
LMRDA.
B.

The Theory Derived: The LMRDA and Section 301(a)

Courts and commentators have long criticized the Supreme
Court's conclusion that the first clause of section 301(a) of the
Taft-Hartley Act authorizes the federal judicial enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements. 20 5 While criticisms of the legitimacy of the judicial role in collective bargaining have been exaggerated, 20 6 one can certainly question the judicial extension of

section 301 to union constitutions. Nothing in the text or history
of the Taft-Hartley Act suggests that Congress contemplated federal enforcement of union constitutions or laid down guidelines
to govern such enforcement decisions. 20 7 To overcome these
criticisms, this Article proposes a narrow interpretation of section
301's reference to contracts between "any such labor organizations" limited to those provisions of the union constitution that
regulate the relationship between the parent union and its
208
subordinate bodies.
Such an interpretive approach confines the judicial role
under section 301 within the parameters defined in the LMRDA,
which played a decisive role in the application of section 301 to
union constitutions, but it also finds support in the language of
"[m]uch can be said.., for the uniformity that would result in the law of internal
union affairs through the development of a federal common law"); Isaacson,
supra note 183, at 122-23 (same).
205. For the classic critique of the Supreme Court's decision in Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), which upheld federal enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, see Alexander M. Bickel & Harry
H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957). The predicate for the authors' critique was their agreement with Justice Frankfurter's view that § 301(a) conferred jurisdiction on the
federal courts but failed to establish federal standards for the enforcement of the
collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 28, 38. Bickel and Wellington thus
claimed that § 301 called upon the courts to undertake a task of lawmaking for
which they were "enormously unfit." Id. at 38.
206. See generally Pfander, supra note 8, at 279-309 (suggesting that conventional critique of Lincoln Mills ignores text and history of § 301).
207. For the history of the between-labor-organizations clause of § 301 (a),
see supra notes 30-119 and accompanying text.
208. For a discussion of the between-labor-organizations clause, see supra
notes 32-56 and accompanying text.
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section 301 itself.20 9 In developing the contract theory2 10 (that
the Court eventually emphasized in Local 334 and Wooddell), state
judges proceeded upon the assumption that the union constitution established a variety of separate contracts, including those between the members and the organization, the parent union and its
locals, and among the members themselves. 2 1 1 One can fairly

read section 301 as applying only to the contractual relationship
between the parent and its affiliated locals-the only contract between labor organizations defined in the union constitution. Ac-

cepting the logic of Local 334 and Wooddell and the application of
section 301 to union constitutions does not, therefore, necessarily
oblige the federal courts to police the separate "contracts" between the union and its individual officers and members. 2 12

209. For a discussion of the judicial role in the enforcement of union constitutions under the LMRDA, see supra notes 90-119 and accompanying text.
210. For a discussion of the contract theory, see supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
211. See Shea v. McCarthy, 953 F.2d 29, 31-33 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that
union constitution establishes contracts between unions, between union and
members, and among members). For a discussion of the common law view of
the contractual relationships in union constitutions, see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
212. If one accepts the holdings in Local 334 and Wooddell and the application of § 301 to some constitutional relationships, then restricting the statute to
the parent-local relationship makes both practical and historical sense.
Early national unions were, in a rather literal sense, the result of contracts
between local unions that met in convention to work out the scope of the national body's power. See HOROWITZ, supra note 2, at 1. In their initial structure,
those national unions were little more than loose confederations of autonomous
local bodies. See ULMAN, NATIONAL UNION, supra note 2, at 108; see also NORMAN
J. WARE, THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 1860-1895, at 167
(1929) (noting that unions were national "only in name"). Early union constitutions were drafted to recognize that locals retained control of all union affairs,
except those expressly ceded to the parent body. See ULMAN, NATIONAL UNION,
supra note 2, at 135. Indeed, they defined local unions as members of the national union, much the way national unions now act as members of the AFLCIO. Id. at 109. Such autonomy meant that locals had sufficient bargaining
power to join and withdraw from national groups without committing their assets to the national treasury. See Moyer v. Butte Miners' Union, 232 F. 788 (D.
Mont. 1916) (refusing to apply forfeiture clause in contract between member
union and national), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 671 (1918); Sanders v. DeLucia, 266 F.
Supp. 852 (S.D.N.Y.) (interpreting Constitution to permit local union to withdraw from parent union without surrendering assets), aff'd, 379 F.2d 250 (2d
Cir. 1967); MARTIN SEGAL, THE RISE OF THE UNITED ASSOCIATION 101-03 (1970)
(describing split of Manhattan local United Brotherhood of Plumbers and Gas
Fitters from Amalgamated Society and subsequent negotiations with United
Association).
Local unions today rarely negotiate the terms of their affiliation with the
national body and rarely retain the right to withdraw with their assets intact. See,
e.g., Tile, Marble, Terrazzo Finishers Int'l Union v. Tile, Marble, Terrazzo Finishers Local 32, 896 F.2d 1404, 1409-10 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that forfeiture
clause in contract with parent required local to turn over all property to parent
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The proposed approach not only finds support in the statute's text, it limits the scope of section 301(a) to the class of constitutional disputes that Congress has most carefully regulated.
The LMRDA subjects the class of disputes arising from the parent-local relationship to federal judicial review and supplies reasonably definite standards to govern resolution of such disputes.
In the course of resolving disputes over the imposition of trusteeships moreover, the federal courts have developed a body of decisional law that defines the extent of parental control and the
nature of local union misconduct that justifies the imposition of
discipline. 21 3 Such a body of law can appropriately govern the
on withdrawal). But one can find a modern analogy to the historical bargaining
between locals over the terms of affiliation in the merger agreements that autonomous national unions have frequently entered into since the merger of the AFL
and CIO. For a discussion of merger activity between national unions, see supra
note 55. Such merger agreements appear to fall squarely within the language of
§ 301 both as historically understood and as currently interpreted. The proposed application of § 301 to relations between constituent bodies thus ensures
that federal courts will retain control over the merger agreement after its effectiveness produces a single merged organization. It thus ensures that the federal
common law of merger agreements continues to apply to the resolution of the
disputes that occasionally arise after the merger takes effect. For examples of
such disputes, see International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Local Lodge
D354, 897 F.2d 1400 (7th Cir. 1990) and cases cited therein.
213. Federal cdurts rather routinely approve the imposition of trusteeships
where the local engages in a strike that violates its collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d 915,
921-22 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that parent union can impose trusteeship to prevent possible illegal strike); Jolly v. Gorman, 428 F.2d 960, 965 (5th Cir. 1970)
(finding that such strike comes within § 302 of the LMRDA, which allows imposition of trusteeship to assure performance of collective bargaining agreement),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971); cf. Hansen v. Guyette, 814 F.2d 547, 550 (8th
Cir. 1987) (enforcing trusteeship where local continued to strike after international lifted strike sanction). But see Benda v. Grand Lodge of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 584 F.2d 308, 313 (9th Cir. 1978) (declaring trusteeship invalid where
parent sought to restructure locus of bargaining authority), cert. dismissed, 441
U.S. 937 (1979). Similarly, federal courts routinely approve trusteeships where
the local fails to assure orderly election procedures. See, e.g., C.A.P.E. Local 1983
v. International Bhd. of Painters, 598 F. Supp. 1056, 1072 (D.NJ. 1984) (holding trusteeship permissible when actions of parent threaten election procedures); Tam v. Rutledge, 475 F. Supp. 559, 568 (D. Haw. 1979) (upholding
imposition of trusteeship based on proliferation of legal actions and public
charges that caused delay in holding supervised elections). Finally, courts often
approve trusteeships where the local fails to account properly for union funds.
See, e.g., International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Local Lodge D461 of Cement
Workers, 663 F. Supp. 1031, 1034-35 (M.D. Ga.) (upholding trusteeship where
local ceased sending monthly per capita tax to national as required in union
constitution), stay denied, 663 F. Supp. 1031 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd, 835 F.2d 1439
(11 th Cir. 1987); Graphic Arts Int'l Union v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, Local No.
529, 529 F. Supp. 587, 594 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (holding that actions constituting
"financial malpractice" will support imposition of trusteeship even if taken in
good faith).
Courts have divided, however, on the question of whether a local's attempt
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federal courts' resolution of parent-local disputes under section
301 (a), even where the dispute arises from actions other than the
21 4
imposition of a trusteeship.
The dispute in Local 334, for example, may have resulted in
the imposition of a trusteeship if, instead of filing suit to challenge the legality of the merger order, the local had simply refused to cooperate with that order. In resolving a challenge to
the legality of such a trusteeship, federal courts would have assessed the issues of whether the merger order complied with the
UA's constitution and whether it carried out a "legitimate object"
of the union within the meaning of the LMRDA. 2 15 Such an analysis might well (and perhaps did) prove dispositive on the issue of
whether the UA's merger order was valid even where, as in Local
334, no trusteeship was imposed because the local filed suit first
2 16
in state court to challenge the order.
to disaffiliate justifies imposition of a trusteeship. Compare Flight Eng'rs Int'l
Ass'n v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 297 F.2d 397, 403 (9th Cir. 1961) (refusing to
uphold trusteeship for dissolution where dissolution occurred prior to enactment of constitutional provision allowing for trusteeship in case of dissolution),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 871 (1962) with Gordon v. Laborers' Int'l Union, 490 F.2d
133, 138 (10th Cir. 1973) (upholding imposition of trusteeship where local refused to use district council as provided for in union constitution and instead
bargained for contract on its own), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974). For Judge
Posner's thoughts on the disaffiliation question, see International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Local Lodge 714, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 845 F.2d 687, 691-92
(7th Cir. 1988) (expressing doubt that parent body may impose trusteeship to
prevent disaffiliation that constitution appears to contemplate and regulate). See
generally Bellace, supra note 183, at 350-61.
214. For a discussion of the past judicial use of § 301 and the LMRDA, see
supra notes 90-119 and accompanying text.
215. For a discussion of Local 334, see supra notes 120-42 and accompanying text. To the extent such merger orders seek to achieve economies of scale
and to eliminate small or redundant locals, they are generally upheld. See Bellace, supra note 183, at 353-58. The proposed approach thus ensures that the
federal standards Congress developed and the courts elaborated upon will apply
irrespective of the posture of the litigation.
216. As this discussion makes clear, the threat of a trusteeship to secure
local union obedience frequently lurks in the background of any serious dispute
between parent unions and affiliated locals. See, e.g., DAVE HAGE & PAUL KLAUDA,
No RETREAT, No SURRENDER: LABOR'S WAR AT HORMEL 235 (1989) (describing
United Food & Commercial Worker's attempt to persuade local union to adopt
more amicable stance toward Hormel and underlying threat of trusteeship if local failed to do so); Eames, supra note 36, at 29-30 (describing process by which
local attempts to secede and parent invokes trusteeship to prevent secession).
Both parties to the dispute measure their conduct against the standards of Title
III and the likelihood that a trusteeship, if any, complies with federal law. At the
same time, both parties have incentives to compromise their differences and
avoid the necessity of a trusteeship. See McLAUGHLIN & SCHOOMAKER, supra note
43, at 134 (discussing deterrent effect of Title III on parent that would otherwise
impose trusteeship). By fostering uncertainty over the applicable source of law,
an approach to § 301 that permits local unions to escape the federal standards of
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In the case of the parent-local relationship, therefore, the
LMRDA supplies a body of federal substantive guidelines that
courts may use to create the common law that they are obliged to
fashion under section 301 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act and the Local
334 and Wooddell decisions. Aside from the enforcement of provisions that regulate the parent-local relationship, however, the
LMRDA provides incomplete guidance to the courts charged with
policing the union constitution. The LMRDA does not, for example, define the extent to which unions may bring suit to collect
fines and assessments from their members. 2 17 Nor does the statute establish standards that govern the relationship between the
union and its officers. 2 18 The absence of guidance perhaps explains why courts chose to adopt dubious tactics to avoid hearing
suits brought by unions against individual members. Lacking any
LMRDA provision to establish a federal interest, the courts may
21 9
simply view such cases as a burden on their dockets.
Title III by initiating litigation in state court would diminish the prospects for a
compromise of differences short of all-out litigation.
217. The Supreme Court has long held that suits brought in state court to
collect fines do not interfere with the scheme of the Labor Act, so long as the
members remain free to resign from the organization and escape from the obligation. See Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 430 (1969) (holding such fines enforceable only where rule was properly adopted, reflected legitimate union
interest, impaired no congressional policy, and was reasonably enforced against
members who were free to leave union and escape rule); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 196 (1967) (holding that union may seek to enforce fines in state court actions against "full" union members). For further
refinement of the free resignation requirement, see Pattern Makers' League v.
NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985) (holding that union could not collect fine where
league rules prevented resignation). On the union's power to collect fines in
judicial proceedings, see Harry H. Wellington, Union Fines and Workers' Rights, 85
YALE L.J. 1022, 1053-55 (1976).
218. Title V of the LMRDA, to be sure, establishes fiduciary standards that
the federal courts might borrow in the course of working out a common law of
the union-officer relationship. See LMRDA §§ 401-403, 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-483
(1988). On this basis, one can argue that Title V provides the guidance needed
to federalize the union-officer relationship under § 301.
Such an argument ignores the fact that the LMRDA fails to provide any
federal rights for officers as such. For a discussion of the statute's failure to
provide union officers with federal rights, see supra note 180 and accompanying
text. While federal courts might borrow Title V law for fiduciary breach claims
brought by unions, they would still lack guidance in the broad range of employment disputes between unions and their officers that such an assertion of federal
power would compel them to hear.
219. Early decisions of the lower federal courts tended to treat § 301 as a
source of discretionary authority over certain aspects of disputes that touched
upon matters of federal concern under the LMRDA. The federal courts were
thus quick to dodge claims that failed to implicate the LMRDA. For a discussion
of the federal courts' use of doctrines such as the "significant impact" test and
supplemental jurisdiction to avoid hearing such cases, see supra notes 116-19
and accompanying text.
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The Theory Applied. Resolving the Open Questions

Under the approach proposed in this Article, section 301 of
the Taft-Hartley Act confers jurisdiction on the federal courts to
hear claims that implicate the parent-local relationship. Such an
approach makes the existence of jurisdiction turn on allegations
that either the parent union or an affiliated local violated its obligations under a national union constitution. As this section of the
Article discusses, such an interpretation of section 301 nicely resolves the questions left open after Wooddell and does so with
greater clarity and simplicity than other approaches.
1. Suits by Individual Members and Officers
This Article's proposed interpretation makes the scope of
section 301 jurisdiction depend not on the identity of the claimant who brings suit, but on the nature of the constitutional provision from which the claim arises. So long as the plaintiff alleges a
breach of any provision in the national constitution that imposes
limits or regulations on the power of the parent or the local, federal courts have jurisdiction to hear the claim. It thus follows that
section 301 jurisdiction extends to most claims that individual
members bring to enforce the national constitution. Federal
court jurisdiction would extend, for example, to the plaintiff's
claim in Wooddell that Local 71 violated its obligation to comply
with its collective bargaining agreements. 220 Such a provision,
made binding on Local 71 by the IBEW constitution, regulates
the parent-local relationship and thus represents a proper subject
for the assertion of federal power.
The proposed approach clarifies the basis of federal power
by requiring the federal courts to focus on the specific terms of
the constitutional provision from which the claim arises. In Kinney v. InternationalBrotherhood of Electrical Workers, 22 1 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit heard the claim of a local union
official who challenged his removal from office by the parent
union. Like the decisions of many lower federal courts, 2 22 the
220. For a discussion of the applicable portions of the Wooddell decision, see
supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
221. 669 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1981).
222. In both DeSantiago v. Laborers Int'l Union, Local No. 1140, 914 F.2d
125, 126-27 (8th Cir. 1990), and Pruitt v. Carpenters, Local Union No. 225, 893
F.2d 1216, 1217-18 (11 th Cir. 1990), the courts asserted § 301 jurisdiction over
actions that included claims for breach of both the national and local union constitutions. Their failure to invoke supplemental jurisdiction over the claims to
enforce the local union constitution suggests that the courts read § 301 as con-
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Kinney decision did not set forth the language of the constitutional
provision that the parent union allegedly violated. The Kinney
court thus apparently assumed that all claims brought by individuals meet the jurisdictional standard. 223 The approach proposed
here would produce the same jurisdictional result, but only where
plaintiffs such as Kinney allege a breach of constitutional provisions that either empower local unions to elect their own officers
or regulate the parent's power to remove them.
Although the proposed approach clarifies the source of federal authority, it does not impose any substantial jurisdictionallimits on the power of federal courts to hear individual claims.
Individual members and officers can readily frame their complaints in terms that allege violations of the union constitution by
either the parent or the local. In Doby v. Safeway Stores, Inc. ,224
individual members brought suit in federal court claiming that
their parent union, the Teamsters, violated the union constitution
by transferring their local's working jurisdiction to a competing
local. In Lewis v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, Local 771,225
the members alleged that their local union violated a provision in
the Teamsters constitution that guaranteed local unions the right
to ratify their collective bargaining agreements. Finally, in Wooddell, the plaintiff alleged that Local 71 violated its obligations both
to comply with its collective agreements and to provide him with a
ferring an independent source of power over such claims, though it obviously
falls short of a square holding to that effect. Much the same can be said of the
decision by the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia in Gable v.
Local 387, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 695 F. Supp. 1174 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
Although the court ultimately refused to assert jurisdiction on another ground,
it appeared to assume that officer's action to enforce the "Bylaws and Constitution of Local 387" came within § 301. Id. at 1175.
223. See Kinney, 669 F.2d at 1229. This lack of clarity later posed difficulties
for the Ninth Circuit in Truck Drivers, Local 420 v. Traweek, 867 F.2d 500 (9th
Cir. 1989), an action initiated by the local union against its former officers. The
Traweek court ultimately refused to assert jurisdiction over Local 420's claim,
although it did so by adopting a problematic interpretation of § 301(b). Id. at
505-07. The court could have achieved the same result by recognizing that Local 420's complaint alleged a violation of the union-member contract, whereas
its earlier decision in Kinney implicated the parent-local contract. Instead of
adopting this distinction, the Ninth Circuit offered a confusing discussion of "litigant permutations," in an effort to justify what it regarded as a departure from
earlier decisional law. See Traweek, 867 F.2d at 507. For additional discussion of
Traweek, see infra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
224. 523 F. Supp. 1162 (E.D. Va. 1981). As the Doby case illustrates, federal courts are unlikely to face a dispute between two local unions that does not
also implicate the parent-local provisions of the national constitution. If such a
local-local dispute should arise, however, the courts should conclude that it
comes within § 301 jurisdiction.
225. 826 F.2d 1310 (3d Cir. 1987).
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fair trial. 22 6 Although such claims implicate widely divergent constitutional provisions, they all meet the jurisdictional test proposed in this Article.
The assertion ofjurisdiction over such claims may appear to
expand section 301 beyond the parent-local relationship and into
the sphere of individual member rights, where the LMRDA fails
to provide the guidance necessary to support the exercise of federal common law-making power. Although claims such as those
in Wooddell appear to implicate the interests of the individual far
more concretely than the interests of the membership, they rest
on alleged violations of constitutional provisions that expressly
limit the power of the parent union and its affiliated locals. Thus,
the local union could have sued the parent union in Kinney to
challenge the exercise of parental control, just as the parent in
Wooddell might have initiated suit against Local 71 to remedy the
local's alleged violation of its collective agreement. 22 7 In order to
draw consistent jurisdictional boundaries, federal courts must
agree to hear all claims that implicate such constitutional provisions without regard to the identity of the claimant. The Court's
decision in Wooddell requires no less.
The obligation to maintain jurisdictional clarity, however,
does not compel federal courts to adjudicate all individual claims
within their jurisdiction on the merits. 2 28 Rather, the federal
courts must still consider whether the individual plaintiffs enjoy
standing to assert the claims. The Court in Wooddell invited such
consideration by leaving open the question whether the plaintiff
had standing to bring suit against Local 71.229 Skillful use of
226. Wooddell v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 112 S. Ct.
494, 495 (1991).
227. Of course, it seems unlikely that the parent union of the IBEW would
exercise its constitutional powers to discipline a local for having breached a provision of the union constitution or that it would bring suit against the local
under § 301 to remedy such a breach. More likely, the parent union would simply correct any errors during Wooddell's appeal from the imposition of improper discipline. The existence of real-world alternatives to federal court
litigation of disciplinary matters does not alter the fact that disputes over the
enforcement of collective agreements often lead to serious rifts that require federal solutions. To preserve jurisdictional clarity, the courts must apply § 301 to
all allegations that the local breached its obligations under the national
constitution.
228. On the distinction between jurisdiction and standing, see Abrams v.
Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1250 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009
(1971). On the analogous problem of permitting individual members to assert
collective rights under the LMRDA, see Mamula v. United Steelworkers, 304
F.2d 108, 112 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962).
229. See Wooddell, 112 S. Ct. at 498-99 & n.5.
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standing rules can preserve crisp jurisdictional lines without extending federal power in ways that threaten to interfere with
other federal labor schemes or invite excessive intervention in internal affairs.
Standing rules pose the least difficulty in cases such as Doby,
where the individual members bring suit on behalf of the entire
local union.2 30 Ordinary rules of derivative litigation should
probably govern member standing in such cases2 3 1 and thus per230. See Doby v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 1162, 1163-64 (E.D. Va.
1981).
231. Some courts suggest that the individual member's standing to enforce
rights of the local vis-a-vis the international should turn upon the ability to show
that the local breached a duty of fair representation by failing to prosecute the
claim on the individual member's behalf. See Lewis v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 826 F.2d 1310, 1313 n.2 (3d Cir. 1987); cf. Santos v. District Council
of United Bhd. of Carpenters, 547 F.2d 197, 202-03 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding that
union's failure to seek compliance with article XX award under AFL-CIO constitution constituted breach of duty sufficient to justify individual suit to confirm
award; ignoring language of AFL-CIO constitution denying judicial enforcement
of such awards). Such a fair representation theory of standing borrows the rule,
developed in the collective bargaining context, that an individual employee may
bring suit to enforce the collective bargaining agreement only after exhausting
rights under the agreement by filing a grievance, and then only upon a showing
that the union breached its fair representation duty by handling the grievance in
an arbitrary, discriminatory or perfunctory manner. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 191 (1967) (concluding that while "union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in perfunctory fashion," individual employee
does not have absolute right to have grievance taken to arbitration); Republic
Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-57 (1962) (noting that employee must
file grievance prior to filing suit to enforce collective bargaining agreement).
Courts that propose to use the fair representation model to govern a member's standing to enforce rights of the local under the union constitution fail to
identify any statutory basis for such use. See Matthew W. Finkin, The Limits of
Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 MINN. L. REV. 183, 193-98 (1980) (expounding on judicial roots for duty of fair representation in contract making).
The duty of fair representation has been judicially implied from provisions of
the Labor Act that give the union the "exclusive" right to represent employees
in the relevant bargaining unit. See id. at 193 & n.49 (citing Steele v. Louisiana &
Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944), which held that Railway Labor Act
imposed upon statutory representatives "at least as exacting a duty to protect
equally the interest of the members . . . as the Constitution imposes upon a
legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those for whom it legislates"). Courts recognize that such an exclusive right attaches only to the
union's representation of employees through the employer, and generally refuse
to extend the duty to the relationship between the union and its members under
the union constitution. See Price v. International Union, UAW, 795 F.2d 1128,
1134-35 (2d Cir. 1986) (refusing to invoke duty of fair representation in challenge to "union shop" clause in collective bargaining agreement requiring payment of dues that would, in part, be used to support certain political and
ideological causes), vacated, 487 U.S. 1229 (1988); Kolinske v. Lubbers, 712 F.2d
471, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (refusing to extend UAW's obligation toward member
under duty of fair representation to UAW eligibility rules for strike benefits);
Bass v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 630 F.2d 1058, 1062-63 (5th Cir.
1980) (finding that union conduct affecting only individual relationships within
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mit members to sue freely, so long as they meet the demand and
adequate representation requirements. 232 Two reasons support
this view. First, local union officers may refrain from pursuing
viable claims against parent unions for political reasons. 2 33 Second, Title III of the LMRDA permits both local unions and members to challenge trusteeships, an approach that signifies a
relatively generous attitude toward the members' standing to
234
prosecute similar claims.
Cases such as Wooddell raise more difficult questions. In
Wooddell, the plaintiff alleged that Local 71 refused to refer him
for work on a non-discriminatory basis and that such refusal violated its obligation under the IBEW constitution to comply with
its collective agreements.2 3 5 Federal labor policy surely does not
permit individual members to bypass the complex rules that govern actions to enforce collective agreements by simply invoking a
provision in the union constitution that obliges the local to comply with its contracts. 23 6 Indeed, the constitutional provision itunion structure is not circumscribed by constraints of duty of fair representation). Where no statutory duty to bring suit exists, it seems anomalous to condition the union member's standing upon a showing that the local breached the
duty of fair representation in failing to sue the parent.
232. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (articulating demand and adequate representation requirements).
233. Suits to remedy the Teamsters' ongoing refusal to honor local ratification rights, for the most part, have not been brought in the name of the local
union. See Lewis, 826 F.2d 1310 (3d Cir. 1987) (suit brought by individual member); Trail v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 542 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1976)
(class action suit brought in name of 10,000 individual plaintiffs); Legutko v.
Local 816, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 606 F. Supp. 352 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (claim
raised by union members in personal capacities).
234. See LMRDA § 304(a), 29 U.S.C. § 464(a) (1988).
235. Wooddell also claimed that Local 71 violated a provision that obliged
the local to provide him with a fair trial on any disciplinary charges. Wooddell v.
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 112 S. Ct. 494, 497 (1991). It makes little
sense, however, to permit Wooddell to sue Local 71 directly for violation of the
fair-trial requirement without first giving the parent union an opportunity to
correct the error through internal procedures.
236. Courts carefully separate questions of standing from questions ofjurisdiction in determining whether to permit individual employees to enforce the
collective agreement against their employers. An individual employee may invoke the federal courts' § 301 jurisdiction in such cases, bringing suit to enforce
the collective agreement as a third-party beneficiary of the employer's promises
to the union. See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). To do so,
the individual employee must first exhaust any arbitral remedies in the collective
agreement. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965).
Next, the employee must convince the court to look behind the result of the
arbitral process by showing that the union breached its statutory duty of fair
representaiton. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967). Only if the employee establishes both a violation of the contract and a breach of the union's
duty of fair representation may the employee recover under § 301.
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self suggests that it was meant to be enforced, if at all, by the
parent union. 2 37 Even if Wooddell had unsuccessfully demanded
that the parent enforce the provision, federal courts might well
deny him standing to enforce it on the ground that the union constitution gives the parent union alone the power to decide
whether to insist that local unions comply with their collective
23 8
agreements.
It seems far superior to use flexible standing doctrines in orClaims such as that brought by Wooddell seek to enforce neither the employer's contractual obligations nor the union's duty of fair representation but
instead the union's contractual obligations under the collective agreement.
Such claims implicate federal law and may go forward only where the employee
points to specific language in the collective agreement that creates enforceable
rights in favor of the employee. See United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S.
362, 344 (1990) (declining to allow § 301 suit because collective agreement did
not contain rights directly enforceable by employee against union); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987) (holding that employee must show that collective agreement creates an enforceable duty of union
to provide safe workplace). The Supreme Court has thus made clear that most
union promises that appear in the collective agreement operate for the benefit of
the employer, not the employees, and may be enforced only at the employer's
instance. Wooddell's action, which sought to enforce the collective agreement
indirectly by alleging a breach of Local 7 I's constitutional obligation to comply,
thus presents a significant threat of interference with the contract enforcement
scheme that § 301 was enacted, and has been interpreted, to preserve.
237. The constitutional provision cited as the basis for jurisdiction in Wooddell appears to contemplate a role for the international union, and only the international union, in policing the local's obligation to comply with its agreements.
Although the provision obliges all local unions to "live up to all approved agreements unless broken or terminated by the other party or parties," it also provides that the parent union's president must determine that such a breach or
termination has occurred before the local union may treat the agreements as abrogated. Joint Appendix at 24, Wooddell, 112 S. Ct. 494 (1991) (No. 90-967).
For the full text of the provision, see supra note 152. Such a provision creates a
parental role in determining the extent of the local's obligation to comply with
its collective agreements and complements other provisions that bar locals from
entering into agreements or engaging in strike action without first obtaining parental consent.
The provision thus appears to contemplate an ultimate determination by
the parent union of the extent of the local's obligation to comply. While an
individual member may bring the local's non-compliance to the parent's attention, either by filing a formal complaint through the internal union adjudication
machinery, or by making informal contact with an officer of the parent, it is far
less clear that an individual should be permitted to insist on local union compliance by bringing an action for breach in federal court. Such an action would
substitute the judgment of the individual member (and the court) for that of the
parent union in determining whether the local's violation posed a threat sufficient to require remedial action. Simply put, the provision does not appear to
create any enforceable rights in favor of the individual member.
238. Federal courts generally subscribe to a policy of deference to structural allocations of decisionmaking authority in union constitutions. See, e.g.,
Parks v. International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 314 F.2d 886, 906-07 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963). Under such an approach, a finding that
the IBEW constitution commits decisions about the breach of collective agree-
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der to refrain from hearing Wooddell's claim on the merits rather
than to use avoidance tactics that manipulate jurisdictional lines.
Disagreements between parents and locals over compliance with
collective bargaining agreements frequently lead to divisive labor
disputes. Federal courts must therefore assert jurisdiction over
all such claims. Once the jurisdictional boundary has been clarified, all dispositions within the scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction become a part of the federal common law under section
301. Unlike a jurisdictional dismissal, the rejection of Wooddell's
claim on other grounds would preclude him from prosecuting the
same claim in state court. 23 9 Precluding reprosecution in state
court would prevent inconsistent decisions, thus vindicating the
federal interest in the uniform interpretation of union constitu240
tions in an area of acknowledged federal concern.
2.

Suits Against Individual Members and Officers

While the approach proposed in this Article would enable
federal courts to assert jurisdiction over most claims brought by
individuals against their parent and local unions for breach of national constitutions, it would dramatically restrict the federal role
in actions brought to enforce the constitutional obligations of
union members and officers. Such obligations-which typically
include the duty to refrain from violating the constitution, the
duty to pay dues on time, the duty to remain loyal to the union
and the duty to refrain from working behind picket lines 24 '-have
long been treated as enforceable contracts between the individual
and the union. 24 2 Suits for violation of such obligations do not,
ments to the judgment of the union's president should, in the absence of a showing that the president acted in bad faith, preclude further judicial review.
239. The suggestion that plaintiffs such as Wooddell lack standing to prosecute their constitutional claims against the local union rests on the federal labor
policy of deference to structural allocations of power in the union constitution.
For a discussion of this policy, see supra note 238. Such a policy-driven denial of
standing would obviously bind state courts as a matter of federal common law.
One should therefore distinguish the binding effect of denials of standing that
rest on labor policy from those denials of standing that rest on Article III limits
on the exercise of federal judicial power and normally do not bind state courts.
See William A. Fletcher, The "Case or Controversy" Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 263, 263-64 & n.l (1990).
240. For a discussion of the nature of the federal interest in the uniform
interpretation of union constitutions, see infra notes 257-58 and accompanying
text.
241. For a discussion of the obligations of union members and officers, see
supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
242. For further discussion of the contract theory, see supra notes 34-56
and accompanying text.
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however, implicate the relationship between unions and would
thus lie beyond the reach of section 301 as interpreted in this
Article.
In practice, the proposed interpretation blocks the federal
courts from hearing most claims that allege a violation of constitutional norms by individual defendants, except of course as a
matter of supplemental jurisdiction. 243 It would, for example,
preclude the federal courts from hearing a union's action to collect fines and assessments from its members. 2 44 It would also bar
the courts from hearing an action brought against union officers
for violation of their constitutional duty of loyalty, whether the
action was prosecuted by the union itself245 or by members of the
union. 24 6 Finally, it would require the dismissal, on jurisdictional
grounds, of Wooddell's claim for damages against the officers of
Local 71. All such claims rest on an alleged breach of an individual's contractual duties to the union.
By denying the federal courts jurisdiction over claims against
individual defendants, the proposed interpretation of section 301
precludes federal courts from hearing that class of claims for
which the LMRDA offers no federal standards. 24 7 Such a limitation makes sense for a variety of reasons. For example, it relieves
the federal courts of the task of policing the relatively minor disputes over the enforcement of union dues and assessments, which
pose the gravest threat to the federal docket.2 48 Furthermore, the
243. For a discussion of the prior treatment of claims brought by individuals alleging violations of union constitutions, see supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
244. But see National Ass'n of Basketball Referees v. Middleton, 688 F.
Supp. 131, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that federal jurisdiction exists when
local union sues members for collection of fines).
245. See Truck Drivers, Local 420 v. Traweek, 867 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1989)
(union counterclaim against expelled members); Local 443, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Pisano, 753 F. Supp. 434, 436 (D. Conn. 1991) (union sued former officer to recover improper payments made to him).
246. Shea v. McCarthy, 953 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992) (upholding jurisdiction
over action by union members to enforce constitutional obligations of union
officers).
247. For a discussion of the LMRDA's regulatory scheme, see supra notes
175-82 and accompanying text.
248. Actions brought by individuals to enforce constitutional norms almost
invariably present closely related federal claims under the LMRDA or other federal labor statutes. For a discussion of cases that combine union constitution
claims with other federal claims, see supra notes 94-117 and accompanying text.
Assertion of federal control over the contractual components of such claims thus
adds little to the federal docket that federal courts could not already hear under
the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction. Actions brought by unions against
members or officers, by contrast, ordinarily fail to assert other federal claims.
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proposed interpretation preserves state court control over internal union relations and thus accords a measure of respect to the
decision of the Eighty-Sixth Congress to save such state law from
249
preemption.
The interpretation of section 301 advocated here protects
the federal docket and preserves state court control without fostering the confusion over jurisdictional lines that other approaches engender. Partly to avoid hearing "internal squabbles"
over union relations, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Truck Drivers, Local 420 v. Traweek 250 held that the federal courts
lack jurisdiction over claims brought by a local union against individual union officers. 25 ' Although Traweek duplicates the result
proposed here, the analysis in Traweek may present problems in
the future. The court based its denial of jurisdiction on a provision of section 301(b) that immunizes individual union members
from liability for damages. 25 2 The Traweek court's transformation
See Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 400 v. Svacek, 431 F.2d 705 (9th Cir.
1970) (local sued member for violation of union constitution); Middleton, 688 F.
Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (suit by union against members for collection of
fines). The assertion of § 301 jurisdiction over such union-initiated claims
would shift them from state to federal court.
249. For a discussion of the LMRDA non-preemption and savings clauses,
see supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
250. 867 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1989). The district court entered final orders
directing former union officers to repay some $55,000 in reimbursed legal fees
that they caused the union to disburse to themselves without proper authorization under local union bylaws. Id. at 505. The Ninth Circuit reversed these
judgments. Id. at 508.
251. Id. at 505-07.
252. Id. at 507. Section 301(b) provides that a "money judgment against a
labor organization . . . shall be enforceable only against the organization as an
entity and . . . shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his
assets." LMRDA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1988). By its terms, this language
precludes judgment creditors of the union from reaching the assets of individual
members; it seemingly fails to address the liability of an individual for his or her
own breach of contract and thus appears to have little relevance in determining
the union member's liability for a violation of his or her obligations under the
union constitution.
In a line of cases beginning with Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S.
238, 249 (1962), however, the Supreme Court extended § 301 (b) to protect individual employees from damages claims arising from their own alleged breach
of the collective agreement. In Atkinson, the Court held that § 301(b) bars an
employer from suing individual union officers and members in contract and tort
for breach of the agreement's no-strike clause. Id. In Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 417 (1981), the Court held that this bar applied to
claims against those who engage in authorized strikes, as in Atkinson, as well as to
those who engage in wildcat strikes.
The Atkinson-Reis doctrine focuses on the employer's suit for damages under
§ 301(a) or § 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act [hereinafter LMRA].
See Complete Auto Transit, 451 U.S. at 414. The rationale of those cases does not
necessarily extend to the union's suit to enforce the union constitution. To be-
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of that immunity into a jurisdictional limit suggests, incorrectly in
my opinion, that union officers and members enjoy immunity
from equitable claims brought to remedy their own breaches of
duty to the union.

2 53

Rejection of the analysis in Traweek need not compel, however, the adoption of the expansive view of federal authority advocated by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Shea v.
McCarthy.2 54 The Shea court held that section 301(a) confers
power on the federal courts to hear claims brought by union
members against officers who allegedly violated duties owed to
the union. The court correctly read the provisions of section
301(b) as providing immunity from the award of damages, thus
rejecting the approach in Traweek. The Shea court nevertheless
upheld the power of the federal courts to entertain actions for
injunctive relief. While the court correctly concluded that injunctive relief may be issued against individuals under section 301,255
gin with, § 301 (b) sought to protect members from liability to employers. See id.
at 406-07 (collecting history). Congress was not concerned with the need to
relieve members of their financial obligations to their own unions.
Moreover, the policies that underlie the Court's refusal to permit damages
claims in Atkinson and Reis have little application to suits to enforce union constitutions. To be sure, unions may attempt to enforce their rules by suspending or
expelling their members. But the Supreme Court has refused to interpret federal labor policy to require unions to rely exclusively on these methods of selfhelp in disciplining their members. Rather, the Court has upheld the union's
right to bring a state court damages action to collect an otherwise proper fine
over the objection that such actions improperly coerce employees in the exercise
of their rights to refrain from union membership. Unlike employer damages
claims, therefore, actions to collect union fines from individuals do not violate
federal labor policy.
Actions such as that brought by the union in Traweek to compel union officials to disgorge union assets that they obtained in breach of their duty to the
union bear even less resemblance to the claims for damages that gave rise to the
Atkinson-Reis doctrine. Such restitutionary claims seek to recover assets that the
officials took improperly; they do not threaten individuals with the potentially
ruinous damages liability that Congress sought to preclude in § 301 (b).
253. Under the approach to § 301 proposed in this Article, actions brought
by unions to collect fines from members and to remedy fiduciary breaches by
officers must go forward in state courts. To the extent that state judges find
§ 301(b) helpful in working out their own theory of limited liability for union
members on such state-created claims, state judges should read Traweek as
adopting the jurisdictional theory proposed in this Article, not as a necessary
element of limited liability for union members and officers. The provisions of
§ 301 (b) that limit member liability to employers shed little light on the propriety of permitting the union to enforce equitably the constitutional obligations of
members and officers.
254. 953 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992).
255. As Shea points out, federal courts often assert jurisdiction over claims
against individual defendants for injunctive relief from violations of the union
constitution. Id. at 30. In the cases Shea cites, however, the courts would enjoy
equitable remedial authority to bind union officers, either by invoking supple-
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it improperly extended that injunctive authority beyond the parent-local relationship and threatened a new and broad-ranging in256
trusion into union affairs.
The prospect that either state or federal law may apply to the
terms of a union's constitution, depending on the nature of the
claim, suggests that the approach proposed here may result in a
certain lack of uniformity. This potential for disparity may particularly trouble labor practitioners, who have grown accustomed to
thinking of section 301(a) as a statute that Congress enacted to
supersede the conflicting approaches of state courts and to
achieve nationally uniform rules to govern the enforcement of the
2 57
collective bargaining agreement.
mental jurisdiction over the officer's state law duty to comply with the constitution or by treating the officer as a party with notice of the injunction who was
bound to refrain from causing the union to violate its terms. The asserted need
to preserve such remedial authority thus offers no justification for Shea's interpretation of § 301 to encompass the union's action to enforce its members' contractual duties.
256. The decision in Shea threatens to subject the great mass of union decisionmaking to the vagaries of federal judicial review. Not only does it squarely
uphold the power of federal courts to police the obligations of union officers, it
also suggests that its rationale would extend to actions brought against members
and that such an extension would serve the interests of "accountability, consistency, conformity and stability." Id. at 31. By thus approving of derivative
actions brought by members to enforce the union's contract with other individuals, the court greatly expanded the reach of federal power.
Surprising enough on its own terms, such an expansion of federal power
seems more startling when considered against the backdrop of the Second Circuit's restrictive approach to member suits under § 501 of the LMRDA. The
Second Circuit has consistently viewed § 501 as limited to derivative actions
against officers to recover money and property for the benefit of the union,
rather than as a roving grant of authority to remedy official misconduct. For a
discussion of the treatment of § 501 by the Second Circuit as well as other
courts, see supra note 179. The decision in Shea appears to accomplish under
§ 301 (a) of the LMRDA what the Second Circuit had long and properly resisted
under § 501 of the LMRDA.
The decision in Shea does not necessarily oblige the federal court on remand to provide the plaintiff with relief. The court might well build on the arguments made in connection with Wooddell, and view Shea as leaving open the
question whether Shea has personal standing to enforce the president's obligation to conduct the union's affairs to further "the best interests of the organization." For a summary of the relevant arguments made in Wooddell, see supra
notes 148-70 and accompanying text. Conceivably, the district court might conclude that the constitution provides the union president, in the absence of bad
faith, with essentially unreviewable discretion in the hiring and firing of union
officials. The breadth of the Shea opinion lies less in its assurance of the availability of a federal remedy than in its expansive view of federal jurisdiction.
257. The Senate Report on § 301 expresses dissatisfaction with conflicting
state approaches to the enforcement of labor contracts and a desire for a nationally uniform approach. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18 (1947),
reprintedin 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 33, at 421-24 (discussing problems
encountered in suing unions in state court). The Supreme Court relied on this
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For several reasons, however, the argument for uniform rules
carries less weight in the case of the union constitution. Consider, for example, the fact that the Eighty-Sixth Congress chose
to accept differences in law from one state to another when it enacted the LMRDA's supplemental standards to govern internal
union affairs, rather than enact comprehensive standards.2 5 8 Because the LMRDA played a decisive role in bringing about the
current application of section 301 to union constitutions, the
LMRDA's tolerance of non-uniformity expresses a legislative purpose more relevant than the Taft-Hartley Act's demand for uniformity in connection with collective bargaining.
In any case, the proposed approach would produce nationally uniform rules in the area in which they seem most desirablethe parent-local relationship. A parent union must monitor the
activities of local affiliates in all fifty states. 259 By making disputes
that arise from such relationships the subject of a uniform federal
law, the proposed approach offers the officials of parent unions
some assurance that the union constitution will have a uniform
260
meaning for each of their affiliated locals in the United States.
rationale in holding that Congress intended a uniform body of § 301(a) law to
prevail over "inconsistent local rules." Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962). Professor Malin argues that the need
to achieve such uniformity in interpretation of the collective agreement "appears to apply with equal force to union constitutions." MALIN, supra note 8, at
11.
258. For a discussion of the Eighty-Sixth Congress' decision to enact only
minimum or supplemental federal standards, see supra notes 182 & 199 and accompanying text.
259. Parent unions often solve the monitoring problem by creating regional or district offices that coordinate the affairs of locals in the region. See
WALLIHAN, supra note 2, at 132-34.
260. Union constitutions frequently grant the parent body extensive control over the local collective bargaining process. See ULMAN, STEEL WORKERS,
supra note 2, at 51-54 (Steelworkers designate parent as bargaining representative). Constitutions often confer such control by directly designating the parent
as the employees' representative. They also frequently designate the local as the
bargaining representative and include other constitutional provisions that authorize the parent to play a significant role in bargaining, such as provisions
allowing the parent to approve the local's bargain or its resort to the use of
economic force. Id. at 51-54.
Parent unions rely on such provisions to maintain control of firm-wide or
industry-wide negotiations that involve a host of geographically dispersed local
unions. See CHARLES R. PERRY & DELWYN H. KEGLEY, DISINTEGRATION AND
CHANGE: LABOR RELATIONS IN THE MEAT PACKING INDUSTRY 149-65 (1989)
(describing national negotiating process in meat packing industry); cf. Hansen v.
Guyette, 814 F.2d 547, 550 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding parent's imposition of
trusteeship where local broke away from parent-led negotiations and pursued an
independent bargaining strategy). For a description of the congressional rejection of proposals to restrict industry-wide collective bargaining, see supra note
68. The success of the union's overall bargaining strategy may thus depend on
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Disputes arising from the parent-local relationship, moreover,
most often trigger strikes, walkouts and other breaches of industrial peace.2 6 1 By authorizing the federal courts to hear parentlocal disputes, the proposed approach also gives such courts the
power to sort out the conflicting interests implicated in the class
of internal union disputes most likely to disrupt established bar26 2
gaining relationships.
Most claims that implicate the individual's relationship with
his or her union, by contrast, grow out of the local union's attempt to enforce fines and assessments imposed in the course of
internal discipline.2 63 The officials of such locals can readily consult state law 264 to determine whether courts will assist the local
in imposing discipline. Additionally, the form of punishment imposed may itself vary from local to local, particularly in unions
that do not insist on uniform local union constitutions. 26 5 Moreover, disputes over individual claims rarely occasion the kind of
breach of industrial peace in which the federal courts have ex2 66
pressed an interest.
Finally, the law of internal union affairs can probably tolerate
some variation from one state to another in order to preserve
its receiving a nationally uniform reading of the provisions it uses to control
local affiliates.
261. Parent-local disagreements over collective bargaining strategy often
produce disagreements over the use of economic force. See generally Hansen, 814
F.2d at 550; Benda v. Grand Lodge of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 584 F.2d 308,
311-12 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 937 (1979); National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1971); Parks v. International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963).
262. To the extent that § 301(a) recognizes a federal interest in stable collective bargaining relationships, the proposed approach thus confers jurisdiction
on the federal courts sufficient to vindicate the interest. See Groves v. Ring
Screw Works, Ferndale Fastener Div., 111 S. Ct. 498, 502-03 (1990) (discussing
federal interest in collective bargaining).
263. For a defense of the fairness of most union discipline, recognizing its
local origin, see TAFr, supra note 44, at 117-37, 243-44 (1954) (discussing union
systems of discipline and appeals). See also HOROWITZ, supra note 2, at 191-92
(discussing Carpenters' president's careful review of appeals from local discipline proceedings).
264. The jurisdiction of local unions in some metropolitan areas extends
across state lines but many locals enjoy only intra-state jurisdiction. In the
building trades, union constitutions often allocate jurisdiction by county.
Choice of law problems, therefore, would not appear to present an insurmountable obstacle to identifying a controlling body of law.
265. See WALLIHAN, supra note 2, at 236 (discussing fact that unions do not
invariably insist on identical local union constitutions).
266. Indeed, early applications of the "significant impact" test were
designed to keep such claims out of the federal courts. See Hotel & Restaurant
Employees Local 400 v. Svacek, 431 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1970).
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state court control over the union's action to enforce individual
obligations in the union constitution. State courts can draw on a
variety of sources in working out the elements of such claims including, perhaps, the protections they have developed for individual employees. The LMRDA's non-preemption provisions,
moreover, make it quite clear that state courts should retain control over at least some aspects of the internal relations of labor
unions.2 6 7 The proposed approach respects that congressional
judgment, at least for internal union disputes that fail to implicate
the parent-local relationship.
Nor does the proposed approach make the body of applicable law depend on the identity of the claimant. Consider a hypothetical dispute arising from an attempt by Local 71 to collect a
fine from Wooddell to punish him for working behind a sanctioned picket line. 268 State law would govern the provisions in
the IBEW constitution that impose obligations on members to
honor picket lines and would control the question whether the
fine was an appropriate method of discipline. 26 9 Federal standards in the LMRDA would control the question whether Local
71 observed its constitutional obligation to provide Wooddell
with fair trial procedures. 2 70 Wooddell could assert his federal
claims either as defenses to a state court action by the union to
267. For a discussion of the LMRDA non-preemption provisions, see supra
notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
268. The IBEW constitution, which was made a part of the joint appendix
in the Wooddell case, prohibits members from working with any employer declared to be in "difficulty" with the union. Joint Appendix at 7-11, Wooddell, 112
S. Ct. 494 (No. 90-967). It also permits the union to impose fines, suspensions
and expulsions as penalties for the violation of union rules. Id. The IBEW constitution thus appears to supply adequate textual basis for an action in state
court to recover a duly imposed fine.
269. The union's action to collect the fine would be subject, of course, to a
host of potential defenses recognized by state and federal law. Some states, for
example, have refused to enforce union fines in the absence of constitutional
provisions that specifically authorize such enforcement. See, e.g., United Glass
Workers Local 188 v. Seitz, 399 P.2d 74 (Wash. 1965); cf. Local 165, Int'l Bhd.
of Elec. Workers v. Bradley, 499 N.E.2d 577 (I1. App. Ct. 1986) (allowing suit
where constitution authorized judicial enforcement of fines). Even where states
agree to enforce fines, federal labor law bars the union from imposing the fine in
circumstances that violate the protections accorded both individual employees
in the Labor Act, and individual union members in the LMRDA. For a discussion of the ban on imposing fines when employees' or union members' protections would be violated, see supra notes 67 & 175-77 and accompanying text.
270. As noted earlier, the requirement of "fair trials" in the IBEW constitution appears to impose duties on Local 71 of the sort that would support the
assertion of jurisdiction over an action for breach under § 301. Questions of
standing and exhaustion, however, would remain. For a discussion of Wooddell,
see supra notes 148-70 and accompanying text.
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collect the fine or as claims affirmatively asserted against the
27
union in federal court to block the imposition of discipline. '
3.

Other Open Questions

The preceding discussion answers most of the questions that
have divided the lower courts. Under the proposed approach,
section 301 embraces only those provisions in the national union
constitution that regulate the parent-local relationship. Actions
to enforce local union constitutions or bylaws would lie beyond
the reach of federal power.2 72 This approach preserves state
court control over the interpretation of locally variable provisions
of union laws. It nevertheless permits federal courts to hear disputes over claims that the local's constitution fails to comply with
the requirements of the national constitution-the only disputes
that plausibly demand uniform federal rules of construction.2 7 3
Refusal to assert jurisdiction over actions arising from local
union constitutions and bylaws would avoid federal involvement
271. In an action such as the one brought by Wooddell, the federal court
would enjoy supplemental jurisdiction over the union's counterclaim to enforce
the fine in accordance with state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. 1990) (failing
to set forth exception from broad rule of supplemental jurisdiction for compulsory counterclaims).
272. Local union constitutions regulate the relationships between the local's members and the local itself, define the authority of the local's officers, and
set forth rules to govern union meetings, officer elections and the like. For a
discussion of the nature of local union constitutions, see supra notes 47-48 and
accompanying text. Such provisions create enforceable contracts but do not appear to establish contracts between unions within the meaning of § 301. See Alford v. National Post Office Mail Handlers, 576 F. Supp. 278 (E.D. Mo. 1983)
(finding that local union constitution standing alone did not satisfy jurisdictional
prerequisite of contract between labor unions); cf. Wooddell, 112 S. Ct. at 498
(describing plaintiff's claim under local's bylaws but refraining from basing jurisdiction on alleged breach of such obligations).
Professor Malin has nonetheless argued that courts should construe § 301
as reaching the local union constitution to "avoid the anomaly of having state
law govern local constitutions while federal law governs the international constitution to which it is subordinate." MALIN, supra note 8, at 12. Contrary to Professor Malin's argument, an interpretation of § 301 that leaves local matters to
local courts does not appear anomalous, particularly where it insures that federal courts may hear all claims that implicate the national constitution.
Many union constitutions require local unions either to adopt a model local
union constitution or to submit all local bylaws and amendments for national
approval or both. See id. Such provisions obviously seek to impose uniform limits on the conduct of local union affairs; because they implicate the parent-local
contract, claims for violation of such limits come within the scope of § 301 as
interpreted here. Where the union itself fails to assert an interest in uniformity
by imposing limits in the national constitution, it is difficult to see why § 301
should control disputes over local union bylaws.
273. For a discussion of the desire for uniformity in the interpretation of
collective bargaining agreements, see supra note 257 and accompanying text.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992

85

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37: p. 443

in a host of minor disputes without blurring jurisdictional lines.
In Gable v. Local Union No. 387, InternationalAss'n of Bridge Workers, 2 74 the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia employed the "significant impact" test to avoid hearing a local union
official's action for three weeks of accumulated vacation pay. 27 5
Rather than relying on the discredited "significant impact"
test, 2 76 the court should have refused to assert jurisdiction on the
ground that the complaint charged a violation of the local union's
constitution and bylaws-documents that do not regulate inter2 77
union relations.
The proposed approach to section 301 not only supplies a
basis for jurisdictional dismissal that avoids continued reliance on
the "significant impact" test, but also leaves state courts largely in
control of the employment relations between the union and its
officers and employees. Union officials certainly enjoy rights as
members under the LMRDA, 27 8 just as union employees enjoy
274. 695 F. Supp. 1174 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
275. Id. at 1177-78. For other cases that rely on the "significant impact"
test, despite its rejection in Local 334, see Brown v. American Arbitration Ass'n,
717 F. Supp. 195, 198-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing pre-Local 334 "significant impact" authority to reject jurisdiction over intra-union dispute with no relationship to collective bargaining); Finnie v. District No. 1, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial
Ass'n, 538 F. Supp. 455, 460 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (permitting individual union
members to sue but only where dispute significantly affects labor-management
relations-an approach apparently rejected in Kinney v. International Bhd. Elec.
Workers, 669 F.2d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 1982)).
276. For authoritative rejections of the test, see Lewis v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, 826 F.2d 1310, 1313 (3d Cir. 1987); Kinney v. International Bhd.
of Elec. Workers, 669 F.2d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 1982); Doby v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 523 F. Supp. 1162, 1166 (E.D. Va. 1981). See also MALIN, supra note 8, at 11.
The test suffers from the distinct disadvantage of making jurisdiction, and choice
of applicable law, turn on the judge's own assessment of the likely seriousness of
the particular dispute. For a critique of the test, see supra notes 116-19 and
accompanying text.
277. Again, the court failed to set forth the precise provisions of the union
constitution on which it rested its jurisdictional analysis. See Gable, 695 F. Supp.
at 1176-77. It appears from the text of the opinion, however, that the right to
vacation pay which the union official sought to vindicate was set forth in local
bylaws. Id. at 1174-75.
The jurisdictional analysis might well change, though, if the national constitution included a provision that required Local 387 to comply with its local bylaws. In such a case, the plaintiff in Gable could plausibly allege a violation of a
contract between unions by claiming that the violation of local bylaws also constituted a breach of the national constitution. Unions could, of course, draft the
constitution to avoid such a federalization of local employment relations either
by qualifying the local's obligation to comply with its own bylaws, or by handling
employment matters in separate contracts with individual officers rather than in
the union's organizational documents.
278. For a discussion of the rights of union officers under the LMRDA, see
supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text. State courts have generally rejected
the argument that Title IV of the LMRDA preempts their power to fashion rem-
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rights under the National Labor Relations Act. 2 79 The existence

of these federal regulatory schemes does not provide an adequate
reason for transferring routine litigation over individual employee rights in the union context from state to federal court
under section 301.
The approach proposed here prevents the shift to federal
court by treating the extra-constitutional contracts of labor unions, such as local bylaws and employment contracts with individual officers and employees, as matters within the states' general
contract jurisdiction. Except where a union officer such as Kinney
bases his challenge to removal from office on the provisions of a
national constitution,2 80 therefore, state law would continue to
control the claim. Garden variety claims for unjust dismissalthose that do not rest on a theory of retaliation under the
28 1
LMRDA-would thus remain the province of state courts.
In sum, the division between state and federal power advocated here produces uniform federal interpretation of constitutional provisions that regulate interstate relations between the
constituent bodies of the union, but leaves the more localized relationship between the union and the individual to state law. By
preserving state court control over the class of claims that the federal courts have historically sought to avoid, the proposed approach achieves a measure of uniformity and clarity. It thus
seems preferable to a broad interpretation that could require the
edies for former officers and employees of labor unions who wish to challenge
their removal from office. See, e.g., Hodcarriers Local Union No. 89 v. Miller, 52
Cal. Rptr. 251 (Ct. App. 1966) (finding that federal law did not preempt state
court from hearing breach of contract action by local union members); Buffalow
v. Bull, 619 S.W.2d 913 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that Title IV does not
preempt state court action); Hannifin v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 511 P.2d 982
(Mont. 1973) (asserting jurisdiction over action by former officer of local union
for wrongful dismissal). A review of the relevant provisions fully justifies their
conclusion. While LMRDA § 401(h)-(i) authorizes the Secretary of Labor to
conduct a secret ballot vote to recall a union officer, and the non-preemption
provision for Title IV makes federal remedies for challenging elections exclusive, the LMRDA does not make the Secretary's "removal" authority exclusive of
other state regulation. See LMRDA § 401(h)-(i), 29 U.S.C. § 481(h)-(i) (1988)
(authorizing secret recall vote); id. § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 483 (governing exclusivity
of federal election remedies and removal authority). Indeed, the Secretary's
power seeks to protect members from a lack of recall provisions, whereas the
state courts have fashioned remedies to protect the officers themselves.
279. Union employees enjoy the same rights as other employees in the private sector to organize and bargain for mutual aid and protection. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1988).
280. For a discussion of individual member suits alleging violations of a
national union constitution, see supra notes 220-40 and accompanying text.
281. For a summary of such claims, see HOWARD A. SPECTER & MATTHEW
W. FINKIN, INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION 288-501 (1989).
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federal courts to hear all constitutional disputes and thus invite
them to adopt strained avoidance techniques. The proposed approach also restricts the scope of federal power within the limits
of legitimacy defined by the LMRDA.
V.

CONCLUSION

When the late Judge Henry Friendly first encountered the between-labor-organizations clause of section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, he expressed the view that the provision did not justify
the assertion of jurisdiction over an unwritten, intra-union custom that was said to have broadened the scope of a local union's
28 2
jurisdiction beyond that set forth in the union constitution.
Judge Friendly explained that "[t]he box that Congress opened
[by enacting the between-labor-organizations clause] need not
become Pandora's unless the courts make it so."283 When Judge
Friendly next considered the Taft-Hartley Act's between-labororganizations clause, he held that it authorized federal district
courts to entertain a parent union's application for an order enforcing its local union's constitutional obligation to comply with a
28 4
lawful trusteeship.
Though Judge Friendly did not say so, his differing approach
to the two cases encapsulates much of the federal experience with
the application of section 301 to union constitutions. His cautionary invocation of Pandora's box provides an apt metaphor for
the confusing overlap of state and federal law that may result
from section 301's indiscriminate application to the various relationships in the union constitution. His subsequent opinion recognizes that Title III of the LMRDA asserts a sufficiently clear
federal interest to justify the federal courts in policing the constitutional relationships between parent and local.
This Article articulates what Judge Friendly and the majority
opinions in Local 334 and Wooddell left unsaid. The task of articulation begins with the recognition that the LMRDA, and not sec282. See Local 33, Int'l Hod Carriers v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council, 291
F.2d 496, 506 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly,J., concurring) ("[T]he truism that courts
will sometimes enforce an intra-union custom or constitution is scarcely a sure
sign that this was what Congress had in mind when it enacted section 301(a)
. . . .").

283. Id. at 507 (Friendly, J., concurring).
284. See National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d 915 (2d
Cir. 1971). Chief Judge Friendly stated: "Iflocals were permitted to refuse to
accept trusteeships and the federal courts have no jurisdiction to assist parent
unions, the trusteeship scheme established by Congress would be effectively
thwarted." Id. at 919.
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tion 301, supplies the impetus for the assertion of federal power
over the union constitution. Early decisions of the lower federal
courts acknowledged the decisive role of the LMRDA, explaining
that their interpretation of section 301 was adopted less to effectuate the design of the Taft-Hartley Act than to fill out the remedial scheme of the LMRDA. While the Supreme Court in Local
334 failed to offer so candid an explanation of its opinion, the
LMRDA undoubtedly drove its analysis as well.
Having established that the LMRDA explains it as a practical
matter, this Article next considered whether the LMRDA also justifies the Court-approved federal role in the enforcement of the
union constitution. Although Title III of the LMRDA does not
expressly authorize federal courts to enforce the union constitution, its articulation of standards to guide the federal courts in
resolving disputes that arise from the parent-local relationship
provides an adequate justification for a federal role in policing
parent-local relations. The failure of the LMRDA to set forth similarly detailed federal standards to govern the constitutional relationships between the union and its members and officers,
moreover, suggests that federal courts should leave such relationships in the hands of state courts.
This Article thus proposes to define the second clause of section 301 (a) as if its reference to contracts between labor organizations applies not to every term and condition in the union
constitution but only to provisions that regulate the relations between affiliated parent and local bodies. The Court's carefully
circumscribed decision in Wooddell not only permits such an interpretation, it also contains a measure of support for confining federal power to the enforcement of inter-union contracts. The
proposed approach supplies answers to the many vexing jurisdictional questions that will occupy the lower courts in the wake of
Wooddell without requiring the major shift of litigation from state
to federal courts contemplated by the decision in Shea. It does so,
moreover, without opening the box to which Judge Friendly
referred.
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